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And The Oscar Goes To?

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John Loyd of Reuters opines, Greece blinked in loan battle, Putin’s gaze remains steely:
The European Union is now a thing of shreds and patches.

Its policies and projects are being shredded, and it seeks, not to find solutions to the crises consuming it, but to patch them up, and hope.

The patch which was the Minsk agreement of last week is now flapping in the wind. The fighting never stopped: the separatists and their Russian allies simply continued to roll back a demoralized Ukrainian army from Debaltseve, the town they had surrounded before the agreement and took after it. On Friday, the Kyiv Post was reporting that separatist and Russian military units were moving down toward the port city of Mariupol, which sits across the direct land route from Russia into its new appendage of Crimea. If that’s taken, then the Donbas area and Crimea can be fused together into a new Russian state, shredding Ukraine further.

The Russians have become much bolder about their involvement, scarcely bothering to disguise their contempt. Vitaly Churkin, the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, slapped down Ukrainian President Poroshenko’s suggestion that international peacekeepers be brought in to police the ceasefire, saying it “raises suspicion that he wants to destroy the Minsk accords.” Of course, Churkin’s government has already destroyed them. The Moscow daily Kommersant interviewed a group of young Russian soldiers, part of a detachment near Debaltseve: the report said, “The young soldiers’ role in military operations was to perform combat missions on behalf of either the self-proclaimed republics, or ‘separate regions of Donetsk and Lugansk region’ (as is written in the Minsk agreement). They know how to fight.”

When Debaltseve was taken, Russian President Vladimir Putin joked, “It’s always tough to lose.”

The disarray within Europe on Ukraine does not get better. A report from the British House of Lords was harsh on the UK, and Europe in general, for “sleepwalking” into an attempted agreement with Ukraine which would have seen it enfolded into Europe, out of the Russian sphere, without thinking through the likely Russian reaction.

This is probably right: yet even if no one in high authority grasped how momentous were the stakes, the EU — and the West as a whole — has no choice but to confront Russia now. It hasn’t, though: the patches are still being applied. Russia advances, European ministers fret about attacks on the tiny Baltic states, all three both NATO and EU members. No one knows the limits to Putin’s ambitions, though the best-informed commentators believe them to be large. For the moment, in any case, he is in the saddle.

The second crisis — the crisis within — that of Greece, on Friday evening inched toward the application of another patch. Faced with finance ministers of the euro zone who had, in many cases, swallowed great draughts of austerity and struggled to meet the conditions for loans and bailouts, Greece had backed down substantially.

The statement from their meeting was framed to be upbeat and optimistic: but had two large necessities embedded in it. One was what Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Dutch finance minister and chairman of the euro zone ministers group called the “recovery of trust” — actually, the creation of a trust that was never there — between the Greek government and the other European states. The other was a tight ultimatum: that Greece produce, by Monday, a credible and substantial list of reforms it is prepared to undertake — which, if approved, will mean that the current financing program will be extended by four months (the Greeks had asked for six).

Is this a better quality of patch? Here’s why it might not stick through the weekend.

The Greek government had mounted a spirited but adolescent defiance of the EU, of the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank — the “troika” — which had tied the loans reforms. It promised its electorate (among much else) to raise wages and re-employ thousands of public-service workers.

In his speech last week to the Greek parliament, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras said, “the bailout failed. We want to make clear in every direction that we are not negotiating. We are not negotiating our national sovereignty.” And, to rub a little more salt into the flesh of a Germany that the new government never fails to remind of its Nazi past, the prime minister promised he would seek World War Two reparations.

The Greeks have made much of the fact that they have a democratic mandate to get what they want from Europe.

One of the first questions to the Dutch finance minister, after he had presented the agreement to the press, echoed that mandate point “Have you not trashed Greek democracy?” the reporter, who was not Greek, asked.

Dijsselbloem, a suave operator, patiently explained that Greece was part of a community of governments, each with a different mandate, each with a stake in the euro and in ending the crisis — and thus the mandate of one could not override the judgments of all the rest.

It was a precious point. Greece’s new government was never in any shape to make the demands it did. Now, if its U-turn is genuine, it has the chance to do what should have been its first posture: to draw the EU partners into a cooperative effort to tackle not just the debt, but the underlying issues of corruption and public sector reform, changes which must be made over an extended period if the state is to get real and sustainable growth in the future. With such an effort, it could find — Christine Lagarde, head of the IMF stressed it at the press conference — flexibility and understanding. Instead, it has wasted a month in posturing.

And therein lies the largest reason why this all may fail. Syriza, deliberately and cynically, raised high the hopes of a population badly battered by austerity, unemployment and public service cuts — and now must return to that electorate to say that the promises mean very little. How far it will be able to keep the trust of its supporters and of the population as a whole while striving to win that of its European partners is the central question of the next days, in which it must commit itself to continuing, hard reform. The patch has been prepared. But it may not stick.
Indeed, as George Georgiopoulos of Reuters explains, as Greece readies for reforms, there is bitter infighting among prominent members of the ruling Syriza party:
Greece's government prepared reform measures on Sunday to secure a financial lifeline from the euro zone, but was attacked for selling "illusions" to voters after failing to keep a promise to extract the country from its international bailout.

Leftist Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has insisted Greece achieved a negotiating success when euro zone finance ministers agreed to extend the bailout deal for four months, provided it came up with a list of reforms by Monday.

Greeks reacted with relief that Friday's deal averted a banking crisis which fellow euro zone member Ireland said could have erupted in the coming week. This means Tsipras has stood by one promise at least: to keep the country in the euro zone.

Tsipras maintains he has the nation behind him despite staging a climbdown in Brussels. Under the deal, Greece will still live under the EU/IMF bailout which he had pledged to scrap, and must negotiate a new program by the early summer.

"I want to say a heartfelt thanks to the majority of Greeks who stood by the Greek government ... That was our most powerful negotiating weapon," he said on Saturday. "Greece achieved an important negotiating success in Europe.".

Top Marxist members of Tsipras's Syriza party, a broad coalition of the left, have so far been silent on the painful compromises made to win agreement from the Eurogroup.

But veteran leftist Manolis Glezos attacked the failure to fulfill campaign promises. "I apologize to the Greek people because I took part in this illusion," he wrote in a blog. "Syriza's friends and supporters ... should decide if they accept this situation."

Glezos, a Syriza member of the European Parliament, is not a party heavyweight. But he commands moral authority: as a young man under the World War Two occupation, he scaled the Acropolis to rip down a Nazi flag under the noses of German guards and hoist the Greek flag, making him a national hero.

A government official said Glezos "may not be well informed on the tough and laborious negotiation which is continuing".

Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis said the reform promises would be ready on Sunday and submitted to Greece's EU and IMF partners in good time. "We are very confident that the list is going to be approved by the institutions and therefore we are embarking upon a new phase of stabilization and growth," he told reporters late on Saturday.

A government official said the reforms would include a crackdown on tax evasion and corruption.

The Brussels deal opens the possibility of lowering a target for the Greek primary budget surplus, which excludes debt repayments, freeing up some funds to help ease the effects of 25 percent unemployment and pension cuts. It also avoids some language which has inflamed many Greeks, angered by four years of austerity demanded by foreign creditors.

TROIKA NO MORE?

In the deal the hated "troika" of inspectors from the European Commission, European Central Bank and IMF, which monitors compliance with Greek bailout undertakings, is referred to as "the three institutions".

Tsipras declared Greece was "leaving austerity, the bailouts and the troika behind". Nevertheless, government plans must still be approved by the re-named troika, although Tsipras won election last month on a pledge to end the humiliation of foreigners dictating Greek economic policy.

The opposition pounced on the climbdown from promises that have raised huge expectations among Greeks. "No propaganda mechanism or pirouette can hide the simple fact that they lied to citizens and sold illusions," said Evangelos Venizelos, leader of the socialist PASOK party.

Venizelos was deputy prime minister in the last conservative-led coalition which succeeded in raising funds from financial markets with two bond issues last year. With the economy showing signs of growth after a depression which wiped a quarter off GDP, it had prepared to exit the bailout program but lost power to Syriza on Jan. 25.

Friday's agreement merely buys time for Greece to seek a long-term deal with the Eurogroup. Euro zone members Ireland and Portugal have already exited their bailouts, but Greece faces yet another program - on top of bailouts in 2010 and 2011 totaling 240 billion euros - when the extension expires.

"Once you get them into the safe space for the next four months, there'll be another set of discussions which will effectively involve the negotiation of a third program for Greece," Irish Finance Minister Michael Noonan said on Saturday.

Tsipras did much of the negotiating for the deal rather than Greece's Eurogroup representative, Varoufakis. But sources close to the government said this reflected Tsipras's need to win backing from Syriza's left wing and his right-wing coalition partner, the Independent Greeks party.

Their support will be crucial in maintaining government unity during negotiations for the long-term agreement.

Likewise Tsipras needs to keep public support. Costas Panagopoulos, who heads the Alco polling firm, said the initial reaction was relief that Greece would stay in the euro. Greeks might even accept Tsipras's change in language and assertions that the troika is no more. "It may sound odd but this could turn into political gains," he told Reuters.
I strongly doubt this could turn into political gains. Tsipras and Varoufakis were rebuffed by the Eurogroup and Germany's finance minister,Wolfgang Schäuble, took them to school. He basically called their bluff and told Varoufakis flat out: "Fine, you want democracy, go back to the drachma but don't expect us to keep lending you money so you can keep buying votes by expanding the Greek public sector" (I'm paraphrasing but that's how it went down).

John Cassidy of The New Yorker explains how Greece got outmaneuvered:
To the surprise of nobody except a few alarmists, the finance ministers of the European Union reached a deal with Greece on Friday, extending the country’s existing bailout until the early summer. Greece’s new left-wing Syriza government had been telling everyone for weeks that it wouldn’t agree to extend the bailout, and that it wanted a new loan agreement that freed its hands, which marks the deal as a capitulation by Syriza and a victory for Germany and the rest of the E.U. establishment.

Strictly speaking, though, the game isn’t over. The deal reached in Brussels is just an interim agreement, which will keep Greece solvent and its banks afloat while a broader agreement is negotiated on the country’s huge debts. Yanis Varoufakis, the Greek finance minister, has put forward some interesting ideas about how to proceed—for example, issuing new types of bonds to replace the old ones—but whatever bargaining leverage he had appears to have been undermined.

In the past few days, according to reports from Athens, ordinary Greeks have been withdrawing cash from the nation’s banks at a rate of about five hundred million euros a day. With the E.U. bailout program due to expire in a week, the Syriza government was facing the prospect of a wholesale financial collapse if the European Central Bank didn’t agree to supply the Greek banking system with more money. But the E.C.B. was telling Greece that it needed to agree to the terms laid down by Brussels and Berlin. Ultimately, this prompted Varoufakis and his boss, Alexis Tsipras, the Greek Prime Minister, to back down and agree to an extension of the bailout.

Going forward, Syriza’s policies will continue to be supervised by the hated “troika” (the European Central Bank, the European Union, and the International Monetary Fund), which many Greeks hold responsible for the dire state of their country. Moreover, the Greek government has agreed to push ahead with a series of new structural reforms, some of which it will have to detail this weekend. If the troika isn’t satisfied with what Greece offers, it could still withhold some of the money that the country needs.

In addition to all of this, Varoufakis appears to have promised not to dismantle some of the troika-imposed measures that he and Tsipras had campaigned against in the run-up to the election, such as privatizing publicly owned enterprises. The text of the new agreement says: “The Greek authorities commit to refrain from any rollback of measures and unilateral changes to the policies and structural reforms that would negatively impact fiscal targets, economic recovery or financial stability, as assessed by the institutions.”

In exchange for these U-turns, the Greek government did gain some concessions, including a relaxation of the fiscal targets that it has to meet. Under the terms of the bailout agreed to in 2012, Greece was supposed to generate a primary surplus of 4.5 per cent of G.D.P. (The primary surplus refers to tax revenues minus spending, not including interest payments on the national debt.) The official statement about the new agreement didn’t specify a target for this year. “Greek authorities have also committed to ensure the appropriate primary fiscal surpluses … in line with the November 2012 Eurogroup statement,” it read, but added, “The institutions will, for the 2015 primary surplus target, take the economic circumstances in 2015 into account.”

That suggests some flexibility. Varoufakis has been saying his government will aim to produce a surplus of 1.5 per cent of G.D.P. Since tax revenues have collapsed over the past couple of months, this is still an ambitious target, and it seems to rule out any large-scale embrace of Keynesian stimulus policies. But any relaxation of the existing austerity policies would be welcome to Greeks—and, after the agreement was reached, that is what Greek officials were saying they’d achieved. “Greece today has turned a page,” one official told Reuters. “We have avoided recessionary measures.”

That’s not just spin. Syriza did get something significant out of the agreement, but nothing like what it was hoping for when it took power, on January 25th. Then, there was talk of liberating not just Greece but the entire continent from the grip of austerity policies. After Friday’s deal was announced, some Greek journalists warned that Varoufakis and Tsipras would have a tough time selling the deal to the party’s radical elements, which have been out on the streets protesting the perfidy of Germany, Brussels, and the E.C.B.

In retrospect, it is clear that Tsipras and Varoufakis overplayed their hand. Their early bluster riled up the Germans and alienated other players that they needed to win over, such as the E.C.B. and the European Commission. Since Varoufakis is an academic game theorist, this is a bit surprising, but perhaps not entirely so. Having been swept into office practically out of nowhere, Syriza’s leaders were understandably giddy, and understandably eager to meet the demands of the popular protest movement that was responsible for their rise.

Tsipras and Varoufakis had economic logic on their side, too. Austerity policies have proved disastrous for the country at large. Greece’s gross domestic product has fallen by about a quarter since 2009, and the unemployment rate stands at nearly twenty-five per cent. Austerity hasn’t even succeeded in reducing the country’s debt burden. Because G.D.P. has fallen so far, its debt-to-G.D.P. ratio has continued to rise, and now stands at about a hundred and seventy-five per cent.

In some other parts of Europe, there is considerable sympathy for the Greeks’ plight, and for their argument that austerity has proved counterproductive. But the fact is that Tsipras and Varoufakis didn’t have much leverage, and they should have recognized that earlier. From the start, there was only one threat they could have made that would have put a fright into Germany and other core countries: that Greece, if it didn’t get the deal it wanted, would default on its debts, leave the euro zone, and go back to printing its own currency. But a majority of the Greek people, despite all they’ve been through, want to keep the euro, and, throughout the election campaign, Syriza said that it had no intention of leaving the currency zone. From an economic perspective, this was arguably a self-destructive policy—the Greek economy is in such bad shape that it might have done better to follow the example of Argentina, which, in 2002, defaulted on its debts and said to heck with the I.M.F.—but promising to keep the euro was one of the prices that Syriza paid for being taken seriously as a political force.

Once Wolfgang Schäuble, the flinty German finance minister, realized that Varoufakis couldn’t play the Grexit card, he knew that he had him where he wanted him. The German government point-blank refused even to consider a Greek request for an end to the bailout and a new bridging loan, and it quietly encouraged the E.C.B. to issue a series of warnings to the Greeks. And then, a couple of days ago, after Varoufakis had reversed course and asked for an extension of the current bailout, Schäuble rejected that request, too, forcing the Greeks to make even more concessions.

Even after the deal was done, Schäuble seemingly couldn’t resist taking a jab at Varoufakis and his colleagues. According to the Guardian’s invaluable live blog, he remarked: “The Greeks certainly will have a difficult time to explain the deal to their voters.” Varoufakis, in his comments, was more reserved. “This is not a moment for jubilation,” he said. “This agreement is a small step in the right direction.”
The Economist also had a lengthy article, Outgamed, explaining why Greece had to step back and accept Schäuble's terms.

But not everyone is convinced that Germany and Schäuble came out victorious. In his article for Truthdig, Scourge of the Greeks: German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble, Alexander Reed Kelly writes:
Veteran German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble “indulged himself with some patronizing comments” after triumphing over the Greek government in debt negotiations last week, observed economics correspondent Phillip Inman at The Guardian.

Schauble said of his Greek opponents in the Syriza party, led by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, “Being in government is a date with reality, and reality is often not as nice as a dream.” His smugness recalls the arrogance of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who famously claimed in the 1980s that “there is no alternative” to neoliberal economic reforms.

Copious empirical research shows that the austerity Schauble and his peers have inflicted on Europe over the past half-decade destroys economies rather than preserves them. His arrogance is therefore that of the powerful, not the informed. He is hypocritical too, given that the willingness of the Allied nations to forgive Germany’s debts after World War II enabled the prosperity that its citizens—Schauble included—enjoy today.

Disturbingly for those who acknowledge these facts, according to statements and findings collected by the analytical political-economy site Open Europe, much of the German public and leading members of the press share Schauble’s self-serving near-sightedness:
A new Emnid poll for N24 finds that 52% of Germans think that the demands made by Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis are “outrageous,” 41% say they are “naive,” 25% say they are “strategically skillful,” while 13% said they “secretly admire” Tsipras and Varoufakis.”
German tabloid Bild responded to the conclusion of the negotiations with the headline, “Finally someone says ‘no’ to the bankrupt Greeks. Germany says: Thank you Wolfgang Schauble!” It then printed in its pages:
“Billions in gifts to the Greek people - and we should pay for it! Schauble is not doing this any longer!”
Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, foreign policy editor for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, wrote:
It is time that the Tsipras government grasps reality, and recognizes who is the creditor and who is the debtor - it must understand how great the resentment is in many European countries over the “Greece” issue. Many citizens are sick of it; this is also nourishing annoyance at Europe.

Apparently the Greek government thinks that it could hold its partners for fools. At times, it has abused the Brussels stage for theatrical performances, sometimes there are signs of program change, and then it starts all over again. This is not serious.
As one Truthdig reader commented privately to this blogger, “If this piece from Open Europe accurately describes the majority view of the press, including some of the leftist press, then we see some more of the fright felt by Syriza’s leaders.”

Read more of the comments here.
In his comment in Counterpunch, Ironman Varoufakis’s Revolutionary Plan for Europe, Mike Whitney praises Varoufakis's strategy as pure genius "mainly because it knocked the EU finance ministers off balance and threw the process into turmoil." Whitney notes the following:
If you look at the way that Varoufakis has handled the Eurogroup, you have to admire the subtlety, but effectiveness of his strategy. In any battle, one must draw attention to the righteousness of their cause while exposing the flaws in the character of their adversary. The incident on Monday certainly achieved both. While David never really slayed Goliath, Goliath is certainly in retreat. And that’s a lot better than anyone expected.

As for the “cause”, well, that speaks for itself. The Greek bailout was never reasonable because the plan wasn’t designed to create a path for Greece to grow its way out of debt and deflation. No. It was basically a public relations smokescreen used to conceal what was really going on behind the scenes, which was a massive giveaway to the banks and bondholders. Everyone knows this. Check this out from Naked Capitalism:
“According to the Jubilee Debt Campaign, 92% of €240 billion Greece has received since the May 2010 bailout went to Greek and European financial institutions.” (Naked Capitalism)
Yep, it was all just one big welfare payment to the moocher class. Meanwhile, the Greeks got zilch. And, yet, the Eurogroup wants them to continue with this same program?

No thanks.

As far as Greece’s finances are concerned, they’ve gotten progressively worse every year the bailout has dragged on. For example, Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio has gone from 115 percent in 2010 more than 170 percent today. The country is headed in the wrong direction, which is what makes Varoufakis’s remedies so compelling. It’s because everyone knows that ‘if you are already in a hole, stop digging’. That’s the logic behind Varoufakis’s position; he simply wants to “stop digging.” But that can’t be done by borrowing more money to repay debts that only get bigger with each new bailout. And it can’t be done by implementing excruciating belt-tightening measures that increase unemployment and shrink the economy. It can only be done by reducing one’s debts and initiating programs that help to grow the economy back to health. This isn’t rocket science, but it is anathema to the retrograde ideology of the European Union which is one part bonehead economics and one part German sanctimony. Put the two together and you come up with a pre-Keynesian dystopia where one of the wealthiest regions in the world inches ever-closer to anarchy and ruin for the sole purpose of proving that contractionary expansion actually works. Well, guess what? It doesn’t, and we now have six years of evidence to prove it.

It’s worth noting that the Eurogroup hasn’t budged one inch from its original position. In other words, there really haven’t been any negotiations, not in any meaningful sense of the word. What there has been is one group of pompous blowhards reiterating the same discredited mantra over and over again, even though austerity has been thoroughly denounced by every reputable economist on the planet. Of course that doesn’t matter to the ex-Goldman swindlers at the ECB or their hairshirt counterparts in Berlin. What they want is to extract every last drop of blood from their Greek victims. That’s their game. And, of course, ultimately what they want to do is annihilate the entire EU welfare state; crush the unions, eviscerate pensions, wages and health care, and privatize everything they can get their greasy hands on. That’s the real objective. Greece’s exorbitant debts are just a means to an end, just a way to decimate the middle class in one fell swoop.

Keep in mind, the EU just narrowly avoided a triple-dip recession in the third quarter, which would have been their third slump in less than six years. How do you like that track record? It just illustrates the stunning mismanagement of the Union’s economic affairs and the incompetence of the bureaucrats making the decisions. Even so, these same leaders have no qualms about telling Greece to step in line and follow their diktats to the letter.

Can you believe the arrogance?

Fortunately, Greece has broken from the herd and set out on a new course. They’ve disposed of the mealy-mouth, sellout politicians who used to run the country and put the A-Team in their place. And, boy, are they happy with the results. Syriza’s public approval ratings are through the roof while Varoufakis has become the most admired man in Europe. The question is whether this new troupe of committed leftists can deliver the goods or not. So far, there’s reason for hope, that is, if we can agree about what Varoufakis’s strategy really is.

In earlier writings, Varoufakis said that he wants a New Deal for Greece. He said:
“Unless we have a new deal for Europe, Greece is not going to get a chance….It’s a necessary condition that the eurozone finds a rational plan for itself…. until and unless the eurozone finds a rational plan for stopping this train wreck throughout the European Union, throughout the eurozone, Greece has no chance at all.” (Naked Capitalism)
Okay, so Varoufakis wants to stay in the EU, but he wants a change in policy. (Reducing the debts, ending austerity, and boosting fiscal stimulus.) But he also has more ambitious plans of which no one in Brussels, Frankfurt or Berlin seems to be aware. He wants to change the prevailing culture of the Eurozone; gradually, incrementally, but persistently. He wants a Europe that is more democratic and more responsive to the needs of the member states, but he also wants a Europe that is more united via institutions and programs that will strengthen the union. He believes that success will only be achieved if concrete steps are taken “to unify the banking system”, mutualize debt (“the Federal Government having its own debt over and above states.”) …”And thirdly we need an investment policy which runs throughout the Eurozone… a recycling mechanism for the whole thing. Unless we have these things,… I’m afraid there is absolutely nothing to avert the continuation of this slow motion derailment.” (Naked Capitalism)

So, there you have it. Nationalize the banking system, create a Euro-wide bond market, and establish mechanisms for fiscal transfers to the weaker states like we do in the US via welfare, food stamps, gov contracts, subsidies etc. to create some balance between the very rich and productive states like California and New York and the poorer states like South Dakota and Oklahoma. That’s what it’s going to take to create a viable United States of Europe and escape these frustratingly recurrent crises. Varoufakis knows this, but of course he’s not pushing for this. Not yet at least.

Instead, he’s decided to take it slowly, one step at a time. Incremental change, that’s the ticket. Just keep plugging away and building support until the edifice cracks and democracy appears.

That’s Varoufakis’s plan in a nutshell: Revolution from within. Just don’t tell anyone in Berlin.
Unfortunately, Whitney is dreaming in technicolor when he writes about a viable "United States of Europe." He also fails to understand what others, including Nober-laureate Paul Krugman, fail to understand about Syriza and Greece.

When we talk about austerity in Greece, we have to understand the starting point. As I explained here and here, Greek politicians from all parties have never cut the disgustingly bloated Greek public sector because they all make promises the country can't afford and try to buy votes by expanding the public sector to ensure they remain in power (remember, over 50% of all jobs in Greece are directly or indirectly related to the public sector).

This is why part of me is glad Schäuble called Varoufakis's bluff and told him "NEIN!" in no uncertain terms. The Germans didn't want to push Greece over the edge but they also didn't want to give Syriza more power so it can continue hiring public sector workers, adding temporary and fake growth to the economy but doing nothing to bolster the Greek private sector, the engine of the real economy.

As the New York Times rightly notes, it's Greek bureaucracy, not austerity that's weighing down the Greek economy. The amount of insane regulations totally turn off foreign investors and domestic entrepreneurs, but they're there to protect the interests of Greek interest groups including many unions that see these regulations as a way to protect public sector jobs and a way to supplement their income via outright bribes (bribes are second nature to most Greeks, if you don't bribe, good luck navigating their regulatory mess!!).

Hence, while I openly criticize Germany's myopic and destructive austerity measures which will only exacerbate global deflation, I also think Syriza's leaders (like all Greek politicians) are blatant and corrupt liars that will say anything and do anything to remain in power. The sooner Greeks get on to transforming their economy, cutting regulations, privatizing industries and cutting their bloated public sector down to an appropriate size, the better off Greece will be in the long-run.

And therein lies the problem. Don't expect any material changes on the Greek economy from Tsipras and company. They want to implement the same ridiculous policies that got Greece into this mess, just like the Germans want to implement the same asinine austerity measures that is transforming Greece and other periphery economies into "debt colonies."

So forgive me if I'm cynical on this latest Greek deal. Each side will claim victory but in the end, the world got a lot more of the same, namely, kicking the can down the road. This is why I personally think the Oscar should go to Greek and German leaders for proving once more that drama sells fear but at the end of the day, nothing ever changes.

It's about time our global leaders get their heads out of their collective asses. They should read a brilliant comment from another Nobel laureate, Michael Spence, who thinks the world is facing the prospect of an extended period of weak economic growth and the best way to avoid such an outcome is to figure out how to channel large pools of savings into productivity-enhancing public-sector investment. My biggest fear is that it's already too late, and when global deflation takes hold, we're all screwed.

Below, professor Nicholas Economides appeared on BBC TV discussing the results of the Eurogroup meeting on the issue of extension of the Greek program. I don't agree with everything he says, including the fear of contagion being limited but he outlines the real problem of being the "implementation of the conditions which are exactly the opposite" of what the Greek government promised its electorate.

But a few brave investors remain undeterred. Japonica Partners founder, Paul B. Kazarian, one of the largest holders of Greek government bonds, thinks that Greece's debt is vastly overstated. He was recently trying to persuade a room full of investors that Greece’s debt load of 318 billion euros was actually a tenth that size. Listen to his comments below.



Is Farmland a Good Fit For Pensions?

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Michel Leduc, senior managing director of public affairs at CPPIB, wrote a comment for the Leader-Post, Saskatchewan farmland a good fit for CPP (h/t, Pension360):
A little more than a year ago the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) bought 115,000 acres of Saskatchewan farmland from Assiniboia Farmland LP. Some misinformation has been circulating about this and I want to set the record straight.

CPPIB exists to help provide a foundation upon which Canadians build their financial security in retirement. The assets we manage belong to over 18 million contributors and beneficiaries who participate in the Canada Pension Plan (CPP), including more than 700,000 Saskatchewanians.

CPPIB believes farmland is a good investment because well-run farms that have been properly maintained provide stable returns over the long term and add diversity to our investment portfolio.

CPPIB has the ability to spend money on improvements to the farms, and to own the land for decades. During that time many emerging countries will see rapid increases in population and wealth, increasing the demand for food. Saskatchewan has the potential to be a big beneficiary of this global trend.

We spent a long time studying farming dynamics before we bought this land. And we're proud to own it.

Assiniboia Farmland is an agriculture investment company founded and based in Regina. It had previously bought the 115,000 acres, much of which grows wheat, barley and canola, and we liked its business model, which supports family farms in Saskatchewan.

It helps farmers to cash in on their land while still allowing them to run, and even expand, their farms if they choose. Assiniboia is now doing that on CPPIB's behalf and with our financial backing. It's playing an important role in a market where many young farmers don't have the money to buy their parents' farms, and loans can be hard to secure.

For a long time now roughly 40 per cent of Saskatchewan's farmland has been rented, rather than owned, by the farmers who farm it.

Within about six months of owning the land we ensured that 18 abandoned buildings were demolished, seven old storage and fuel tanks were removed, and three yard sites were cleared up.

In addition, two ponds that were being used to dump waste were cleaned out. An abandoned water well was capped. We are working on improvements to irrigation, storage and drainage.

We want to partner with local farmers to improve production techniques - and the livelihoods of those working in the sector.

Premier Brad Wall's government has made clear its desire to foster a competitive, strong and vibrant economy. The long-term vision that he laid out in 2012 included increasing crop production by 10-million tonnes by 2020 and boosting exports of agriculture and food products to $15-billion. We want to contribute to those goals through our investment.

CPPIB is a patient, responsible, long-term investor. We do not plan to amass huge individual holdings of farmland, or to squeeze out returns. We will make reasonable investments to improve farms and help those farmers who choose to partner with us to compete.

CPPIB paid Assiniboia about $120 million for the land. If we bring our investments in Saskatchewan farmland up to $500 million over the next five or six years, we would still constitute less than one per cent of the market. Large investors make up a tiny sliver of Saskatchewan farmland transactions.

We did this deal in full daylight, following all the rules, trusting in Saskatchewan's stable regulatory environment and its desire to foster a thriving economy.

Contrary to what's been alleged, CPPIB did not make use of any loophole. The Saskatchewan Farmland Security Act (SFSA) allows CPPIB to buy farmland because we're Canadian. CPPIB was created for Canadians by an Act of Parliament, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board Act. Any changes to that Act require approval from twothirds of the provinces representing two-thirds of the country's population.

The SFSA was updated in 2002 to allow both Canadian individuals and Canadian entities to own farmland. It says that foreigners and publicly-traded companies are restricted.

CPPIB is quintessentially Canadian. We work for the millions of Canadians who have contributed hard-earned dollars to the CPP and want to see that money put to work in investments like Saskatchewan farmland.

Other than the traditional family farm, it is hard to imagine another owner that better represents both the interests of Saskatchewan residents and the province's own goals.
That article elicited a critical response from Dan Patterson who ranches south of Moose Jaw and was general manager of the Farm Land Security Board for 20 years. He wrote an article, Valid concerns about CPP land venture:
Two recent articles regarding Saskatchewan's farm land ownership legislation ("Leduc: Saskatchewan farmland a good fit for CPP" and Bruce Johnstone's "Gov't eyes farmland Act changes") contribute some confusion to the issues involved.

Firstly, is the assertion by Michel Leduc of the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB), and by the minister of agriculture as quoted by Johnstone, that the farmland purchases by the CPPIB are beyond the regulatory scope of the Farm Land Security Board.

For complex regulatory reasons, the special status claimed by the CPPIB can be legitimately questioned. Clearly, though, the existing situation creates untenable inequity among Canada's largest pension plans, which have similar aspirations to invest billions of dollars in Saskatchewan farmland.

Examples are the BC Public Service Pension Plan, the Quebec Pension Plan, the Federal Public Employees Pension Plan and the Ontario Teacher's Pension Plan.

Leduc describes the CPPIB in terms that depict his organization as a developmental institution motivated to improve the prospects of young Saskatchewan farmers. This is entirely contradictory to the CPPIB Act. It explicitly requires the board to maximize its return on investments.

Similarly, Assiniboia Farmland LLP claimed its establishment would also foster and support young farmers by encouraging farm parents to liquidate their land holdings to an investment firm leaving their children as tenants.

Meanwhile its private advice to prospective investors was that the land would be managed to extract maximum rental income and would be blocked into "efficiently managed units".

Managing 500,000 acres of farmland with the objective of maximizing profits both for itself and for its client will logically lead over time to a reduction of renters to achieve management efficiencies. This result will be contrary to the benevolent assertions of Mr. Leduc.

As to the question of who will ultimately profit most from this transfer of land ownership from farmers to investors, recent history has shown the significant increase in value of farmland over the last decade would have been better left with multi-generational farmers to enhance their financial capacity to invest in new technology and the risk management benefit that growing equity creates.

The proposition put by the CPPIB is that its planned acquisition of 500,000 acres is such a low percentage of Saskatchewan's total farm land that it will have little effect on individual farmers or their communities.

This is facile. All farmers, whether established or beginning, know that competing in the land market with a $200-billion pension plan is an uneven competition.

Furthermore, its intended acquisitions will not be spread evenly over the province, but will create serious local impacts. Land values will be artificially inflated by such funds, which are external to the normal agricultural economy. The historic pattern where land that comes on the market is distributed to farmers within target communities will be destroyed.

The farmland ownership rules of Canada's three Prairie provinces are actually very similar. Instead of depicting this common regulatory environment as the world's most restrictive, the message should be that they are the most forward-looking.

The majority of the world's farmers wish their legislators had the same foresight.
I have to admit, Mr. Patterson raises some excellent points that need to be properly addressed by CPPIB. In particular, how is CPPIB going to "maximize returns" without hurting the livelihood of local farmers and squeezing them out of owning farmland?

And when Mr. Leduc claims "CPPIB is quintessentially Canadian," I say prove it by hiring a truly diverse workforce that reflects Canada's multicultural landscape and takes into account the plight of our minority groups, especially aboriginals and persons with disabilities, the two groups with scandalously high unemployment. 

In fact, I have publicly criticized all of Canada's large pensions for lack of diversity in the workplace, and for good reason. They simply don't do enough to hire all minorities and it seems that operating at arms-length from the government is convenient when it suits their needs, like justifying their hefty payouts, but less so when it comes to taking care of society's most vulnerable and diversifying their workforce (even though they should all abide by the Employment Equity Act).

Importantly, as someone who suffers from multiple sclerosis and has faced outright discrimination from all of Canada's venerable public pensions, especially the Caisse and PSP, I challenge all of you to publish an annual diversity report which shows exactly what you're doing to truly diversify your workforce. And no lip service please, I want to see hard statistics on the hiring of women, visible minorities, aboriginals and especially persons with disabilities.

So, when Mr. Leduc claims "CPPIB is quintessentially Canadian," it just rubs me the wrong way. Let's not kid each other, all of Canada's large pensions are more Canadian for some groups than they are to others. And I take CPPIB to task because it should be leading the rest when it comes to diversity in the workplace.

Now that I got that off my chest, let me discuss some other concerns I have with pensions investing in farmland. Jesse Newman of the Wall Street Journal recently reported, Farmland Values in Parts of Midwest Fall for First Time in Decades:
Farmland values declined in parts of the Midwest for the first time in decades last year, reflecting a cooling in the market driven by two years of bumper crops and sharply lower grain prices, according to Federal Reserve reports on Thursday.

The average price of farmland in the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s district, which includes Illinois, Iowa and other big farm states, fell 3% in 2014, marking the first annual decline since 1986, the Chicago Fed said. Prices for cropland during the fourth quarter remained steady compared with the previous quarter, according to the bank’s survey of agricultural lenders, though half of all respondents said they expect farmland values to decline further in the current quarter.

In the St. Louis Fed’s district, which includes parts of Illinois, Kentucky and Arkansas, prices for “quality” farmland gained 0.8% in the fourth quarter compared with year-ago levels, despite lower crop prices and farm incomes in the region. A majority of lenders in the district expect values to cool in the current quarter compared with the first quarter of last year, reflecting reduced demand for land amid tighter profit margins for farmers.

The reports spotlight an overall slowdown in the U.S. farm economy and in the appreciation of farmland prices. Crop prices had soared for much of the past decade, fueled by drought and rising demand for corn from ethanol processors and foreign importers. The gains pushed agricultural land values so high that some analysts warned of a bubble.

On Tuesday, the U.S. Department of Agriculture projected net U.S. farm income this year would fall to $73.6 billion, the lowest since 2009, from $108 billion in 2014.

Prices for corn, the biggest U.S. crop by value, have tumbled more than 50% since the summer of 2012, when they soared to record highs amid a severe U.S. drought. Growers produced the nation’s largest corn and soybeans harvests ever last autumn, helped by nearly flawless weather over much of the growing season.

In the Chicago Fed district, farmland values in the latest quarter dropped in major corn-producing states like Illinois, Iowa and Indiana compared with year-ago levels, while land values in Wisconsin increased slightly and were unchanged in Michigan. The fourth quarter of 2014 marked the first time since the third quarter of 2009 that cropland values in the district dropped overall compared with a year earlier.

“Lower corn and soybean prices have been primary factors contributing to the drop in farmland values,” David Oppedahl, senior business economist at the Chicago Fed, wrote in Thursday’s report, adding that for 2015, “district farmland values seem to be headed lower.”

While exceptional returns for livestock producers in 2014 helped blunt the impact of falling crop prices on land values, Mr. Oppedahl said, the trend may come to a halt if prices for animal feed grains stabilize somewhat this year.

Meanwhile, the St. Louis Fed said farm income, household spending by farms and expenditures on farm equipment declined in its region. Midwestern bankers expect a continued slowdown in the current quarter in those three categories.

“It is very difficult for farmers to buy farmland and new equipment with corn prices in the $3.50 range,” said one Missouri lender in the St. Louis Fed report.

Bankers in the Midwest also noted a rise in financial strain for crop farmers in the latest quarter. Lenders in the Chicago region reported a dramatic increase in demand for farm loans compared with year-ago levels, with an index of loan-demand reaching the highest level since 1994. Farm loan repayment rates also were “much weaker,” in the fourth quarter of 2014 compared with the same period a year earlier, the bank said, with an index of loan-repayment falling to the lowest level since 2002.
As if that's not bad enough, just yesterday, Joe Winterbottom and P.J. Huffstutter of Reuters reported, Rent walkouts point to strains in U.S. farm economy:
Across the U.S. Midwest, the plunge in grain prices to near four-year lows is pitting landowners determined to sustain rental incomes against farmer tenants worried about making rent payments because their revenues are squeezed.

Some grain farmers already see the burden as too big. They are taking an extreme step, one not widely seen since the 1980s: breaching lease contracts, reducing how much land they will sow this spring and risking years-long legal battles with landlords.

The tensions add to other signs the agricultural boom that the U.S. grain farming sector has enjoyed for a decade is over. On Friday, tractor maker John Deere cut its profit forecast citing falling sales caused by lower farm income and grain prices.

Many rent payments – which vary from a few thousand dollars for a tiny farm to millions for a major operation – are due on March 1, just weeks after the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimated net farm income, which peaked at $129 billion in 2013, could slide by almost a third this year to $74 billion.

The costs of inputs, such as fertilizer and seeds, are remaining stubbornly high, the strong dollar is souring exports and grain prices are expected to stay low.

How many people are walking away from leases they had committed to is not known. In Iowa, the nation's top corn and soybean producer, one real estate expert says that out of the estimated 100,000 farmland leases in the state, 1,000 or more could be breached by this spring.

The stakes are high because huge swaths of agricultural land are leased: As of 2012, in the majority of counties in the Midwest Corn Belt and the grain-growing Plains, at least 40 percent of farmland was leased or rented out, USDA data shows.

"It's hard to know where the bottom is on this," said David Miller, Iowa Farm Bureau's director of research and commodity services.

SIGNS OF TROUBLE

Grain production is, however, unlikely to be affected in any major way yet as landowners will rather have someone working their land, even at reduced rates, than let it lie fallow.

But prolonged weakness in the farm economy could send ripples far and wide: as farms consolidate, "there would be fewer machinery dealers, fewer elevators, and so-on through the rural economy," said Craig Dobbins, professor of agricultural economics at Purdue University.

Possibly also fewer new farmers.

Jon Sparks farms about 1,400 acres of family land and rented ground in Indiana. His nephew wants to return to work on the farm but margins are tight and land rents high. Sparks cannot make it work financially.

"We can't grow without overextending ourselves," Sparks said. "I don't know what to do."

Landowners are reluctant to cut rents. Some are retirees who partly rely on the rental income from the land they once farmed, and the rising number of realty investors want to maintain returns. Landlords have also seen tenants spend on new machinery and buildings during the boom and feel renters should still be able to afford lease payments.

"As cash rent collections start this spring, I expect to see more farm operators who have had difficulty acquiring adequate financing either let leases go or try and renegotiate terms," said Jim Farrell, president of Farmers National Co, which manages about 4,900 farms across 24 states for land-owners.

Take an 80-acre (32 hectare) farm in Madison County, Iowa, owned by a client of Peoples Company, a farmland manager. The farmer who rented the land at $375 an acre last year offered $315 for this year, said Steve Bruere, president of the company. The owner turned him down, and rented it to a neighbor for $325 -- plus a hefty bonus if gross income tops $750.

There are growing numbers of other examples. Miller, of the Iowa Farm Bureau, said he learned about a farmer near Marshalltown, in central Iowa, who had walked away from 650 acres (263 hectares) of crop ground because he could not pay the rent. Just days later, he was told a north-central Iowa farmer breached his lease on 6,500 acres.

COURTS OR LOANS

Concern about broken leases has some landlords reviewing legal options, according to Roger A. McEowen, director of the Iowa State University Center for Agricultural Law and Taxation. His staff began fielding phone calls from nervous landowners last autumn.

One catch is that many landlords never thought to file the paperwork to put a lien on their tenants' assets. That means landowners "can't go grab anything off the farm if the tenant doesn't pay," McEowen said. "It also means that they're going to be behind the bank."

Still, farmers could have a tough time walking away from their leases, said Kelvin Leibold, a farm management specialist at Iowa State University extension.

"People want their money. They want to get paid. I expect we will see some cases going to court over this," he added.

To avoid such a scenario, farmers have begun turning to banks for loans that will help fund operations and conserve their cash. Operating loans for farmers jumped 37 percent in the fourth quarter of 2014 over a year ago to $54 billion, according to survey-based estimates in the Kansas City Federal Reserve bank's latest Agricultural Finance Databook.

Loans with an undefined purpose -- which might be used for rents, according to the bank's assistant vice-president Nathan Kauffman -- nearly doubled in the fourth quarter of 2014 from a year earlier to $25 billion.

Total non-real estate farm loan volumes jumped more than 50 percent for the quarter, to $112 billion.

"It's all about working capital and bankers are stressing working capital," said Sam Miller, managing director of agricultural banking at BMO Harris Bank. "Liquidity has tightened up considerably in the last year."
These articles highlight two things: First, the bubble in farmland is bursting and second, when it bursts and farmers walk away from their leases, it could potentially mean costly and lengthy court battles pitting landowners (ie. endowment funds and public pension funds like CPPIB and PSPIB which also invests in farmland) against farmers. That doesn't look good at all for pensions.

All this to say, while it's really cool following Harvard's mighty endowment into timberland and farmland, when you come down to it, managing and operating farmland is a lot harder than it seems on paper and the risks are greatly under-appreciated. Add the potential of global deflation wreaking havoc on all private market investments and you understand why I'm skeptical that farmland is a good fit for pensions, even if they invest for the long, long run.

Below, economist Ernie Goss says the steep rise in agricultural land prices in a short period of time has created a bubble, and there's no doubt that land price growth is coming down. He says it won't be like the farm crisis of the 1980s, because a lot of farmers have paid cash for purchases (December 2013). It wasn't just the Fed that led to the farmland bubble, endowments and pensions also contributed to it.

Also, an older WKBT TV report (March, 2013) where some agriculture experts warned the market for farmland could be headed toward a similar fate as the housing market bubble. I agree with Vance Haugen, farmers and investors should be very concerned about the bubble in farmland popping. It's going to get a lot worse.


Overhauling New Jersey's Pensions?

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Josh Dawsey of the Wall Street Journal reports, Gov. Chris Christie Panel Proposes Overhaul of New Jersey’s Pension System:
Gov. Chris Christie’s committee to study New Jersey’s troubled pension system wants to overhaul the retirement program for public employees, freezing the current setup and replacing it with a “cash balance” plan.

The plan would spread out the current pension system’s unfunded liability over many years, and would more closely reflect benefits in the private sector, according to members of the commission. Mr. Christie endorsed the report conclusions Tuesday in a speech to the Legislature.

The commission is also calling for a state constitutional amendment to require governors to make payments to the new plan.

“Although the proposed plans are likely to be less generous to long-tenured employees as compared with the current plans, a less generous plan that is funded is preferable to a more-generous plan that isn’t,” the report says.

Benefits in the new plan could swing based on fluctuations in the stock and bond markets, introducing an element of risk.

Workers in the system would have their current plan frozen, according to Tom Healey, the commission chairman, and new workers would be entered into the new plan. Employees would have individual accounts, he said.

“You can do lots of different things with a total mess,” Mr. Healey said in an interview. “You can either say, let’s try to fix it or you can move to Wisconsin. We’re at the edge of the cliff here.”

The proposal received pushback from some unions and Democrats. Mr. Healey said he had met with the state’s main teachers union, and said its leaders were cooperative. Other meetings are scheduled in coming weeks.

Wendell Steinhauer, president of the New Jersey Education Association, said the union supports the proposal’s recommendations to freeze benefits of the current pension system, create a newly managed one and adopt a guarantee of state funding in the state constitution.

But Mr. Steinhauer said that some of the pension proposal “unfairly burdens” workers and wouldn’t be feasible.

“There will be many things that NJEA disagrees with, some of them very strongly,” Mr. Steinhauer said in a statement. “This is a report. It is not a law, and it is not the final word on what will or must happen.”

Other states such as Kentucky and Louisiana have recently introduced cash benefit plans, though Louisiana’s plan was ruled unconstitutional.

Joshua Franzel, a vice president for research at the Center for State and Local Government Excellence, said cash benefit plans are a way for states to provide more predictability in their pension systems.

The plans tend to guarantee a certain rate of investment return, but unlike a defined benefit pension system the hybrid ones don’t lock in a fixed allowance based just on the worker’s salary. It shifts some of the risk of market fluctuations to the employee without fully doing so, Mr. Franzel said.

“It’s a middle approach for managing risk and trying to control costs and control liabilities,” said Mr. Franzel, whose center studies pensions. “We are seeing a trend to more states beginning to consider and implement hybrid plans.”

New Jersey’s pension system is underfunded by about $37 billion.

The commission’s report said parts of its approach are likely to be unpopular at first but that “in time they will be viewed as the best way to move forward.”
A little over a month ago, I wrote a comment on taming New Jersey's insatiable beast, explaining why New Jersey's pensions are grossly underfunded and criticizing Gov. Christie's approach to handling their "pension crisis."

On Monday, a judge ruled that Gov. Chris Christie and the state's Democrat-controlled Legislature must find $1.57 billion to put into pension funds for retired public workers. 

And how did New Jersey's feisty governor respond? In a sad attempt to chalk up political points by trying to emulate Wisconsin's popular governor Scott Walker, he responded with a "fiscally responsible" plan to reform his state's pension system (a last ditch attempt to run as a GOP candidate in 2016?).

But New Jersey isn't Wisconsin in any way, shape or form. State of Wisconsin Investment Board is one of the best state pensions in the United States because they got the governance right and are following Canadian funds in managing more of their assets in-house.

By contrast, New Jersey's Division of Investment outsources most of their pension assets and doles out huge fees to private equity funds and hedge funds, one of which employs Gov. Christie's wife. Also, just like elsewhere, there's way too much political interference in their state pension, which virtually ensures mediocre performance over a long period (don't look at the last four years, a monkey could have outperformed in this environment just over-weighting equities).

More worrisome, I'm against these so-called "hybrid" plans because they are nothing more than defined-contribution (DC) plans in disguise placing the onus of risk entirely on members of these plans. And the brutal truth on DC plans is they're far less secure and much worse than DB plans.

Also, while I believe in shared-risk plans if they're done right, the sad truth is converting more public sector workers in DC or hybrid plans is bad economic policy which will only ensure more Americans will retire in poverty.

Importantly, this isn't a conservative or liberal issue. Good pension policy that bolsters defined-benefit plans is good economic policy. The benefits of defined-benefit (DB) plans are grossly under-appreciated, especially well-governed ones which operate at arms-length from the government.

This is why I'm happy to see New York City is contemplating setting up a pension plan for private workers. As Bloomberg's Megan McArdle notes, details are still sketchy as to whether it will be a DC or DB plan but it will mean people will have to save more now to enjoy a safe retirement later (I disagree with her facile dismissal that "each type has its benefits and drawbacks,' because she doesn't understand the the brutal truth on DC plans).

All around the United States, we're witnessing major problems in public pensions. Last week, I discussed why Chicago and Tampa are the next Detroit. On Tuesday, I read a Bloomberg article on how Kansas and Kentucky may borrow billions to invest in cash-strapped pension funds, undeterred by warnings the practice risks driving up taxpayers’ bills to retirees. Keep in mind, Kentucky is in an even bigger pension mess than Illinois, which speaks volumes on just how dire their situation is.

And how are politicians responding to their pension mess? They're basically ignoring the problem or coming up with dumb solutions which will exacerbate pension poverty down the road and weaken the economy of the United States. This is certainly the case in New Jersey, Illinois,  Kentucky, Kansas and other states struggling to slay their pension demon.

Below, NJTV News provides live coverage of Gov. Chris Christie’s 2016 Budget Address from Trenton Tuesday, Feb. 24 at 2 p.m. The coverage includes the duration of the remarks and expert analysis (fast forward to minute 25 to listen to Gov. Christie's comments on pensions).

He's right, New Jersey desperately needs to reform its pension system because they can't tax or grow their way out of this problem. But the reforms his administration is proposing are not going to make the problem go away. In fact, these reforms are going to exacerbate pension poverty in New Jersey and weaken their economy, making their public debt much worse over the long run.

To his credit, however, Gov. Christie is calling for a state constitutional amendment to require governors to make payments to the new plan. I think every state should adopt a similar constitutional amendment to top up their existing public pensions every year, not some new hybrid plan New Jersey is proposing.

Caisse Gains 12% in 2014

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Ross Marowits of the Canadian Press reports, Caisse de dépôt sees softer stock market ahead after generating 12% return in 2014:
The years-long bull run on equity markets that helped the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec generate a 12% return in 2014 is running out of steam and will require careful watching going forward, CEO Michael Sabia said Wednesday.

“We’re certainly not calling for a big correction…but it’s going to be increasingly difficult to replicate the kind of returns that we’ve seen everywhere basically since 2009,” Sabia told reporters in discussing the Quebec pension fund manager’s 2014 results.

That means the Caisse must continue to invest defensively in high quality assets, including real estate and infrastructure that have generated strong returns, he said.

Chief investment officer Roland Lescure said the double-digit returns of the past four to five years will end.

“In the next five years we should expect single-digit returns with double-digit volatility and that requires quality, quality, quality, but also the ability to be opportunistic.”

The large institutional investor said its assets as of Dec. 31, 2014, were $225.9 billion, even though investment return slowed slightly from 13.1% in 2013.

All three of the Caisse’s major asset classes experienced gains, led by equities which had a nearly 14% return as assets rose to $106.9 billion. Inflation-sensitive investments had an 11 per cent return, while fixed-income investments increased 8.4%.

Sabia described the Caisse’s performance as “solid,” considering currency fluctuations, low interest rates and falling oil prices near year-end.

“Despite the volatility, we showed our resilience. We have stayed the course and that’s what counts.”

Its real estate division, Ivanhoe Cambridge, completed a record number of transactions in 2014 as shifted focused from hotels to multi-residential and logistics properties. It made acquisitions valued at $5.1 billion and sold properties worth $8.6 billion, including 21 hotels.

The division generated $2.1 billion of net investments in 2014 as its assets grew to $22.9 billion.

The Caisse’s infrastructure portfolio has more than doubled in four years to $10.1 billion, including $1.3 billion invested in 2014, when it enjoyed a 13.2% annual return.

Sabia expects new investments will more than double the infrastructure portfolio again in the next few years as the Caisse creates a new subsidiary that will fund and build projects in Quebec and chase opportunities in the United States and elsewhere abroad.

“It is probably fair to say our No. 1 global priority is to substantially expand our infrastructure presence in the United States, where we think the needs are great,” he said.

The Caisse invested $2.5 billion in Quebec companies last year and more than $11 billion over four years, pushing its assets in the province to $60 billion.

However, it shifted five per cent of its Canadian exposure to other markets to capitalize on global growth. More than 47% of its investments are outside the country.

Meanwhile, Sabia said the Caisse continues to have faith in two troubled Quebec companies — SNC-Lavalin (TSX:SNC) which faces bribery and corruption charges, and Bombardier (TSX:BBD.B) which is seeking new liquidity.

Sabia said SNC-Lavalin has made big ethics changes and is not the same company it was a few years ago. The Caisse has maintained its level of investment in the embattled engineering firm at about 10%.

The Caisse also took advantage of Bombardier’s recent nearly $1-billion equity offering to increase its $271-million stake in the airplane and rail equipment manufacturer, but didn’t say by how much.
Nicolas Van Praet of the Globe and Mail also reports, Caisse eyes ‘substantial infrastructure opportunities’ in the U.S.:
Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec has already helped Canadian investors become the single largest foreign buyer of U.S. commercial real estate since 2010.

Now, the Caisse has its eye on another big bet south of the border: infrastructure, from airports to bridges.

Canada’s second-largest pension fund is aiming to double its current $10-billion infrastructure portfolio over four years and believes a significant portion of that growth will come from the United States.

“We think there are very, very substantial infrastructure opportunities in the United States,” chief executive Michael Sabia told reporters in discussing the pension fund’s 12-per-cent return for 2014. “In geographic terms, this would be priority one.”

As part of a transformative deal announced last month with Quebec giving the Caisse new powers to develop major infrastructure projects in the province, the pension fund is carving out a new subsidiary to handle such investments. It hopes to parlay the Quebec model, based on easing the financial load on government, to other parts of the world.

The Caisse has slowly been ramping up its infrastructure exposure in the U.S. Recent investments include a $600-million commitment for a roughly 30-per-cent stake in electricity supplier Indianopolis Power & Light Co. It also holds a 16-per-cent interest in U.S. petroleum pipeline Colonial and is said to be among a group being solicited to bid for natural gas pipeline operator Southern Star Central Corp.

But, ever searching for investments that generate long-term stable cash-flow, it wants more.

“There is a significant demand and need for infrastructure investment in the U.S., in particular in the transport sector,” said Macky Tall, who leads the Caisse’s infrastructure business. “Many roads and bridges are in need of being repaired and renewed.”

Despite the historic reluctance of the U.S. government to open up the country’s physical assets to private investors such as the Caisse, President Barack Obama’s administration has recently shown more openness in light of the strained finances of many state governments. As U.S. Transportation Secretary Anthony Fox said last year in announcing the Build America Investment Initiative: “The reality is we have trillions of dollars internationally on the sidelines that are not being put to work.”

Mr. Sabia has been executing a strategy of boosting investments in tangible assets such as real estate and infrastructure while focusing on public equities it sees as high-quality and less risk. The aim is to generate even and predictable results at a time when equity markets remain erratic and low yields are expected to continue in bond markets.

Last year’s 12-per-cent return was powered by strong gains in U.S. stock holdings. The Caisse’s global equity portfolio in particular, which invests in large-cap companies, returned 18.5 per cent as those multinationals tapped into growth in the U.S. consumer market and the economy in general.

Asked if public equity markets are overheated, Mr. Sabia noted that efforts companies have made on cost-cutting have fuelled an improvement in corporate profits of late. He said that can’t continue forever and that companies will need to generate revenue growth eventually.

“We’re not calling for a big correction in the markets,” Mr. Sabia said. “Our sense of this is, yeah the elastic is stretched pretty tight. And we’re very conscious of that. That doesn’t lead us to believe things are going to snap tomorrow. But we’re very vigilant about it.”

With a stake of about 10 per cent, the Caisse remains a major investor in SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. Mr. Sabia said the pension fund continues to back the engineering company’s efforts to win new business and put its ethics scandal behind it, even in light of new corruption charges laid by the RCMP last week.

“The fact that we haven’t changed our position, I think, speaks clearly about what we think about the current situation,” Mr. Sabia said.

Returns over the past four years under Mr. Sabia’s watch have totalled 9.6 per cent. His five-year term as CEO was extended in 2013.
Third, Ben Dummett of the Wall Street Journal reports gains in U.S. stocks helped the Caisse generate a 12% return:
Canada’s second-largest pension fund said it generated a 12% return last year, led by gains in U.S. stocks, eclipsing the fund’s internal benchmark by a small margin.

But Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec isn’t convinced the strong run in U.S. equities will continue this year, citing stretched valuations.

The Quebec pension fund said net assets totaled 225.9 billion Canadian dollars ($180.8 billion) at the end of December, up from about C$200 billion at the end of 2013. That placed the fund, which manages pension money for much of Quebec’s workforce, behind CPP Investment Board, which had C$238.8 billion of assets under management at the end of December.

Caisse’s 12% return also edged out a 11.4% gain in the fund’s benchmark. Canadian pension funds typically measure themselves against an in-house index to reflect the diversity of public and private asset classes in which they invest.

The latest results come as the fund has moved away from investments that mirror benchmark indexes in favor of focusing more on concentrated portfolios of public and private holdings that are meant to generate steady returns. The goal is to reduce the fund’s exposure to market volatility while take better advantage of global economic growth.

“A big part of the strategy…is to be able to outperform on the downside,” something Caisse hasn’t managed well historically, Chief Executive Michael Sabia said in a phone interview.

Caisse’s public and private-equity holdings generated the biggest return among its investments, gaining 13.9% compared with 12% for the benchmark. Within that group, U.S. equities fared the best, posting a 24% return as major U.S. stock indexes rose amid growing confidence in the U.S. economy.

The weaker Canadian dollar measured against its U.S. counterpart would have also helped boost the pension fund’s U.S. equity returns after converting the U.S. dollar gains back into Canadian currency.

But the fund is more leery of the outlook for U.S. equities since stock valuations relative to corporate earnings growth are near record highs.

“The market is suddenly more vulnerable than it has been,” Roland Lescure, the fund’s chief investment officer, said in the same phone interview.

Caisse also splits its assets among fixed income and so-called inflation-sensitive investments, including real estate, infrastructure and real return bonds. The fixed-income portfolio performed largely in line with its index, but inflation-sensitive investments led by infrastructure holdings underperformed.

Infrastructure holdings, which appeal to pension funds because of the steady income they generate, also lagged behind Caisse’s benchmark over the last four years.

Caisse said its infrastructure return for 2014 exceeded its long-term target. The pension fund measures its infrastructure holdings against a benchmark of 60 public securities even though many of its infrastructure holdings aren’t listed on a stock exchange, making an accurate comparison more difficult.

According to the fund, 75% of the index’s four-year return stemmed from rising equity markets, while dividend income generated by the index-member companies accounted for 25% of the benchmark’s return.

“The Caisse will continue to make significant investments in infrastructure, particularly in Québec, the United States and in growth markets,” the pension fund said in a statement. “This asset class is central to its investment strategy, especially in an environment of low interest rates and greater volatility in the equity markets.”
Finally, Scott Deveau of Bloomberg reports,Caisse's Sabia Says Stock Markets Will `Run Out of Gas':
The double-digit gains global stock markets have experienced in the past few years can’t continue much longer, and more modest gains are in store, said Michael Sabia, the head of Canada’s second-largest pension fund.

“It’s going to run out of gas,” said Sabia, chief executive of the Caisse de Depot et placement du Quebec, in an interview in Montreal.

The Caisse has benefited from the run-up in stock prices, in particular in the U.S., coming out of the recession. The Montreal-based pension fund posted an overall return of 12 percent in 2014 on its investments, fueled by an increase in its equities portfolio. Over the past five years, its overall return on its investments has averaged 10.4 percent annually.

Sabia said a more realistic annual return would be in the single digits once the public equity markets cool, although he cautioned he didn’t know when that will be.

The bulk of gains in corporate profitability, in particular among U.S. multinationals, have come from cost cuts, he said. Companies will have to boost sales too, for the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index to continue rising.

The Caisse isn’t forecasting a massive correction. Instead, single-digit returns are a more likely scenario, he said. The fund had C$225.9 billion ($182 billion) in total assets at the end of 2014, compared with C$200 billion a year earlier.

Quebec Retirement

The pension fund, which oversees the retirement savings of those living in Quebec, is a prominent investor in infrastructure, real estate, public and private equity worldwide. The fund is looking to diversify its portfolio globally and will pursue opportunities in the U.S., Australia, and Mexico, Sabia said. It will also be exploring some opportunities in India and Europe.

The Caisse has shifted about 5 percent of its exposure in Canada to other markets in the past four years and currently has about about C$117 billion, or 47 percent of its investments, outside of the country. That’s up from C$72 billion in 2010.

Sabia also took the opportunity to defend two embattled Quebec companies the Caisse is currently invested in: SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. and Bombardier Inc.

The Caisse is SNC-Lavalin’s largest shareholder with about 10 percent of its outstanding common shares. SNC-Lavalin was charged last week with attempted bribery and fraud related to construction projects in Libya and said it would vigorously defend itself against the charges, which it said involved employees who left “long ago.”

Governance Changes

SNC-Lavalin has made great strides in corporate governance as it moves to distance itself from a scandal over improper payments that led to the departure of its former CEO Pierre Duhaime three years ago, Sabia said. The Caisse has not altered its investment in SNC-Lavalin after the last charges and supports the board’s efforts to improve its governance.

“The SNC-Lavalin today is not the SNC-Lavalin of five or six years ago,” he said.

Bombardier issued C$938 million in new equity last week to help cover the cost overruns of its CSeries jet program. The Caisse participated nominally in the raise, just a “top up” of its existing investment, Sabia said.

It will also consider investing in whatever debt offering the company might consider, he said.

“They managed to do a pretty big equity offering. Given that and whatever debt they’re going to do, they’re going to come out of this period with a dramatically changed balance sheet,” Sabia said. “I think the runway is there for them.”
You can gain more insights on the Caisse's 2014 results by going directly on their website here. In particular, the Caisse provides fact sheets on the following broad asset classes:
Keep in mind that unlike other major Canadian pension funds, the Caisse has a dual mandate to promote economic activity in Quebec as well as maximizing returns for its depositors.

In fact, the recent deal to handle Quebec's infrastructure needs is part of this dual mandate. Some have criticized the deal, questioning whether the Caisse can make money on public transit, but this very well might be a model they can export elsewhere, especially in the United States where CBS 60 Minutes reports infrastructure is falling apart.

Whether or not the Caisse will be successful in exporting this infrastructure model to the United States remains to be seen but if you follow the wise advice of Nobel laureate Michael Spence on why the world needs better public investments, public pensions investing in infrastructure could very well be the answer to a growing and disturbing jobs crisis plaguing the developed world.

As far as the overall results, they were definitely solid, with all portfolios contributing to the overall net investment of $23.77 billion (click on image below):


Of course, what really matters is value-added over benchmarks. After all, this is why we pay Canadian pension fund managers big bucks (some a lot more than others). 

In fact, in its press release, the Caisse states in no uncertain terms:
"[its] investment strategy centers on an absolute return approach in which investment portfolios are built on strong convictions, irrespective of benchmark indices. These indices are only used ex post, to measure the portfolios’ performance. The approach is based on active management and rigorous, fundamental analysis of potential investments."
I've already discussed life after benchmarks at the Caisse. So how did their active maangement stack up? For the overall portfolio, the 12% return edged out the fund's benchmark which delivered an 11.4% gain, adding 60 basis points of value-added last year (do not know the four year figure).

Below, I provide you with the highlights of the three main broad asset classes with a breakdown of individual portfolios (click on each image to read the highlights):

Fixed Income:


Inflation-Sensitive:


Equities:


Some quick points to consider just looking at these highlights:
  • Declining rates helped the Fixed Income group generate strong returns in 2014 but clearly the value-added is waning. In 2014, Fixed Income returned 8.4%, 10 basis points under its benchmark which gained 8.5%. Over the past four years, the results are better, with Fixed Income gaining 5.6%, 70 basis points over its benchmark which gained 4.9%. Real estate debt was the best performing portfolio in Fixed Income over the last year and four years but on a dollar basis, its not significant enough to add to the overall gains in Fixed Income.
  • There were solid gains in Inflation-Sensitive assets but notice that both Real Estate and Infrastructure underperformed their respective benchmarks in 2014 and the last four years, which means there was no value-added from these asset classes. The returns of Infrastructure are particularly bad relative to its benchmark but in my opinion, this reflects a problem with the benchmark of Infrastructure as there is way too much beta and perhaps too high of an additional spread to reflect the illiquid nature and leverage used in these assets. More details on the Caisse's benchmarks are available on page 20 of the 2013 Annual Report (the 2014 Annual Report will be available in April).
  • In Equities, Private Equity also slightly underperformed its benchmark over the last year and last four years, but again this reflects strong gains in public equities and perhaps the spread to adjust for leverage and illiquidity. U.S Equity led the gains in Equities in 2014 but the Caisse indexes this portfolio (following the 2008 crisis) so there was no value-added there, it's strictly beta. However, there were strong gains in the Global Quality Equity as well as Canadian Equity portfolios relative to their benchmarks in 2014 and over the last four years, contributing to the overall value-added.
If you read this, you might be confused. The Caisse's strategy is to shift more of its assets into real estate, private equity and infrastructure and yet there is no value-added there, which is troubling if you just read the headline figures without digging deeper into what makes up the benchmarks of these private market asset classes.

The irony, of course, is that the Caisse is increasingly shifting assets in private markets but most of the value-added over its benchmarks is coming from public markets, especially public equities.

But this is to be expected when stock markets are surging higher. And as a friend of mine reminded me: "It about time they produced value-added in Public Equities. For years, they were underperforming and so they came up with this Global Quality Equity portfolio to create value."

Also, keep in mind private markets are generating solid returns and as I recently noted in my comment on why Canadian pensions are snapping up real estate:
... in my opinion the Caisse's real estate division, Ivanhoé Cambridge, is by far the best real estate investment management outfit in Canada. There are excellent teams elsewhere too, like PSP Investments, but Ivanhoe has done a tremendous job investing directly in real estate and they have been very selective, even in the United States where they really scrutinize their deals carefully and aren't shy of walking away if the deal is too pricey.
There is something else, the Caisse's strategy might pay off when we hit a real bear market and pubic equities tank. Maybe that's why they're not too concerned about all the beta and high spread to adjust for leverage and illiquidity in these private market benchmarks.

But there are skeptics out there. One of them is Dominic Clermont, formerly of Clermont Alpha, who sent me a study he did 2 years ago showing the Caisse's alpha was negative between 1998 and 2012. Dominic hasn't updated that study (he told me he will) but he shared this:
I had done a study two years ago that showed that the Caisse's alpha was close to -1% and close to statistically significantly different from zero and negative. Part of that regular value lost is compensated by taking a lot more risk than its benchmark by being levered. That leverage means doing better than the benchmark when the markets do perform well, and being in a crisis when the market tanks...
I asked him to clarify this statement and noted something a pension fund manager shared with me n my post on the highest paid pension fund CEOs:
Also, it's not easy comparing payouts among Canada's large DB plans. Why? One senior portfolio manager shared this with me:
"First and foremost, various funds use more leverage than others. This is the most differentiating factor in explaining performance across DB plans. In Canada, F/X policy will also impact performance of past 3 years. ‎It's very hard to compare returns because of vastly different invest policies; case in point is PSP's huge equity weighting (need to include all real estate, private equity and infrastructure) that has a huge beta."
Dominic came back to me with some additional thoughts:
I would love to do proper performance attribution, but I had limited access to data. But we can infer a lot with published data. We do have historical performance for all major funds like the Caisse, CPP, Teachers, PSP, etc. in their financial statements. They also publish the performance of their benchmark.

I agree that because of different investment policies, it is difficult to compare one plan to the next. But we can compare any plan to itself, i.e. its benchmark.

Again, I like to do proper performance attribution in a multivariate framework and that is one area of expertise to me. To do it on a huge plan like the Caisse would require a lot of data which I do not have access to. But a simple CAPM type of attribution would give some insight. In this case, the benchmark is not an equity market as in the base case of CAPM, but the strategy mix of the Caisse.

Thus if we regress the returns (or the excess returns over risk free rate) of a plan, over its benchmark return (or excess over RF rate), we would obtain a Beta of the regression to be close to one if the plan is properly managed with proper risk controls. That is what I obtain when I do this exercise with the returns of a well-known plan – well known for its quality of management, and its constant outperformance.

When I do this for the Caisse, I get a Beta of the regression significantly greater than 1 – close to 1.25. It looks like the leverage of the Caisse over the 15 years of the regression was on average close to 25% above its benchmark! Now part of that as you mentioned and as I explain in my study could come from:
  • Investment in high Beta stocks,
  • Investment in levered Private equity
  • Investment in levered Real Estate and Infrastructure
  • Investment in longer duration bonds
  • Leveraging the balance sheet of the plan: Check Graphic 1 on the link: http://www.clermontalpha.com/cdpq_15ans.htm
It shows the leverage of the Caisse going from 18% in 1998 to 36% in 2008! So my average of 25% excess Beta is in line with this documented leverage.

The chart also shows Ontario Teachers' and OMERS' leverage. The difference is that Teachers' leverage is IN its benchmark, while the Caisse is NOT. Thus the Caisse is taking 25% more risk than its clients' policy mix! You would think that all these clients risk monitoring would be complaining… They are not. 

Of course, that leverage is good when markets return positively and you can see that on the colored chart. But that leverage is terrible when the markets drop 2008, 2002, 2001. When that happen, it is time to fire the management, restart with a new one and blame the previous management for the big loss. Some of those big losses were also exaggerated by forced liquidation accounting (we all remember the ABCP $6 billion loss reserve which was almost fully recovered in the following years inflating the returns under the new administration).

By not doing proper attribution, we are not aware of the continuous loss (negative alpha) hidden by the excess returns not obtained by skilled alpha, but by higher risk through leverage. The risk-adjusted remains negative… And we are not focusing our energies into building an alpha generating organisation with optimal risk budgeting. Why bother, the leverage will give us the extra returns! But that is not true alpha, not true value added.

Which brings me to the alpha of the regression. I told you that this other great institution which does proper risk controls, gets a Beta close to one. They also get a positive alpha of the regression which is statistically significant (t stat close to 2). Not surprising, they master the risk budgeting exercise, and they understand risk controls.

For the Caisse, the Alpha of the regression is close to -1% per year and it is statistically significant. Nobody in the private market could sustain such long period of negative alpha. Nobody could manage a portfolio with 25% more risk than what is requested by the client.

In my report, I also talk about the QPP contribution rate. When Canada created the CPP in the mid-60s, Quebec said "Hey, we want to better manage our own fund." That led to the creation of the Caisse de Depot and it was an excellent decision as the returns of the QPP were much better because they were managed professionally in a diversified portfolio (vs provincial bonds for the CPP). Unnoticed by everyone in Quebec, the contribution rate started to increase in 2012 and will continue to increase up until 2017 at which time Quebecers will pay 9% more than the rest of Canadians for basically the same pension plan (some tiny differences). And the explanation is this negative alpha.

I also explained that with proper risk budgeting techniques at all level, the Caisse could deliver an extra $5 Billion with 20% less risk! Instead of increasing the contribution rate of all CDPQ clients QPP, REGOP, etc., we could have kept them at the same level or lower. And part of that extra $5B return every year would find its way into the Quebec government coffer through reduced contributions and higher taxes (the higher contributions to QPP, Regop, etc. that Quebecers pay are tax deductible…)

For how long are we going to avoid looking at proper attribution? For how long are we going to forfeit this extra $5B per year in extra returns?
I shared Dominic's study with Roland Lescure, the CIO of the Caisse, who shared this with me:
You are right, we have significantly lowered leverage at the Caisse since 2009. Leverage is now solely used to fund part of our real estate portfolio and the (in)famous ABCP portfolio which will be gone by 2016. As you rightly point out, most Canadian pension funds use leverage to different degrees. Further, we also have significantly reduced risk by focusing our investments on quality companies and projects, which are less risky than the usual benchmark-driven investments. And those investments happen to have served us well as they did outperform the benchmarks significantly in 2014. You probably have all the details for each of our portfolios but I would point out that our Canadian equity portfolio outperformed the TSX by close to 300 bps. And the global quality equity portfolio did even better.
I thank Dominic Clermont and Roland Lescure for sharing their insights. Dominic raises several excellent points, some of which are politically sensitive and to be honest, hard to verify without experts really digging into the results of each and every large Canadian pension. Also, just how much of that increase in the contribution rate for public sector workers is do to Quebec's pension reforms and introduction of plain old risk-sharing?

Again, this is why even though I'm against an omnipotent regulator looking at systemic risks at pensions, I believe all of Canada's large pensions need to provide details of their public and private investments to the Bank of Canada and we need to introduce uniform comprehensive performance, operational and risk audits at all of Canada's major pensions.

These audits need to be conducted by independent and qualified third parties that are properly staffed to conduct them. The current auditing by agencies such as the Auditor General of Canada is simply too flimsy as far as I'm concerned, which is why we need better, more comprehensive audits across the board and the findings should be made public for all of Canada's large pensions.

And let me say while the Caisse has clearly reduced leverage since the ABCP scandal which the media keeps covering up, it is increasingly shifting into private markets, introducing more illiquidity risk that can come back to haunt them if global deflation takes hold.

As far as stocks are concerned, I see a melt-up occurring in tech and biotech even if the Fed makes a monumental mistake and raises rates this year (read the latest comment by Sober Look to understand why market expectations of Fed rate hikes are unrealistic). It will be a rough and tumble year but my advice to the Caisse is to stay long U.S. equities (especially small caps) and start nibbling at European equities, like Warren Buffett. And stick a fork in Canadian equities, they're cooked!

Will the liquidity and share buyback party end one day? You bet it will but that is a topic for another day where I will introduce you to a very sharp emerging manager and his team working on an amazing and truly unique tail risk strategy.

As far as U.S. equities, I think the Caisse needs to stop indexing and start looking at ways to take opportunistic large bets using some of the information I discussed when I covered top funds' Q4 activity. This would be above and beyond the information they receive from their external fund managers.

By the way, if you compare the Caisse's top holdings to those of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, you'll notice they are both long shares of Waste Management (WM), one of the top-performing stocks in the S&P 500 over the last year.

I'll share another interesting fact with you, something CNBC's Dominic Chu discussed a few days ago. Five stocks -- Apple (AAPL), Amazon (AMZN), Biogen Idec (BIIB), Gilead (GILD), and Netflix (NFLX) -- account for all of the gains in the Nasdaq this year. If that's not herd behavior, I don't know what is!!

Lastly, it takes a lot of time to write these in-depth comments and you won't read this stuff in traditional media outlets which get hung up on headline figures and hardly ever dig deeper. Please take the time to contribute to my blog on the top right-hand side, or better yet, stop discriminating against me and hire the best damn pension and investment analyst in the world who just happens to live in la belle province!

Below, Michael Sabia, CEO of the Caisse, discusses the Caisse's 2014 results with TVA's Pierre Bruneau (in French). Michael also appeared on RDI Économie last night where he was interviewed by Gérald Filion. You can view that interview here and you can read Filion's blog comment here (in French).

Also, some food for thought for the Caisse's real estate team. A new report from Zillow shows that rents across the U.S. are increasing, and not just in the expected regions of New York City, San Francisco and Boston. Overall, rents increased 3.3% year-over-year as of January. But many cities outpaced that, including Kansas City, which saw rent grow more than double the national average, jumping 8.5% year-over-year. St. Louis saw rent increase by 4.5% over the same period. Rents in Detroit grew by 5.0% and rents in Cleveland grew by 4.2%.

Zillow CEO Spencer Rascoff explains the U.S. rental market following the housing crisis: "All of a sudden, there were 5 million new renters and the rental stock didn't increase." People can't afford new homes so pensions should be focusing on multi-family commercial real estate and not just in prime markets. The Caisse is already betting big on multi-family real estate.

Private Equity Discovers Warren Buffett?

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Simon Clark of the Wall Street Journal's MarketWatch reports, Blackstone wants to invest like Warren Buffett:
Blackstone Group is talking to its biggest investors to create a “coalition of the willing” that can buy control of large companies outside of its existing funds, according to Joe Baratta, head of private equity at the New York-based firm.

Blackstone (BX) usually buys control of companies through its main private-equity fund. It is talking to a select group of large investors who may want to own a company for longer than the usual term of private-equity ownership of five to 10 years and target lower returns.

Baratta likened the potential new approach to the style of Warren Buffett, whose Berkshire Hathaway Inc. doesn’t have a time limit on its investments because it doesn’t buy assets through a fund.

“I don’t know why Warren Buffett should be the only person who can have a 15-year, 14% sort of return horizon,” Baratta said at the Super Return private equity conference in Berlin.

Several large private equity groups recently started exploring ways to buy big companies in partnership with large investors outside their existing funds. The potential new approach comes as major institutional investors, such as pension funds and sovereign-wealth funds, which are clients of the big private-equity groups, look for steady returns in an environment of persistently low global interest rates.

An expanded version of this report appears at WSJ.com.
William Alden of the New York Times also reports, Blackstone Considers a Lower-Return, Longer-Term Approach to Private Equity:
Private Equity firms have always offered a high-octane investing experience, attempting to multiply investors’ capital over a period as long as a decade.

But some of the largest firms are now considering taking a more sedate approach with some of their biggest clients in the latest sign that the industry is moving away from its former free-wheeling spirit.

Joseph Baratta, the head of private equity at the Blackstone Group, the biggest alternative investment firm, said at a conference in Berlin on Tuesday that the firm was speaking with large investors about a new investment structure that would aim for lower returns over a longer period of time.

Mr. Baratta, whose remarks were reported by The Wall Street Journal, said the investments would be made outside of Blackstone’s traditional funds, which impose time limits on the investing cycle. Invoking Warren E. Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway, Mr. Baratta said he wanted to own companies for more than 10 years.

”I don’t know why Warren Buffett should be the only person who can have a 15-year, 14 percent sort of return horizon,” Mr. Baratta said, according to The Journal.

His remarks, at the SuperReturn International conference, were only the latest example of chatter about this sort of structure in private equity circles.

News reports last fall said that Blackstone and the Carlyle Group, the private equity giant based in Washington, were both considering making investments outside their existing funds. Such moves would let the firms buy companies they might otherwise pass on — big, established corporations that don’t need significant restructuring but could benefit from private ownership.

Another private equity giant, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, has increasingly been making investments from its own balance sheet in addition to its funds. While this differs from the approach Mr. Baratta discussed, it similarly allows for new types of investments and provides a more stable source of capital. K.K.R., for example, has used its balance sheet to make minority investments in fast-growing companies like Arago, a German software maker, and Magic Leap, an augmented-reality start-up.

The holy grail that these private equity firms are chasing is what they call “permanent capital,” exemplified by Berkshire.

Blackstone, which has not yet deployed such a strategy, might gather a “coalition of the willing” investors to buy individual companies, Mr. Baratta said. This approach could be attractive to some of the world’s biggest investors, including sovereign wealth funds and big pension funds, which, though they want market-beating returns, also want to avoid taking too much risk.

Mr. Baratta said Blackstone and the coalition of investors could buy consumer goods companies like H.J. Heinz, which Berkshire Hathaway bought with the Brazilian investment firm 3G Capital, or infrastructure assets, according to The Journal.

”It opens up a whole universe of opportunities that we’re not currently accessing,” he said.
I must admit, when I read these articles earlier this week, I started chuckling and getting all cynical. Why? Because I was thinking to myself that in a low-return world awash in liquidity where it's getting harder for these private equity giants to compete with each other and with strategics (ie. corporations with record profits), all of a sudden they're discovering the virtues of the long, long view that Canadian pensions have been talking up for a very long time!

Don't kid yourself, this "new shift" among private equity giants is nothing more than a clever ruse to garner ever more assets so they can keep collecting that all important management fee. The New York Times article above talks about "permanent capital" but I prefer an expression Derek Murphy, the head of PSP's Private Equity group, once cynically quipped to me: "The only reason these guys want to talk to us is that they view us as a perpetual funding machine" (he used more colorful language but I'll spare you the details).

"Murph" is absolutely right, PSP Investments, CPPIB, and other mega large global pensions and sovereign wealth funds are nothing more than perpetual funding machines to these private equity giants. Facing pressure from investors and more regulatory scrutiny, they are lowering fees but looking to make it up by shifting focus on the longer term to collect increasingly more assets from their biggest clients. This gives new meaning to the term "glorified asset gathers."

In other words, just like overpaid hedge fund gurus, realizing they had to do something to respond to all this regulatory scrutiny and pressure from investors, overpaid private equity titans came up with this "ingenious" new way to garner more assets from the "coalition of the willing" to keep adding to their obscene wealth, which by the way, they amassed through the blood, sweat and tears of public sector workers contributing to their pensions (Piketty needs to revise his treatise on inequality).

Alright, let me take a breather here and stop being such a hopeless cynic. The truth is unlike hedge funds, private equity funds provide a better alignment of interests with pension funds and other investors focusing on a long period. So perhaps these private equity firms are shifting focus, aiming for lower returns over a long period, because they're responding better to the needs of their biggest clients.

Also, I don't mean to take swipes at Blackstone and Steve Schwartzman who has assembled a great investment team. Their success is well earned as they're printing money over there. I would invest with a David Blitzer or a Jonathan Gray any time because these guys are truly the cream of the crop and unlike other shops, Blackstone has a better governance structure and real succession planning, which is why they're the global leaders in alternative investments and why their shares are finally surging higher (click on image):


But I agree with TPG's co-founder, Jim Coulter, there are 'titanic shifts' going on in private equity:
The structure of the traditional private equity fund is under threat as investors seek new ways to buy and own companies without paying high fees to buyout firms, according to TPG co-founder Jim Coulter.

“I’ve never seen a period of time when we’ve had the extent of titanic shifts in the industry that we are seeing right now,” Mr. Coulter said at the Super Return private equity conference in Berlin. “The first is really the shift from funds.”

Investors usually commit to private equity funds for 10 years. They typically pay fees on undrawn commitments to private equity firms as well as lower fees on commitments that have been drawn to buy assets. Undrawn is money committed to a fund but not yet used. Drawn is money committed and used to buy a company.

The fees that private equity firms charge investors on capital that has been committed but not used are likely to decrease, Mr. Coulter said.

Investors such as sovereign wealth funds are increasingly demanding to invest money alongside private equity firms or through separate managed accounts to reduce the fees they pay.

Mr. Coulter said he expects the share of companies acquired through traditional private equity fund structures to decrease as new models emerge. Blackstone Group and CVC Capital Partners are among firms experimenting with new models,  people familiar with the firms have said.

One reason for the change is the fees on undrawn commitments usually cause private equity funds to show poor performance in their first years.

“That fee drag in the early years of a fund actually becomes difficult,” Mr. Coulter said.
As I stated above, facing pressure from investors and heightened scrutiny from federal regulators, some of the largest private equity firms are giving up their claim to fees that generated hundreds of millions of dollars for them over the years. But the private equity giants are adapting and looking to make up any drag on fees by increasing the assets they manage over a longer period.

Maybe these private equity giants are concerned that we're heading into a protracted period of global deflation, and they're thinking it's a wise business decision to shift focus to generate more modest returns over a longer period. I don't know but there are certainly 'titanic shifts' going on in the industry right now.

On the last point, Chad Bray of CNBC reports, Private Equity Executives Offer Differing Views on Industry’s Future:
Guy Hands and David M. Rubenstein gave vastly different views on Wednesday about the future of the private equity industry. But that may be a result of where they are perched.

Mr. Rubenstein is co-chief executive of one of the world's largest private equity firms, the Carlyle Group, and Mr. Hands is the founder of Terra Firma Capital Partners, a smaller, privately held firm.

Speaking at the SuperReturn International conference in Berlin, Mr. Hands said he believed the industry, outside the large, publicly traded firms like Carlyle, would go back to its roots and focus on smaller fund-raising and on being more closely tied to its clients.

Most important, he said, they will go back to being "more genuinely private," while the large firms will continue to move beyond traditional private equity to become generalist asset managers.

"It means being more aligned with your investors, putting much more of your own skin in the game, giving them what they really want, minimizing their fees, maximizing their returns," Mr. Hands said.

"That way private equity will go 'back to the future,'  " he said. "To take advantage of these opportunities and create alpha, the future for private equity lies in its past."

Mr. Rubenstein offered a bit of a different view on a separate panel at the conference.

He sees private equity opening up to a much larger client base in the next decade, including individuals managing their 401(k) investments in the United States. He also sees sovereign wealth funds playing a larger role than they ever have.

And, he predicted, the industry will discuss its returns and its operations in a more standardized and public fashion.

"People will actually know what a top quartile fund is," Mr. Rubenstein said. "There will be a standard definition and a standard organization — government or nongovernment — that will certify someone is a top quartile. People will not be able to say they are top quartile, when they are not."

He also thinks the industry will go by a new name: Private equity does not fully describe what the industry does today, if not tomorrow, he believes.

"Everything will be known to the public," Mr. Rubenstein said. "Everybody's performance will be known. Everybody's valuation will be known."

"Everyone will feel the industry is as transparent as the public equity industry is," he said.
I actually agree with both Guy Hands and David Rubenstein. I see smaller private equity and venture capital funds with much better alignment of interests sprouting up but they will be targeting ever growing family offices (or smaller pensions) who are looking to build strong, long lasting relationships with excellent but smaller funds.

But Rubenstein is absolutely right, the big players, the so-called "coalition of the willing" that write huge tickets in the hundreds of millions are looking for scale which is why they'll be focusing their attention on truly top quartile alternative investment firms that offer investments in private equity, real estate, hedge funds and anything in between. Some are even venturing into infrastructure (although there the CPPIBs of this world invest directly) but not farmland.

As far as opening up private equity to the masses investing in their retirement accounts, I'm a lot less sanguine or enthusiastic as Mr. Rubenstein. I prefer to see enhanced CPP or an enhanced Social Security where well-governed, large public DB pensions invest in private equity for the masses instead of introducing private equity as an option for retirement accounts. This would be in everyone's best interest.

If you want to invest in these private equity giants, just buy shares of Blackstone (BX), The Carlyle Group (CG), KKR & Co. (KKR), Oaktree Capital Group (OAK), or Apollo Global Management (APO). They offer great dividends and some will see substantial capital appreciation but keep in mind the discussion above and realize there are 'titanic shifts' going on in the industry right now and if global deflation strikes, it will hurt everyone, including private equity giants.

If you have any comments you want to share on this topic, feel free to send me an email (LKolivakis@gmail.com). I'm taking a week off to recharge my batteries but will have access to my emails. Please remember to show your appreciation for this blog and donate and/or subscribe via PayPal at the top right-hand side. The information you find here and the way I tie it all together is truly unique and well worth your financial support.

One final note. I read a lot of nonsense in other blogs on the "Greek crisis," especially on Zero Hedge but also in more reputable blogs like Naked Capitalism which just posted something silly on the alternative in Greece. If you really want to understand why Greece is in such a mess, take the time to read an op-ed the New York Times published by Aristos Doxiadis, What Greece Needs. It is truly superb and he explains it all in that short comment.

Below, David Rubenstein, co-chief executive of the Carlyle Group, discusses trends in private equity, where bubbles are forming and where he sees the best global investment opportunities. Take the time to listen to his comments, he's one of the smartest private equity gurus in the world and a tireless philanthropist, just like Blackstone's Jonathan Gray.

More hedge fund and private equity gurus should follow their lead and ignore Forbes' silly list of the world's richest. Sitting on their vast wealth is pointless, just ask Buffett, Gates and other billionaires, including Blackstone's co-founder, Pete Peterson, who understand the meaning of enough (see the 60 Minutes clip below).


Fully Funded HOOPP Surges 17.7% in 2014

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The Canadian Press reports, HOOPP reports 17.71% return in 2014, drives net asset to $60.8 billion:
The pension fund that invest on behalf of health-care workers in Ontario reported a 17.71 per cent rate of return for 2014.

The Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan says the $9.1 billion in investment income exceeded its portfolio benchmark by more than $1 billion, and drove net assets to a record $60.8 billion from $51.6 billion at the end of 2013

HOOPP said the funded position of the pension plan remained stable at 115 per cent, up from 114 per cent in 2013.

President and CEO Jim Keohane attributed the results to the “liability driven investing” approach that the plan adopted several years ago.

“2014 was a year that highlighted the merits of the LDI approach,” Keohane said. “Sharp declines in interest rates, that were highly beneficial to our fixed income portfolio, offset the negative impact of the rate declines on our pension obligations.”

HOOPP’s approach utilizes two investment portfolios: a liability hedge portfolio that seeks to mitigate risks associated with pension obligations, and a return-seeking portfolio to help to keep contribution rates stable and affordable.

In 2014, the liability hedge portfolio provided about 72 per cent of HOOPP’s investment income. Nominal bonds and real return bonds provided most of the income within this portfolio, generating returns of 30.2 per cent and 13.4 per cent respectively. The real estate portfolio provided a 9.8 per cent return.

Within the return-seeking portfolio, public equities returned 10.4 per cent, while private equity posted a return of 16.3 per cent.
Barbara Shecter of the National Post also reports, HOOPP credits ‘liability-driven investing’ for 17.7% return in 2014:
The Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP) posted a return of 17.7% for the year ended December 31, with net assets rising to a record $60.8 billion from $51.6 billion in 2013.

Investment income for the year more than doubled to $9.1 billion from $4 billion in 2012, and exceeded HOOPP’s portfolio benchmark by more than $1 billion.

The plans 10-year and 20-year returns are now 10.27% and 9.98%, respectively.

HOOPP’s funded position is stable at 115%, up slightly from 2013.

Jim Keohane, the pension manager’s chief executive, credited the plan’s “liability driven investing” approach for the results.

The approach uses two investment portfolios. The first, a liability hedge portfolio, is intended to mitigate risks associated with pension obligations, while the second, a return-seeking portfolio of public and private equities, is designed to earn “incremental” returns to help keep contribution rates stable and affordable.

In 2014, the liability hedge portfolio provided about 72% of the investment income. Nominal bonds and real return bonds provided most of the income within this portfolio, generating returns of 30.2% and 13.4% respectively.

“Sharp declines in interest rates, that were highly beneficial to our fixed income portfolio, offset the negative impact of the rate declines on our pension obligations,” Mr. Keohane said.

HOOPP has 295,000 members including nurses, medical technicians, food services staff and housekeeping staff that work for 470 employers in the health care field.
And Adam Mayers of the Toronto Star reports, Why this Ontario pension plan can afford to boost its benefits:
Ontario’s nurses, social workers, lab technicians and other hospital staff have a lot of reasons to smile today.

At a time when most pension plans are cutting benefits, their Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP) has just increased inflation protection for its 295,000 members. Instead of covering 75 per cent of the annual increases in the cost of living, HOOPP is raising the bar to 100 per cent.

While many plans struggle with underfunding, Ontario’s third-largest pension fund has $1.15 on hand for every $1 it must spend. Stocks on the Toronto market returned 7.4 per cent on average in 2014, while HOOPP returned a record 17.71 per cent. The plan’s average return in each of the last 10 years is 10.27 per cent.

CEO Jim Keohane seemed almost embarrassed Wednesday as he discussed his annual results. He noted somberly, “We have the highest 10-year return of any global pension plan.”

Hey, let me in. Where can I get a pension plan like that? Well, in the private sector, nowhere.

The surest way to rouse readers from slumber to red hot anger is to suggest that anything in the public sector can be better than the same thing done privately. The profit motive is the only way to breed efficiency, some say. Let the market decide. Government and quasi-government agencies are fat, wasteful and largely corrupt. You can add lazy, unproductive and incompetent.

But when it comes to pensions, that’s not true. Ontario’s big public-sector funds are the top of their class. While companies want 110 per cent of our effort, they’ve largely rewarded workers by abandoning the sort of pension plans that provide security and let people sleep easy in retirement.

Some 76 per cent of private-sector employees don’t have a pension of any kind. Of those who do have a pension, less than half have defined benefit plans. When you do the math, only about one in 10 people working in the private sector has a defined benefit plan.

Such plans pay a monthly amount for life, putting the onus on companies to come up with the money. Corporate Canada doesn’t like that idea and has been bailing out, moving to defined contribution (DC) plans where they can throw some money in the pot to match workers’ contributions (if they’re lucky) and then wash their hands.

That leaves workers with all the risks and stress of investing and managing the money on retirement. These are skills most people don’t have.

The public sector still believes that collective effort can give a better outcome. So, 86 per cent of workers for provincial and local governments — people such as firefighters and police, those at universities and colleges and workers in health care — are covered by pension plans, mostly the defined benefit kind.

Pensions provide a broader social benefit beyond the cash in a pensioner’s pocket. According to HOOPP, 7 per cent of all income in Ontario comes from defined benefit pensions, which pay out about $27 billion a year, money that supports the communities where people live.

Keohane says 20 per cent of all income in Collingwood, for example, comes from pensions.

He says it’s a myth that taxpayers are footing the bill. In HOOPP’s case, 80 cents of every dollar in the $61 billion fund come from investment returns.

There are several reasons why an individual can’t hope to match the performance of a big fund with an RRSP. Big funds bring investing expertise and economies of scale to bear in a way that individuals cannot. It is precisely because they lack a “for-profit” motive that such funds can keep fees low and returns high.

Think of how many fees you might pay along the way when investing — for advisors, buying and selling stocks and funds, trailer fees, management expense ratios, fees you can’t see.

Big funds are also “patient money”, which means they can weather market ups and downs and not be forced to sell. The next “quarter” for HOOPP is 25 years, not three months.

OMERS, Ontario’s largest pension plan, also reported strong results last week. OMERS manages the assets of 450,000 municipal employees and earned a 10 per cent investment return in 2014.

The fund stumbled during the financial collapse of 2008 and has been working its way out of a hole. In 2014, OMERS made more progress, increasing its funding level to 91 cents per dollar needed, up from 88 cents a year ago. There’s still a long way to go to catch HOOPP, but it’s going the right way.

Our frayed faith and anger with our public institutions is well-deserved, and that general discontent spills over to public pension envy.

But a better target would be private-sector employers who have abandoned their workers because it’s expedient, leaving them to make financial decisions in retirement they are often ill-equipped to make.
You can read the press release HOOPP put out on their 2014 results here. As shown below, in 2014, the liability hedge portfolio provided approximately 72% of our investment income. Nominal bonds and real return bonds provided most of the income within this portfolio, generating returns of 30.2% and 13.4% respectively (click on image):


The real estate portfolio was also a contributor during the year, with a 9.8% return. Within the return seeking portfolio, public equities were the largest contributor to investment income, returning 10.4%. Private equity posted a return of 16.3%.

Now, you might be wondering how did HOOPP post such exceptional results, beating out OMERS which gained net 10% in 2014 and the Caisse which gained 12% in 2014? The answer is good old boring bonds! HOOPP's LDI approach means it's much more weighted in fixed income (44%) than its larger Canadian peers (click on image below).

And remember what I wrote when I discussed whether longevity risk will doom pensions:
.... I've got some very bad news for you, when global deflation hits us, it will decimate pensions. That's where I part ways with Mauldin because longevity risk, while important, is nothing compared to a substantial decline in real interest rates.

Importantly, a decline in real rates, especially now when rates are at historic lows, is far more detrimental to pension deficits than people living longer.

What else did Mauldin conveniently miss? He ignores the brutal truth on DC pensions and misses how the 'inexorable' shift to DC pensions will exacerbate inequality and pretty much condemn millions of Americans to more pension poverty.
In a world of historic low rates, any decline in rates disproportionately impacts pension deficits and that is why HOOPP will keep outperforming its peers if deflation sets in and rates keep falling.

Of course, there were skeptics on why HOOPP outperformed in 2014. One pension expert shared this with me:
HOOPP put up good numbers, especially with fully hedged USD investments. When they outline returns in the table, it looks like must have seriously leveraged bonds to get the returns, and it is weird how they identify only a couple of pieces the risk seeking equity bucket, some type of strategy cost them a lot of return, probably S&P put protection, and/ or their old option strategy that laid off equity risks for insurance companies at the time. Also, Jim Keohane alludes to moving out of bonds due to low rates, how can one actually do that and still claim LDI? It is important, in that those who seek to copy HOOPP, especially the LDI idea, need to understand the execution details.
There are a few things here that we need to clear up. First, did HOOPP seriously leveraged its bond portfolio in 2014? i will come back to this below but when you look at the returns the Caisse posted for its long-term bonds in 2014 (click on image below), HOOPP's returns look awfully suspicious:


How did the Caisse post an 18% return for long-term bonds while HOOPP posted 30%? Did leverage factor into the equation? This is something the Caisse's CIO, Roland Lescure, discussed with me when I went over their 2014 results:
You are right, we have significantly lowered leverage at the Caisse since 2009. Leverage is now solely used to fund part of our real estate portfolio and the (in)famous ABCP portfolio which will be gone by 2016. As you rightly point out, most Canadian pension funds use leverage to different degrees. Further, we also have significantly reduced risk by focusing our investments on quality companies and projects, which are less risky than the usual benchmark-driven investments. And those investments happen to have served us well as they did outperform the benchmarks significantly in 2014. You probably have all the details for each of our portfolios but I would point out that our Canadian equity portfolio outperformed the TSX by close to 300 bps. And the global quality equity portfolio did even better. 
Why do I bring this up? Because I hate when people look at headline returns and get all impressed without digging deeper into how those returns were achieved. Also, keep in mind what one senior pension portfolio manager shared with me when I went over the list of the highest paid pension CEOs:
"First and foremost, various funds use more leverage than others. This is the most differentiating factor in explaining performance across DB plans. In Canada, F/X policy will also impact performance of past 3 years. ‎It's very hard to compare returns because of vastly different invest policies; case in point is PSP's huge equity weighting (need to include all real estate, private equity and infrastructure) that has a huge beta."
I actually emailed Jim Keohane, CEO of HOOPP, today and last week to discuss how leverage contributed to their results. Jim cleared up any confusion sharing this with me:
With regard to the difference in returns between our bond portfolio and the Caisse, I can't comment on the Caisse portfolio, but our portfolio benefited from a significant holding in US Treasuries which materially outperformed long Canada's. Leverage was not a factor in this return.
There is no question that HOOPP took the right duration bet in 2014, going long Treasuries relative to Canada long bonds (the Caisse was short duration which is why they underperformed in Bonds in 2014). If you add in currency gains from a surging USD, HOOPP got an added return on its long U.S. bonds position in 2014.

On leverage, Jim also added this last week when I reached out to him:
A significant amount of the "leverage" we have results from the fact that we do all of our securities borrowing and lending in house rather than outsourcing the function to the custodian. Other funds have this same leverage but because they have outsourced the activity it shows up on the custodian's balance sheet instead of their own balance sheet. These types of activities significantly increase the size of the balance sheet but they contain very little risk.

We also run a number of funding strategies and long/short strategies and other absolute return strategies. Many of these strategies inflate the balance sheet but contain very little risk. Pursuing these strategies enables us to earn sufficient returns which enables us to reduce our exposure to public equities where the return streams are much more volatile and unpredictable. This reduces our overall funding risk.

The main driver of returns was our LDI approach. Several years ago our modeling showed us that a major decline in long term interest rates would impair our ability to meet our pension obligations. We knew that we needed to increase the interest rate sensitivity of the portfolio to hedge against this risk. We accomplished this by selling our physical equity portfolios and used the proceeds to buy long term bonds, then used an equity derivative overlay to maintain our equity exposure. When this risk played out in 2014, the present value of our liabilities increased materially, but our holdings in long term bonds increased the value of our assets to offset the increase in liabilities and allowed us to maintain our surplus. I guess you could call these synthetic positions that better match our liabilities leverage. I call it anticipating what could go wrong and taking actions to hedge against that risk - in other words risk management.

We are not using leverage to boost returns, we are using it to reduce risks. Our objective is to meet our pension obligations regardless of the economic backdrop and the restructuring of our balance sheet is what has enabled us to do this.
I also asked Jim about the S&P put strategy, which really helped them deliver great results in 2012, and whether it subtracted from their overall results. I also asked him how others can copy their approach. Jim replied:
On the equity side, the only strategy that subtracted value was a small tactical underweight in US equities we put on in the latter half of the year.

The returns reported for equities is the return on the derivative overlay position without the underlying assets. The underlying assets are bonds.

With regard to LDI, I believe that all plans should be managed with their liabilities in mind. LDI is not simply about owning long bonds, it is more about understanding the risks inherent in the liabilities and creating a portfolio which most effectively reduces those risks. Those risks are not constant over time so the portfolio has to be managed in a dynamic fashion. Very low interest rates mean that your interest rate sensitivity is lower so the need to hedge that risk is diminished.
To be honest, I'm not sure what he meant by that last sentence. In a low rate environment, your interest rate sensitivity (in terms of duration risk) is much higher as is the need to hedge that risk. I think what he meant is in a low rate environment, the risks of rates rising are bigger, which will help reduce liabilities.

But Jim is right, the LDI approach, when done correctly and dynamically, can significantly reduce funding risk, ie. the risk that your plan won't have enough assets to match liabilities.

Eric Fontaine of Pavillion Advisory Group confirmed some of what Jim discusses above, sharing this with me:
As you can see from the table below (click on image), it was also possible for an investor to achieve a return of over 30% in 2014 by investing in ‘unlevered’ super long term (20+ Strips) bonds, a strategy we have recommended to some of our clients not comfortable with leverage (although you get some curve risk).
Other investors could have achieved the same by using leverage and invest the proceeds in LT bonds (eg. 2 X LT BOND return, less marginal cost of borrowing gives you over 30%). Both are nice approaches to better match the duration of your assets and those of your liabilities (of 12-15 years) without given up the upside of the risky assets. The main risk though is an increase in the short-term rates combined with the decline of the risky assets, which we haven’t seem for a while now, so as HOOPP is saying, it is important to be dynamic about it and, I would add, to properly manage the risk inherent in risky assets!
On the funding side, it's important to keep in mind that HOOPP is a shared-risk plan, which means the stakeholders share the risks of any shortfall equally. If there are deficits, they cut benefits. Conversely, if there is a surplus, they increase benefits, which is the case this year (notice however, they are increasing cost-of-living adjustments, which are easier to cut down the road if there is trouble and pose less risk to the plan, especially if deflation sets in).

HOOPP actually does a great job communicating to its members through their regular newsletters putting pensions in perspective. I wish they had a lot more information on their strategies and compensation but it's a private plan catering to public sector employees (in my opinion, it should be turned into a public plan).

There are a few other interesting tidbits I read when I went over HOOPP's 2014 year in review. First, as is widely known, HOOPP manages almost everything internally, which is why they highest five-year net return in CEM's database of Canadian peer funds and the highest 10-year net return among 124 global funds (click on image):


In this regard, HOOPP follows the Oracle of Omaha who warned public pensions to stop pouring money into expensive, high-end money managers (this is why Buffett delivered exceptional long-term returns and one reason why PE firms are trying to emulate his long investment horizon approach).

Also, check out some quick facts on their members (click on image below):


You'll notice 84% are female and the average age of their active members is 45, which means they're a relatively young plan compared to Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan which is why they don't have to use as low a discount rate as the Oracle of Ontario and can take on more risk than Teachers.

More importantly, notice the average unreduced pension is $23,500, which is good but hardly as high as all the pension scaremongers keep harping on when they spew their ridiculous myths on DB pensions

Lastly, I've tried to write a very balanced and objective comment on HOOPP's solid returns. If you have anything to add, feel free to email me at LKolivakis@gmail.com. The results are impressive and HOOPP's members are in an enviable position but there are risks to such a high fixed income exposure, especially if rates rise considerably.

Having said this, a rise in rates also means liabilities will fall commensurately and HOOPP will still be able to maintain its fully funded status if it adds value over its overall benchmark. Jim and I discussed this in the past here.

Below, a video HOOPP put out on its website where Jim Keohane, its CEO,  explains 2014 results. I suggest other pensions copy HOOPP with similar videos explaining their results with an embeddable code for blogs (get on it, we're in 2015 and live in an era of social media! There are no excuses for not doing this!). HOOPP's Annual Report will be available soon and I look forward to reading it once it's available.

OMERS Gains 10% in 2014

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Janet McFarland of the Globe and Mail reports, OMERS earns 10% return in 2014, reduces funding shortfall:
The pension plan for Ontario municipal employees earned a 10-per-cent investment return in 2014 and reduced its funding shortfall as it continued to implement a new lower-risk investment strategy.

The Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System reported its assets climbed to $72-billion in 2014, up from $65-billion at the end of 2013. The plan is now 90.8 per cent funded, up from 88.2 per cent a year earlier.

OMERS, which manages assets for 450,000 Ontario employees and retirees, has faced a significant funding shortfall since the financial crisis in 2008 when it reported a 15-per-cent loss that cost the fund $8-billion. In 2010, OMERS implemented a plan to eliminate the deficit by 2025, including a contribution increase for members to be phased in over three years.

The 2014 results are the first reported by new OMERS chief executive officer Michael Latimer, who replaced retiring CEO Michael Nobrega last year.

“Given that I’ve come in on April 1 of last year, we have an opportunity to take a view of our strategy, and so we’re doing that with our board,” Mr. Latimer said. “I think once we establish that road map … we will put the pin in the map, and we’ll be focused.”

In the mean time, OMERS has already pledged to increase its exposure to infrastructure investments in countries such as Canada and the U.S., as well as Australia.

“We’ve got more appetite for infrastructure. We like the stable cash flows that infrastructure provides to the portfolio,” said Jonathan Simmons, chief financial officer at OMERS.

Mr. Latimer added that out of the opportunities he sees to invest in private equity, real estate and infrastructure, “the one that sits on the top of the priority list for us is … infrastructure.”

OMERS said its Borealis Infrastructure division posted gains of 12.7 per cent, Oxford Properties real estate earned 8.7 per cent and OMERS Private Equity investments earned 14.4 per cent.

As of 2014, OMERS’ portfolio was weighted towards the public markets, which made up 58 per cent of investments. Within a few years, Mr. Latimer intends to reduce that to about 53 per cent.

OMERS needs to earn a long-term 6.5-per-cent annualized return on its investments to meet its pension obligations. The fund currently has a net five-year annualized rate of return of 7.9 per cent, and a 10-year annualized return of 7 per cent. OMERS says that 2014 results beat its benchmark of 7.7 per cent.

The fund’s 10-per-cent return for 2014 is an improvement from 6.5 per cent earned in 2013, when OMERS introduced a new investment strategy that lost money. The strategy is aimed at reducing public market investments such as stocks and plain-vanilla bonds, replacing them with a lower-risk portfolio with holdings such as inflation-linked bonds and commodities, reducing the risk of losses from major market crashes.

The portfolio lost $407-million in 2013, however, due to a sudden spike in interest rates. OMERS did not detail the results for the new portfolio in 2014, but the fund said its $41-billion capital markets portfolio in total earned returns of 10.7 per cent for the year. Investments in bonds performed well, helping boost returns this year.

The only negative return for a major investment group was posted by OMERS Strategic Investments, which lost 10 per cent last year.

Strategic Investments is the smallest of OMERS main divisions with $2.2-billion in assets invested in alternative areas, including resources and energy, venture capital and emerging new markets such as airport management and lottery operations. OMERS annual report last year said 53 per cent of the division’s holdings at the end of 2013 were in the Alberta oil and gas sector, which drove returns down in the year.
John Tilak and Euan Rocha of Reuters also report,Canada's OMERS posts solid 2014 results, targets asset mix shift:
Canadian pension plan OMERS said on Friday it generated a 10 percent return in 2014 on the back of big gains in investments in public and private markets, and it plans to make a gradual shift in its portfolio asset mix over the next 3 to 5 years.

OMERS, or the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System, said net assets rose to C$72 billion ($57.71 billion) at the end of 2014, from C$65.1 billion at the end of 2013.

The company is seeing momentum in infrastructure investments and also recorded higher investment returns in its real estate and private equity segments.

"My own view is that the story will continue to be around the alternative asset space," Chief Executive Michael Latimer said at a press conference. "And that is a reflection of the flow of capital."

Alternative assets from office buildings to rare stamps, or infrastructure assets to artwork, are typically less liquid and harder to value than publicly traded assets, but they allow big investors like pension funds to diversify their portfolios and avoid the perils of market volatility.

The pension fund manager said its public-sector investments returned 10.7 percent on the back of strong bond prices, while its private market investments returned 9.5 percent on the year.

Its portfolio in 2014 was 58 percent in the public markets and 42 percent in private investments.

Latimer expects that to eventually shift to 53 percent in the public markets and 47 percent in the private markets. That target portfolio asset mix could be realistically achieved over the next 3 to 5 years, he said.

"We are still trying to migrate to what we describe as our target mix," Latimer said. "We are not there yet, but we're very comfortable with the progress that we've made in getting there."

OMERS, which has over 450,000 members, said it received some C$3.7 billion in contributions from plan members and employers in 2014, and paid out C$3.1 billion in benefits.
You can read the press release on OMERS 2014 results here. The Annual Report is not available yet so I can't delve deeply into the individual portfolios. I suspect it will be available on Monday April 13th when OMERS does its Spring Information session.

In any case, both public and private markets delivered solid returns and it appears that bonds, which OMERS was touting earlier this year, delivered decent gains. It's also worth noting that OMERS worked with Bridgewater to implement a risk parity approach that many U.S. pensions have been implementing in the last couple of years to make bonds act like stocks:
Pension funds across the U.S. are desperate to overcome low interest rates and churn out returns big enough to pay future retirees.

Now some hedge funds and money managers are pitching something they see as a Holy Grail: a strategy that often uses leverage to boost returns of bonds that usually occupy the low-risk, low-return portion of pension-fund investment portfolios.

Leverage relies on borrowing money or using derivatives to make large investments while putting up less cash. The tactic's widespread use helped inflate the world-wide debt bubble that burst during the financial crisis, and it was blamed for ruinous losses at banks and securities firms.

But money managers such as Bridgewater Associates, the world's largest hedge-fund firm, and a growing number of pension funds say this type of leverage is different. By using leverage through derivatives, such as bond futures, and by investing in commodities, some pension funds believe they can reduce their typically large exposure to the turbulent stock market and still earn solid returns.

Other proponents of this strategy, known as "risk parity," include AQR Capital Management and Clifton Group, a Minneapolis-based investment firm.

In Virginia, officials at the Fairfax County Employees' Retirement System have revamped the entire $3.4 billion portfolio around a risk-parity approach. About 90% of the pension's portfolio now is exposed to bonds, when factoring in leverage.

"We think we can improve returns while reducing the risk level of the portfolio,'' says Robert Mears, the pension fund's executive director.

Fairfax County had an annual return of 19% as of Sept. 30, for the latest 12-month period for which figures are available. In the same period, the median return for public pensions in the U.S. was 17%, according to Wilshire Trust Universe Comparison Service (article was written in January 2013).

Critics worry that leverage, by its very nature, magnifies profits when trades go well and increases losses when they go sour.

"The minute there is leverage involved it is going to kill you on the downside,'' says Ashvin Chhabra, chief investment officer at the Institute for Advanced Study, a research center in Princeton, N.J.

Pension officials that employ risk parity say they are using a modest amount of leverage, and nowhere near what investment banks used leading up to the crisis. They also are trading in large, liquid markets, and say they have ample liquidity should they ever need to settle trading losses with cash.

Bridgewater is known as a pioneer of risk parity. Executives from the Westport, Conn., firm have pitched the idea to pension trustees across the U.S., even making a documentary-style online video about risk parity featuring founder Ray Dalio.

Pension funds and other institutional investors typically take most of their risks in the stock market. Mr. Dalio says risk parity spreads the risk to a pension's bonds and other holdings.

"Ironically, by increasing your risk in the bonds you are going to lower your risk in your overall portfolio,'' he said in an interview.

A core tenet of risk parity is that when stocks are falling, bond prices typically rise. By using leverage, bond returns can help make up for losses on stocks. Without leverage, bond returns in a typical pension portfolio of 60% stocks and 40% bonds wouldn't be large enough to compensate for low stock returns.

Stocks have much higher volatility than bonds, meaning returns are higher but losses also can be larger. Leverage creates more volatility in bonds.

Risk parity can involve investments in commodities and Treasury-inflation- protected securities, derivatives known as TIPS.

Proponents say it is risky not to use leverage. "It means you are going to have huge equity risk,'' says Michael Mendelson, a principal and portfolio manager at AQR, an investment firm based in Greenwich, Conn.

Risk-parity investments make up about a third of AQR's $71 billion in assets under management, according to a person familiar with the matter.

Risk parity's growing popularity comes at a fragile time in the bond market. Some critics warn the strategy may fizzle if interest rates rise and erode bond returns.

There is "reasonable concern" that could happen once the bull market for bonds cools, says Mark Evans, a managing director at Goldman Sachs Asset Management, a unit of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. That factor "isn't likely to be there going forward for a number of years."

The basic concept of risk parity has been around for years. Mr. Dalio first experimented with the idea in 1996 when he applied the strategy to his family's trust. "What is the asset allocation mix that when I am dead and gone is going to last for generations?'' Mr. Dalio recalled asking himself back then.

Bridgewater started offering risk parity broadly to clients in 2001 through its All Weather fund. For the trailing 10 year period since Sept. 30, All Weather has had an average annual return of about 10%, compared with a median 10-year return for all public pension funds of 6%.

Mr. Dalio said risk parity has proved to generate returns in just about any economic condition. In the near term, if bond values begin to sink as the economy grows, risk-parity proponents expect stock and commodity holdings to offset those losses.

The strategy isn't invincible. In 2008, the fund sank 20%, a big decline but not as bad as overall losses at most pension funds.

The All Weather fund uses leverage of about 2 times, which means for every dollar of cash invested it obtains about $2 of exposure.

The employee pension fund of United Technologies Corp. has gradually increased its risk parity-related investments to $1.8 billion, or about 8% of its total assets, up from an initial 5% allocation in 2005.

At the San Joaquin County Employees' Retirement Association, in Stockton, Calif., risk parity now amounts to 10% of the pension's overall portfolio of approximately $2 billion.

In an email, the pension fund's chief investment officer said the fund "is aware of the leverage being utilized in their risk-parity strategies and has no misgivings."
The article above was written in January 2013 but I mention it because OMERS did implement a risk parity approach in recent years which it outlined in an older background paper covering all their investments.

Some funds, like HOOPP, implement risk parity internally, forgoing to pay fees to outside money managers. But as Jim Keohane, HOOPP's CEO, explained in my last comment going over their spectacular 2014 results, their use of leverage is minimal and appears to be larger than it truly is because they don't use custodians to repo their bonds. Instead, they do their securities lending in-house.

As far as OMERS is concerned, they are determined to forge ahead and shift a substantial portion of their assets into private markets, especially infrastructure. OMERS Borealis is a global leader in infrastructure, arguably one of the best infrastructure outfits among global pensions. It invests directly in infrastructure projects around the world.

Still, infrastructure is risky and some rightly argue we're reaching a bubble phase. Moreover, many institutional investors are increasingly concerned about regulatory risks and transparency, which is why the approach they take matters a lot.

OMERS, like the Caisse which just bought a 30% stake in Eurostar International Ltd., owner of the “Chunnel” rail service that runs between London and Paris, wants to focus on prime infrastructure assets in Europe, the U.S. and Australia. They have a great team to invest in these projects directly but they too will have to judge the merits of each deal very carefully, walking away when they are too pricey.

As far as funding, OMERS hasn't reached the enviable status of HOOPP but it's on its way to bolstering its funding requirements, which is very important to keep the cost of the plan down for all stakeholders.

Finally, I had a chance to discuss HOOPP's great results with Brian Romanchuk, publisher of the Bond Economics blog and a former senior quantitative analyst at the Caisse's Fixed Income group. Here is what Brian shared with me:
I did not calculate the exact numbers, but I had moved most of my bond position into US Treasurys last year. The gains were pretty impressive once you added up the capital gains in USD plus the gain on the currency. I believe you also had decent returns on long-dated CAD government bonds, which they own as a result of their LDI positioning. Equity returns were good to, especially unhedged S&P 500.

I did not look at the Caisse results, but I believe Fixed Income under performed the index. I would note that 2014 was their first full year Romanchuk-less.

But to be fair, the Fixed Income team at la Caisse would not be allowed to take forex risk; that would be done at the asset mix (Superposition) level. This makes the returns between funds not completely comparable. To my mind, buying USTs unhedged was a screamingly obvious trade to put on as a strategic position, but it is something that could not easily be implemented because of modern portfolio management techniques.
Brian is one of the nicest and smartest people I ever had the pleasure of working with. The Caisse's Fixed Income team just isn't the same without him or Simon Lamy, a former fixed income portfolio manager and another great guy that I loved working with (but the Caisse's HR department assures me they are busy hiring "the best and brightest and real team players"...../sarc, roll eyes!).

Anyways, all this to say, when you look at results at these large Canadian pensions, it's very difficult to make direct comparisons because you need to understand key differences in investment policies, benchmarks they use to measure value-added, leverage, and currency hedging policies and how these factors impact overall results (by the way, I called the decline in the loonie back in December 2013 and warned all of you in October 2014 that euro-USD parity is coming this year).

Below, Jacques Demers, President and CEO of OMERS Strategic Investments, addresses the Australia-Canada Infrastructure Symposium, hosted by Infrastructure Partnerships Australia and the Australia-Canada Economic Leadership Forum, held in Melbourne on the 24th February 2014.

Caisse Chunnels Into Europe?

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Barbara Shecter of the National Post reports, Quebec’s Caisse bites off a big piece of the Chunnel, snapping up a 30% stake in Eurostar International Ltd:
Canadian pensions are continuing to snap up stakes in landmark properties around the world, the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec becoming the latest with a 30% stake in Eurostar International Ltd., owner of the “Chunnel” rail service that runs between London and Paris.

The Quebec pension fund giant is paying about $850 million for the lion’s share of the British government’s stake in the high-speed train service best known for its route through the Channel Tunnel.

The deal is being done in partnership with Hermes Investment Management through a consortium called Patina Rail LLC, which will involve a subsidiary of Hermes buying the balance of the UK government’s 40% stake.

George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced last fall that the British government intended to sell the stake to reduce the national debt. It was reported he hoped to raise at least £300 million.

Tuesday’s deal could be derailed if the state-owned railways in France and Belgium, that together own the remaining 60% of Eurostar, exercise their right to buy the British government’s stake by paying a 15% premium to the agreed price.

However, if that does not occur, the Caisse expects the deal to close during the second quarter of 2015.

“We don’t think they will exercise it and hope they would not… but it remains in their discretion,” said Macky Tall, senior vice-president of private equity and infrastructure at the Caisse.

The Eurostar transaction is also subject to regulatory approval from the European Commission and the German Federal Cartel Office.

The Quebec pension fund manager faced other competitors in the bidding process, but did not overpay, said Mr. Tall.

“We feel confident [it] will provide us with an attractive rate of return over many years,” he said.

Mr. Tall said the Caisse took Europe’s uncertain economic future into consideration when deciding how much to bid for Eurostar.

“Our position on Europe has not changed. We remain cautious,” he said.

However, he added that the rail company “has proven to be resilient” and demonstrated over the past decade that it is “able to go through the ups and downs of the European economy well.”

In addition to running between London and Paris, Eurostar’s high-speed passenger train service runs between London and Brussels.

Over the past 20 years, it has carried 150 million passengers, including 10.4 million last year.

The company made a profit of £18.6 million in 2013, according to published reports in the UK.

Mr. Tall said the Caisse approached Hermes Investment Management, a team they have known for some time and a leading institutional investor in the United Kingdom, about joining forces to bid for Eurostar.

“We did reach out to them,” he said, adding that the transaction is the Caisse’s first “joint investment” with Hermes.

Peter Hofbauer, head of Hermes Infrastructure, said in a statement that the rail company provides “attractive investment characteristics” such as long-term stable and predictable cash flow.

Eurostar was originally a partnership among three railway companies including British Rail. The French state-owned railway, SNCF, continues to own 55%, while Belgium’s SNCB owns a 5% stake.

The Caisse and SNCF have co-invested in the past. They have been partners in Keolis, a public transportation group active in 15 countries, since 2007.

Other global transportation interests for the Caisse include a 26.7% stake in the Port of Brisbane in Australia, purchased in 2013.
Nicolas Van Praet of the Globe and Mail also reports, Caisse takes stake in Eurostar railway as part of global infrastructure push:
Canadian pension fund manager Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec is buying the British government’s stake in high-speed train service Eurostar International Ltd., part of a push to accelerate its infrastructure investments around the world.

Montreal-based Caisse, together with London-based consortium partner Hermes Investment Management, are purchasing the U.K. government’s 40-per-cent holding in the rail company in a deal expected to be announced Wednesday morning. Eurostar connects Britain with continental Europe.

The Caisse is paying about £440-million ($850-million), for a 30-per-cent share while Hermes picks up the 10-per-cent balance. The total transaction value, including assumed debt, is believed to be about £757-million.

The deal highlights a new effort by the Caisse to step up its global infrastructure investments, jumping in as owner and developer of public assets being divested by debt-challenged governments. Building on existing assets such as Australia’s Port of Brisbane, the pension fund is aiming to double its current $10-billion infrastructure portfolio by the end of 2018.

The investment also shows the Caisse‘s confidence that Eurostar can resist the economic shocks in Europe. Led by chief executive Michael Sabia, the fund remains cautious on European investments over all, but considers Eurostar a high-quality trophy asset that will generate predictable returns.

“This investment we’re making because we actually believe that it will be resilient in Europe – as it was if you look at the last decade,” said Macky Tall, the Caisse’s senior executive in charge of infrastructure. He noted Eurostar’s customer satisfaction in the service is consistently high and reliability tops 90 per cent.

Launched in 1994, Eurostar offers train service at up to 300 kilometres an hour between London and Paris, as well as London and Brussels, through the English Channel tunnel. Promising travel times of 2 hours and 15 minutes between France and Britain’s two largest cities for a return fare of £69, it carried more than 10.4 million people last year.

Eurostar’s controlling shareholder is France’s state-owned railway, the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français, with a 55-per-cent stake. Belgium’s Societé Nationale des Chemins de Fer Belges holds the remaining 5 per cent.

Both railway companies have a pre-emption right to buy the U.K. government’s 40-per-cent holding in Eurostar at a 15-per-cent premium to the price the Caisse consortium is paying. Mr. Tall said the Caisse believes they won’t exercise that right because the railways have not signalled they would do so.

The deal is also conditional on winning regulatory clearance from the German Federal Cartel Office and the European Commission under the so-called EU Merger Regulation.

“I like this as an investment,” said Michel Nadeau, a former Caisse vice-president who now leads the Institute for Governance in Montreal as executive director.

“It’s much better than the other options. Staying in cash? That’ll give you nothing. Stocks will likely correct sooner rather than later. Bonds will lose value as interest rates rise. The beauty of this is that it’s a private investment with recurring revenues.”

British Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne announced the government’s intention to sell the Eurostar stake last October as part of a plan to raise £20-billion from various public asset sales to pay down debt. Opposition lawmakers from the Labour Party, as well as the RMT rail union have expressed apprehension about selling Eurostar, saying it could lead to more British infrastructure falling into foreign hands.

Said Mick Cash, general-secretary of the RMT union: “The French and Belgians think we are insane knocking off such a valuable and strategic infrastructure asset.”

The Caisse has an existing partnership with SNCF. Both companies are shareholders in Keolis, a public transportation provider based in France that runs a regional high-speed train line in southeast England.

Mr. Tall said the relationship helped spark the Eurostar deal. “We’re broadening and continuing to build on that quality relationship [with them],” he said.
This is a huge deal for the Caisse which is increasingly shifting its focus on domestic and international infrastructure. It signed a deal with Quebec's government to develop some of the province's future infrastructure projects and is now going after prize assets in other developed markets.

But unlike the Quebec project, which is essentially a greenfield project full of critics, the Eurostar International is a mature and coveted infrastructure asset that is already very profitable and can offer the Caisse and Hermes Investment Management steady cash flows over the next decades, if the deal passes regulatory approval and isn't nixed by the majority shareholders.

And that's where things get tricky. Canada's mighty pensions already own a huge chunk of Britain and there will be fierce opposition to this deal. This is a strategic infrastructure asset with important economic and security concerns. It's not just any old boring infrastructure asset, it's a real prize, one of the most recognizable infrastructure assets in the world.

Also, if for any reason the British and European economy stumbles and the dark forces of nationalism rear their ugly head, there could be problems down the road. Just look at what's going on in Greece with this new leftist government threatening to nationalize key infrastructure assets (left and right-wing extremism don't bode well for foreign investors) .

Still, this is a great deal for the Caisse even once you factor in all the economic uncertainty and regulatory risks. If Europe is able to finally turn the corner, which seems to be the case but with lingering risks, then this will really be a great deal for the Caisse. Even if Europe stagnates, people are still going to use high-speed trains to travel within Europe and tourism will boom as the euro plunges, adding to Eurostar's profits.

As far as pricing, I can't tell you if the Caisse overpaid but I will take Macky Tall's word that they didn't. Keep in mind, these are ultra long-term assets which pay steady cash flows, which is what the Caisse and other large Canadian pensions are increasingly looking for to match their long-dated liabilities. And by going direct, they avoid paying fees to third parties.

Below, Steve Hedley, senior associate general secretary at the RMT union talks about the Conservatives sale of the 40% UK taxpayers share of Eurostar to foreigners. Listen carefully to his comments and think about the possible backlash in the U.K. coming from the sale of Eurostar.

Also, a clip on a beginner's guide to travel from London to Paris by Eurostar train, showing check-in and boarding arrangements, first and standard class seating. Bon voyage!!



Focusing Capital on the Long Term?

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David Benoit of the Wall Street Journal's MoneyBeat reports, BlackRock’s Fink, McKinsey Lead Group Fighting Wall Street Myopia:
A group of executives and investors sought the answer to the “scourge” of short-term thinking on Wall Street, Washington and across businesses in a New York conference room overlooking Central Park on Tuesday.

The group, calling itself Focusing Capital on the Long Term, batted around ideas on what concrete steps they and their powerful organizations can take to give executives breathing room to make the kinds of decisions that may drive growth down the road but might also draw flak from investors wondering about the here and now.

Among the steps discussed were changing compensation for both corporations and fund managers and about how to improve dialogue between both sides.

What exactly the group concluded in their closed-door meeting hasn’t yet been announced. It plans to release more specifics, but in interviews, the co-chairs portrayed the forum as a first step toward implementing goals that are still being ironed out. The co-chairs acknowledged they need to convince players that their solutions can actually help even.

“The most important concrete step was bringing greater awareness,” said Laurence Fink, the head of BlackRock Inc. and one of the co-chairs.

Among the topics Mr. Fink raised at the meeting, he said, was whether changes should be made to the definition of fiduciary duty – the requirement that investment managers are beholden to seek to grow their clients’ money above all else. Mr. Fink wanted discussion about whether the definition could expand to give leeway to fund managers to think about topics like job creation or the environment when making decisions. He said he didn’t know the answer.

Dominic Barton, a managing director at McKinsey & Co. and a fellow co-chair, said one CEO (names were carefully guarded) captivated the group’s imagination when he admitted his pay structure would actually allow him to make more in a few years than his whole career by eliminating research and development spending and instead buying back stock. The company wouldn’t exist after 10 years, the CEO added.

That fits with the group’s call to arms, a study conducted by McKinsey and the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board, or CPPIB, in late 2013. The study found 63% of executives felt short-term pressure was increasing. And, most memorably to the group, a majority wouldn’t be willing to make an investment to increase their profits by 10% over three years if it meant missing quarterly earnings. The group has labelled this the “scourge” of short-term thinking.

Mark Wiseman, the CEO of CPPIB and the third co-chair, said the forum’s intention was to bring together investors and executives who actually make decisions.

Among those there were Andrew Liveris, the CEO of Dow Chemical Co., Steve Schwarzman, CEO of Blackstone Group LP, Randall Stephenson, CEO of AT&T Inc., and Eric Cantor, the former congressman now at Moelis & Co.

Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew discussed his hopes to reform the tax code and support infrastructure spending in order to help businesses grow.

While the group aims at loftier goals, its message counteracts growing pressures from some investors like activists, who the group tends to frown upon. (Mr. Fink has publicly said activists are hurting the economy.)

Mr. Wiseman and Mr. Fink said activists are taking advantage of the void that’s been left by institutional investors, and that the group is looking to fix that by fostering more dialogue between boards and those who drive longer-term growth.

“To me, the fact a holder of 1% of the stock can have that amount of influence [means] shame on the other 99%,” Mr. Wiseman said of activists.

Mr. Lew was asked to address whether activism has gone too far, but delivered the kind of non-answer the group will need to overcome from its own members in order to actually create change.

“I don’t think you can dismiss either short-term or long-term,” Mr. Lew said. “If you are a steward of a company, your responsibility is for both.”
McKinsey just published their quarterly insight, Perspectives on the Long Term, going over what it will take to shift markets and companies away from a short-term way of thinking. The study cited in the article above can be found here.

Forgive my skepticism but while these conferences bring together some powerful industry titans, the reality is the constant pressure to deliver short-term results will only intensify unless corporate America addresses a compensation system run amok.

As far as activists are concerned, everyone publicly frowns upon them, but privately many pension funds are all too happy to see activists doing their thing, especially if it means higher share prices for everyone. Carl Icahn may be thinking myopically when he's urging Apple to buy back its shares but if it means higher share prices for the world's largest company by market cap, everyone stays silent. At the end of the day, investment funds are looking out for performance, short-term performance.

And the sad reality is that pensions, which make up the bulk of so-called patient capital touting the long, long view, are guilty of the same short-term thinking that they supposedly want to combat. Pension360 just posted an interesting comment on a study examining herd mentality in pensions:
Pension funds exhibit a herd mentality when formulating investment strategies, according to a new paper that studied the investment decisions of UK pension funds over the last 25 years.

The paper, authored by David P. Blake, Lucio Sarno and Gabriele Zinna, claims that pension funds “display strong herding behavior” when making asset allocation decisions.

More on the paper’s conclusions, from ai-cio.com:
According to the study, there was overwhelming evidence of “reputational herding” behavior from pension funds—more so than individual investors.

Pension funds are often evaluated and compared to each other in performance, the paper said, creating a “fear of relative underperformance” that lead to asset owners picking the same asset mix, managers, and even stocks.

Data showed herding was most evident at the asset class level, with pension funds following others out of equities and into bonds at the same time. They were also likely to herd around the average fund manager producing the median return—or a “closet index matcher.”
The paper can be found here.
It's about time academics publish research on something which I've been covering for years on this blog, namely, that pension funds exhibit severe herding behavior going to the same conferences, listening to the same useless investment consultants shoving them in the same brand name funds and listening to brokers recommending a new asset allocation tipping point which generates huge fees for their big hedge fund and private equity clients, but milks public pensions dry.

But wait, aren't private equity funds now following Warren Buffett's long-term approach? Nope, that's all nonsense to garner more assets and fees from underfunded pensions desperate for yield. The Oracle of Omaha has warned pensions to stop pouring money into expensive money managers and so has George Soros who rightly notes most hedge funds aren't worth the fees they're charging and most pensions should avoid them altogether (interestingly,  CalPERS expects to pay 8 percent less next year for external money managers as it liquidates its hedge-fund program).

It's hardly surprising then to see pensions like HOOPP which think independently and don't follow the crowd, delivering outsized gains for their members and more importantly, keeping their plan fully funded. HOOPP basically takes the opposite side of the consensus pension fund allocation and uses smart tactical alpha to add gains to this allocation.

And while we're on the topic of short-term thinking and compensation run amok, I think Canada's public pensions should lead by example, cutting the bloated compensation of their senior executives which is based on value-added over (mostly) bogus benchmarks in private markets designed to game a system that allows them to make multimillions based on four-year rolling returns on money they're managing on behalf of captive clients.

That last paragraph won't win me a lot of support from many senior pension fund executives in Canada, some of whom subscribe(d) to this blog but that's fine by me. I have publicly stated we need to scrutinize compensation at some of Canada's large public pensions and see if there are abusive practices going on there.

As far as corporate America, CEO pay is spinning out of control, and it will continue to get worse until the next crisis hits and there is a real effort to rein it in. That system is rigged too as the Fed's policies have generated massive inequality, liquidity and record profits, allowing Fortune 500 companies to buy back their shares to 'generate more value' for their shareholders and more importantly, to boost their increasing and insanely bloated compensation system for their senior executives.

Winston Churchill once famously quipped: "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." I can say the same about capitalism, it's the worst economic system except for all other forms that have been tried from time to time.

This leads me to recommend policymakers around the world pass laws forcing private and public organizations, including public pensions, to publicly state the ratio of their CEO and senior executives' compensation relative to the median and average compensation at their organization. It should be stated in black and white in their annual report even if they don't publish data on specific individual compensation.

What else do I recommend? That we start compensating public pension fund managers on real value-added based on benchmarks that reflect the beta, leverage and illiquidity risks they're taking and compensate them based on ten-year rolling returns. We should also cap the compensation of senior executives at Canada's large public pensions to reflect the fact that they're public pensions which manage money from captive clients (admittedly, I don't like capping comp but it's obvious the status quo will only lead to more public outcry, especially in socialist Canada).

We live in an age of austerity for most people. Teachers, police officers, firemen, public sector workers, and even doctors are now facing drastic budget cuts, so why aren't we scrutinizing the compensation at Canada's large public pensions? Pay for performance, no problem, but make sure it's real performance not leveraged beta, and make sure the compensation system at Canadian public pensions reflects the risks these managers take and the fact that they're in an advantageous position of managing billions from captive clients.

Again, some of you will disagree with my comments above. If you feel strongly that I'm not properly covering the topics of compensation at Canadian pensions or the fact that pensions calling for long-term thinking are themselves guilty of short-term herding behavior, then by all means reach out to me via email (LKolivakis@gmail.com) and I'll be happy to post your feedback.

On that note, I've got to get back to doing what I love most, swing trading and focusing on markets. I don't have the luxury of making multimillions based on four-year rolling returns beating bogus private market benchmarks. I've got to survive by eating what I kill in these crazy, volatile schizoid markets dominated by short-term high-frequency algorithmic and momentum traders. But rest assured I'm taking the opposite side of the pension consensus trade and loving every minute of it. :)

Those of you who have subscribed to this blog, a friendly reminder that it's time to re-subscribe and show your appreciation for my tireless work in bringing you the very best insights on pensions and investments in the world. Unlike the pension herd worried about career and reputation risk, I'm sticking my neck out day in and day, providing you with much needed critical thinking. Please show your support by donating or subscribing via PayPal on the upper right-hand side.

Below, Mark Wiseman, CEO of CPPIB, talks about the FCLT initiative - and the reasons that long term investing is needed, and how we can get there. More videos will be posted on YouTube here.

And Dennis T. Whalen, Executive Director and Partner in Charge, KPMG's Audit Committee Institute, shares some key takeaways from KPMG's Spring 2014 Roundtable Series. Read the full report here.


America's Attack on Public Pensions?

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Tim Reid of Reuters reports, California pension reform measure to target Calpers:
A ballot measure campaign to cut California's public pensions will be launched in May by a coalition of politicians and business people led by former San Jose Mayor Chuck Reed, with the state's largest retirement system a prime target.

The measure would take aim at California's $300 billion giant Calpers, which has a near-iron grip on the state's pensions. Calpers, America's largest public pension fund and administrator of pensions for more than 3,000 state and local agencies, has long argued that pensions cannot be touched or renegotiated, even in bankruptcy.

"Calpers has dedicated itself to preserving the status quo and making it difficult for anybody to reform pensions," Reed said in an interview. "This is one way to take on Calpers, and yes, Calpers will push back."

Calpers spokeswoman Rosanna Westmoreland said: "Pensions are an integral part of deferred compensation for public employees and a valuable recruitment and retention tool for employers."

The measure will be closely watched by reformers and their union opponents in other states, in an ongoing national battle between those who say public pensions are putting intolerable strains on budgets and those who argue pension cuts unfairly penalize retirees and workers.

For most California cities, their largest debt is pension liability, a significant factor in the recent bankruptcies of Vallejo, Stockton and San Bernardino. Calpers has said it will increase pension contributions for most cities by up to 50 percent in the coming years.

Reed, a Democrat, abandoned a similar statewide ballot initiative in 2014, claiming that Kamala Harris, California's Democratic attorney general, had approved wording of the initiative that was biased and union-friendly.

But he vowed to fight on after leaving office in December, and in an interview with Reuters confirmed for the first time the launch of the initiative and its timing, while noting that a major motive was to challenge Calpers' grip.

Reed says the push will seek to place a simpler, more legally watertight pension reform measure on California's November 2016 ballot, giving mayors and other local government executives the authority to renegotiate contracts.

To win a place on the 2016 ballot, backers of the initiative will have to obtain the signatures of 585,000 registered voters, or 8 percent of the number of voters in California's last gubernatorial election, in this case 2014.

Reed and his allies have been huddling with legal advisers for months to devise a voter initiative that is simpler and less vulnerable to court challenges than last year's effort.

They have also been buoyed by a ruling in the recent municipal bankruptcy of Stockton, whose judge said California's public pensions are not inviolate.

As San Jose mayor, Reed helped pass a pension reform measure for his city, parts of which have been struck down after union lawsuits.

Reed is working with other pension reform advocates, including former San Diego Republican council member Carl DeMaio, the primary backer of a pension reform initiative in San Diego that was approved by voters in 2012; and the Ventura County Taxpayers Association's David Grau.

"We have done a lot of legal work to make sure this initiative is bulletproof," DeMaio said. "Because the unions are going to throw the kitchen sink at us."

The group is talking to potential financial backers, Reed said. Last year Reed took $200,000 from a group funded by Texas hedge fund billionaire John Arnold and they could partner again this time round, he said.

Karol Denniston, a public finance attorney and pension expert at Squire Patton Boggs in San Francisco, said voters should be working for legal change to provide more options than municipal bankruptcy: "Right now Calpers has no program for financially distressed cities," Denniston said.

Dave Low, executive director of the California School Employees Association, said the group would campaign to defeat the measure and was "confident we can defeat it."
What is this all about? Pretty much more of the same. Attack U.S. public sector pensions using a flawed logic in order to make an asinine ideological point that everything run by the government is by its very nature doomed to fail.

I'm not saying we don't need to reform U.S. public pensions. As I debated with others in the New York Times, we most certainly do. But when you read about a Texas billionaire hedge fund manager, John Arnold who runs Centaurus, backing a measure to weaken CalPERS, you have to wonder what is going on here (Read more on Arnold's agenda here. Maybe he's pissed off CalPERS nuked its hedge fund program but that will help the giant pension save some very hefty fees next year).

Whatever the case, the coming war on pensions is just getting started in the United States of Pension Poverty. On Thursday we found out that U.S. household net worth posted its biggest gain in a year but when you look behind the numbers, you see massive inequality is fueling these gains.

America has a retirement crisis which is being exacerbated by a serious pension problem. Vipal Monga of the Wall Street Journal reports, Multiemployer Pension Participants Set for Benefit Cuts:
More than 35,000 workers in multiemployer benefit plans will suffer benefit cuts when their plans go bust, according to a new study by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.

The government’s private-sector pension insurer found that more than half of 78,557 workers in plans already insolvent, or projected to do so in the next few years, would get less money after the PBGC begins supporting their plans.

The agency had a $42.4 billion deficit in its fund to back the plans at the end of its 2014 fiscal year on Sept. 30. That means the agency doesn’t have enough money to fully support the 1,400 multiemployer plans it guarantees.

Of all those plans, 109 are either insolvent or are on the way to insolvency, according to the PGBC.

A 10% cut was typical for multiemployer pension recipients, but the reductions are “likely to become deeper and more frequent for retirees and workers in plans that require PBGC assistance in the future,” said the PGBC.

Multiemployer plans are run jointly by unions and employers. They are negotiated through collective bargaining and typically financed by several companies. They are designed to provide defined-benefit pensions, which promise retirees a set payout.

The plans cover a wide range of unionized employees in industries from retailing to casino workers. But as employers in these industries run out of money or downsize, it puts a bigger financial burden on their peers, sometimes threatening the solvency of the plans.

This year, for example, casino company Caesars Entertainment Operating Co., sought bankruptcy protection, throwing into doubt its continuing contributions to fill a $75 million pension liability.

Congress passed a law in December that allowed pension funds to cut benefits to current retirees. It also doubled companies’ pension-insurance premiums.

That law could allow funds to last longer, but it won’t help save benefits for those plans that succumb to financial pressures, said a PBGC official.
I've already discussed how Congress nuked pensions. U.S. politicians are completely ignorant on the benefits of defined-benefit plans and worse still, they're all clamoring to switch public sector employees to defined-contribution plans which will virtually ensure more pension poverty down the road, a weaker economy and skyrocketing debt.

And as a sad testament of the pension debate in America, a judge in Detroit bankruptcy is now calling for dismantling public employee pensions nationwide:
In remarks this week at a luncheon sponsored by the publishing conglomerate Crain Communications, federal bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes said that pension cuts imposed as part of the Detroit bankruptcy, should be used as a starting point to completely eliminate defined benefit pension plans nationwide.

Rhodes, who in late 2014 ruled to approved the city’s plan to slash pensions and other retirement benefits, predicted that state governments nationwide would soon force workers onto defined-contribution plans, citing estimates that US municipal pension funds face collective shortfalls of some $4 trillion.

“I think that solution across the country, including in Detroit, has to be at some point defined contribution plans,” Rhodes said.

Only days earlier, Rhodes told the Detroit Free Press in an interview, “The political reality of pension obligations is there isn’t a real strong political constituency for them.”

He added that he believes Detroit’s Chapter 9 filing should have been used to eliminate defined-benefit plans for retired Detroit city workers and that he viewed the failure to do so as a “missed opportunity.”

“I regret that the City of Detroit did not take the opportunity that this case offered,” Rhodes said.

Rhodes’ comments come as yet another confirmation of the analysis made by the World Socialist Web Site at the time of the Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing in July 2013. “Detroit will serve as a precedent for other cities across the country that have been financially crippled by the economic crisis,” the WSWS declared, two days after Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr submitted bankruptcy papers on behalf of the city.

“The use of the bankruptcy court to rip up pensions and health benefits will open the floodgates for similar attacks on millions of teachers, transit workers, sanitation workers and other municipal employees. Just as Greece became the model for attacks on workers throughout Europe and beyond, the Detroit bankruptcy—which goes beyond even the brutal measures carried out in Greece—will set the pattern for the next stage in the attack on the working class in the US and internationally,” the WSWS wrote.

Rhodes’ order authorized the effective reduction of health benefits owed to retired city workers—who subsist on an average annual income of some $20,000 per year—by nearly 90 percent. For the countless retirees who pay hundreds and thousands of dollars per month in health care related costs, the ruling amounts to a death sentence.

The ruling came in defiance of decades’ worth of precedents upholding constitutional mandates—themselves the product of ferocious struggles by the American working class during the 20th century—stating in clear language that public sector pensions cannot be tampered with under any circumstances.

The Detroit bankruptcy case was orchestrated from the outset as part of a conscious, far-reaching agenda to overturn these protections. During the lead-up to the December 3 ruling, Rhodes himself attended conferences focusing on the implications of Chapter 9 statutes for pensions, and his co-conspirators from the Jones Day law firm wrote strategy papers, including one entitled “Pensions and Chapter 9: Can municipalities use bankruptcy to solve their pension woes,” detailing the ways in which bankruptcy proceedings could be used to subvert the rule of law and steal constitutionally-protected pension benefits.

Orr, himself a former partner with Jones Day, has since been appointed as “special counsel” in yet another slash-and-burn “emergency management” municipal restructuring, this time targeting Atlantic City, New Jersey.

The conclusion of the Detroit bankruptcy has been followed by a continuously escalating series of attacks on pensions by US state and city governments. In a budget plan announced last week, Illinois Republican Governor Bruce Rauner approved plans to cut more than $2 billion from state employee pensions. Earlier in February, Judge Christopher Klein approved cuts to pensions of city workers in Stockton, California, declaring with shocking arrogance that the city’s pension fund “turns out to have a glass jaw.”

All of these attacks are rationalized by the US ruling elite and its ideological servants on the grounds that “there is no money.” Even a cursory examination of the vast sums squandered every year by the US government on handouts to Wall Street and the Pentagon’s war machine is sufficient to demonstrate the absurdity of these claims. In reality, the mass seizure of pension funds now being prepared is part of the drive by the financial oligarchy to return workers to the levels of poverty and social misery that prevailed in the 19th century.
As I discussed in a recent comment looking at whether Chicago and Tampa are the next Detroit, "buckle up folks, what is happening in Greece is coming to a city and county near you and it will exacerbate global deflation and decimate pensions over the next decade."

A friend of mine, a successful entrepreneur in Silicon Valley, the true heart of American capitalism, shared his thoughts with me after reading my comment above:
You do realize that in California something like 50% revenue comes from 1% of the population.Basically the ultra rich are paying for the rest of us. And they are saying - enough. We created people who are so ultra wealthy that they view themselves apart of the state. And the machinery of democracy is in their hands.

I believe - really do believe - that eventually when there are enough impoverished people - revolution happens. In the 1930s it was a peaceful one led by FDR. I am uncertain of the shape of the one to come. The foolishness of the ultra rich can not be ignored. This will pass. The nature of it's passing is unclear.
I'm afraid he's right and I'm sorry I couldn't leave you on a more cheery note for my weekend comment but the sad reality is that while we desperately need to reform U.S. public pensions, introducing shared-risk and much better governance, the asinine austerity reforms being proposed are only going to ensure more pension poverty and global deflation down the road (ie. stay long U.S. Treasurys as long as austerity for the poor and working class is on the menu!!).

Below,  Democracy Now interviews David Sirota who discusses how U.S. cities and states have been increasingly investing worker pensions in risky hedge funds, private equity and other so-called "alternative investments" which charge huge fees.

Go read Sirota's paper on the plot against pensions and my recent comments on longevity risk dooming pensions, private equity emulating Warren Buffett, overhauling New Jersey's pensions and focusing capital on the long term.

Unwinding the Mother of All Carry Trades?

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Over the weekend, Mike Whitney wrote an interesting comment for Counterpunch, Why a Stronger Dollar will Lead to Deflation, Recession and Crisis:
“There are no nations…. no peoples…. no Russians.. no Arabs…no third worlds…no West. There is only one holistic system of systems, one vast and immane, interwoven, interacting, multi-variate, multi-national dominion of dollars. Petro-dollars, electro-dollars, multi-dollars, reichmarks, rins, rubles, pounds, and shekels. It is the international system of currency which determines the totality of life on this planet. That is the natural order of things today.”

Arthur Jensen’s speech from Network, a 1976 American satirical film written by Paddy Chayefsky and directed by Sidney Lumet
The crisis that began seven years ago with easy lending and subprime mortgages, has entered its final phase, a currency war between the world’s leading economies each employing the same accommodative monetary policies that have intensified market volatility, increased deflationary pressures, and set the stage for another tumultuous crack-up. The rising dollar, which has soared to a twelve year high against the euro, has sent US stock indices plunging as investors expect leaner corporate earnings, tighter credit, and weaker exports in the year ahead. The stronger buck is also wreaking havoc on emerging markets that are on the hook for $5.7 trillion in dollar-backed liabilities. While most of this debt is held by the private sector in the form of corporate bonds, the stronger dollar means that debt servicing will increase, defaults will spike, and capital flight will accelerate. Author’s Michele Brand and Remy Herrera summed it up in a recent article on Counterpunch titled “Dollar Imperialism, 2015 edition”. Here’s an excerpt from the article:
“There is the risk for a sell-off in emerging market bonds, leading to conditions like in 1997. The multitrillion dollar carry trade may be on the verge of unwinding, meaning capital fleeing the periphery and rushing back to the US. Vast amounts of capital are already leaving some of these countries, and the secondary market for emerging bonds is beginning to dry up. A rise in US interest rates would only put oil on the fire.

The World Bank warned in January against a “disorderly unwinding of financial vulnerabilities.” According to the Financial Times on February 6, there is a “swelling torrent of ‘hot money’ cascad[ing] out of China.” Guan Tao, a senior Chinese official, said that $20 billion left China in December alone and that China’s financial condition “looks more and more like the Asian financial crisis” of the 1990s, and that we can “sense the atmosphere of the Asian financial crisis is getting closer and closer to us.” The anticipated rise of US interest rates this year, even by a quarter point as the Fed is hinting at, would exacerbate this trend and hit the BRICS and other developing countries with an even more violent blow, making their debt servicing even more expensive.” (Dollar Imperialism, 2015 Edition” Michele Brand and Remy Herrera, CounterPunch)
The soaring dollar has already put the dominoes in motion as capital flees the perimeter to return to risk-free assets in the US. At present, rates on the benchmark 10-year Treasury are still just slightly above 2 percent, but that will change when US investment banks and other institutional speculators– who loaded up on EU government debt before the ECB announced the launching of QE–move their money back into US government bonds. That flush of recycled cash will pound long-term yields into the ground like a tent-peg. At the same time, the Fed will continue to “jawbone” a rate increase to lure more capital to US stock markets and to inflict maximum damage on the emerging markets. The Fed’s foreign wealth-stripping strategy is the financial equivalent of a US military intervention, the only difference is that the buildings are left standing. Here’s an except from a Tuesday piece by CNBC:
“Emerging market currencies were hit hard on Tuesday, while the euro fell to a 12-year low versus the U.S. dollar, on rising expectations for a U.S. interest rate rise this year. The South African rand fell as much as 1.5 percent to a 13-year low at around 12.2700 per dollar, while the Turkish lira traded within sight of last Friday’s record low. The Brazilian real fell over one percent to its lowest level in over a decade. It was last trading at about 3.1547 to the dollar…

The volatility in currency markets comes almost two years after talk of unwinding U.S. monetary stimulus sent global markets reeling, with some emerging market currencies bearing the brunt of the sell-off…

Emerging market (EM) currencies are off across the board, as markets focus back on those stronger U.S. numbers from last week, prospects for early Fed tightening, and underlying problems in EM,” Timothy Ash, head of EM (ex-Africa) research at Standard Bank, wrote in a note.

“In this environment countries don’t need to give investors any excuse to sell – especially still higher rolling credits like Turkey.” (Currency turmoil as US rate-hike jitters bite, CNBC)
Once again, the Fed’s easy money policies have touched off a financial cyclone that has reversed capital flows and put foreign markets in a downward death spiral. (The crash in the EMs is likely to be the financial calamity of the year.) If Fed chairman Janet Yellen raises rates in June, as many expect, the big money will flee the EMs leaving behind a trail of bankrupt industries, soaring inflation and decimated economies. The blowback from the catastrophe is bound to push global GDP into negative territory which will intensify the currency war as nation’s aggressively compete for a larger share of dwindling demand.

The crisis in the emerging markets is entirely the doing of the Federal Reserve whose gigantic liquidity injections have paved the way for another global recession followed by widespread rejection of the US unit in the form of “de-dollarization.” Three stock market crashes and global financial meltdown in the length of decade and a half has already convinced leaders in Russia, China, India, Brazil, Venezuela, Iran and elsewhere, that financial stability cannot be achieved under the present regime. The unilateral and oftentimes nonsensical policies of the Fed have merely exacerbated inequities, disrupted normal business activity, and curtailed growth. The only way to reduce the frequency of destabilizing crises is to jettison the dollar altogether and create a parallel reserve currency pegged to a basket of yuans, dollars, yen, rubles, sterling, euros and gold. Otherwise, the excruciating boom and bust cycle will persist at five to ten year intervals. Here’s more on the chaotic situation in the Emerging Markets:
“The stronger the US boom, the worse it will be for those countries on the wrong side of the dollar. [...] The US Federal Reserve has pulled the trigger. Emerging markets must now brace for their ordeal by fire. They have collectively borrowed $5.7 trillion, a currency they cannot print and do not control. This hard-currency debt has tripled in a decade, split between $3.1 trillion in bank loans and $2.6 trillion in bonds. It is comparable in scale and ratio-terms to any of the biggest cross-border lending sprees of the past two centuries. Much of the debt was taken out at real interest rates of 1pc on the implicit assumption that the Fed would continue to flood the world with liquidity for years to come. The borrowers are ‘short dollars’, in trading parlance. They now face the margin call from Hell…. Stephen Jen, from SLJ Macro Partners said that ‘Emerging market currencies could melt down. There have been way too many cumulative capital flows into these markets in the past decade. Nothing they can do will stop potential outflows, as long as the US economy recovers. Will this trend lead to a 1997-1998-like crisis? I am starting to think that this is extremely probable for 2015.’” (Fed calls time on $5.7 trillion of emerging market dollar debt, Ambrose Evans Pritchard, Telegraph)
As the lone steward of the reserve currency, the Fed can boost global liquidity with a flip of the switch, thus, drowning foreign markets in cheap money that inevitably leads to recession, crises, and political unrest. The Fed was warned by Nobel Prize-winning economist, Joseph Stiglitz, that its loosy goosy-monetary policies, particularly QE, would have a ruinous effect on emerging markets. But Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke chose to shrug off Stiglitz’s advice and support a policy that has widened inequality to levels not seen since the Gilded Age while having no noticeable impact on employment , productivity or growth. For all practical purposes, QE has been a total flop.

On Thursday, stocks traded higher following a bleak retail sales report that showed unexpected weakness in consumer spending. The news pushed the dollar lower which triggered a 259 point rise on the Dow Jones. The “bad news is good news” reaction of investors confirms that today’s market is not driven by fundamentals or the health of the economy, but by the expectation of tighter or looser monetary policy. ZIRP (Zero interest rate policy) and the Yellen Put (the belief that the Fed will intervene if stocks dip too far.) have produced the longest sustained stock market rally in the post war era. Shockingly, the Fed has not raised rates in a full nine years due in large part to the atmosphere of crisis the Fed has perpetuated to justify the continuation of wealth-stripping policies which only benefit the Wall Street banks and the nation’s top earners, the notorious 1 percent.

The markets are bound to follow this convoluted pattern for the foreseeable future, dropping sharply on news of dollar strength and rebounding on dollar weakness. Bottom line: Seven years and $11 trillion in central bank bond purchases has increased financial instability to the point that any attempt to normalize rates threatens to vaporize emerging markets, send stocks crashing, and intensify deflationary pressures.

If that isn’t an argument for “ending the Fed”, then I don’t know what is.
There is a lot to cover in the article above which contains some excellent points but ends with the typical "end the Fed" rubbish that appeals to financial imbeciles who don't understand the important role of the Federal Reserve.

First, Whitney is right, the mighty greenback is wreaking havoc on emerging markets and the risks are being exacerbated by the dollar carry trade. To understand why, go back to read a Forbes article written last year by Bert Dohmen, founder of Dohmen Capital, titled "Carry Trade: The Multi-Trillion Dollar Hidden Market":
The dollar is soaring. The U.S. stock market is making new highs. U.S. T-bond yields are declining, causing T-bond prices to rise while all the experts say they are too overvalued. European government bonds actually yield less than U.S. Treasuries, which makes no sense because the U.S. bonds are considered much safer. Many analysts confess that they are mystified.

What is the driving force for these moves? The “carry trade.”

What is the carry trade? It’s the borrowing of a currency in a low interest rate country, converting it to a currency in a higher interest rate country and investing it in the highest rated bonds of that country. The big trading outfits do this with leverage of 100 or 300 to one. This causes important moves in the financial markets, made possible by the trillions of dollars of central bank money creation.

The monetary stimulus in Japan is aimed to produce a cheaper yen, and thus a stronger dollar. That causes the U.S. bond market to rise, bond yields to decline, commodity prices to plunge, and precious metals prices to decline. If you are in any of these investments, you must know what drives their prices.

Here is how the “yen carry trade,” a favorite currency for the trade, basically works now:
  • Hedge funds and other very big traders borrow the yen at very, very low interest rates now approaching zero.
  • The yen are converted to dollars, which are invested in U.S. Treasuries at a much higher yield than the interest cost for the borrowed yen. That creates a “positive carry” because of the differential in interest rates.
  • The buying drives up U.S. bond prices. The traders accrue big profits, when done with high leverage, assuming the yen value doesn’t rise.
  • Additional profits are made when a) The dollar rises vs. the yen as the BOJ intends, b) U.S. Treasuries rise in price (as is happening)
  • Triple Profits: A leverage 100:1 means that a 1% rise in the value of the dollar vs. yen doubles the value of the equity investment. An additional profit is made if the U.S. T-bonds rise in price as they have done. Further profits are made from the positive carry, i.e. when the yield on the T-bonds is greater than the interest cost on the yen. That’s a “triple profit.”
  • So far, so good. And that’s what is happening now. Some of the profits are probably reinvested in the stock market for diversification.
The emerging markets have benefited from this as well. The currencies of the lower-interest countries like Japan or the U.S. are borrowed and invested in the much higher-yielding bonds of emerging countries. The danger is that when one of these countries has trouble paying the interest on its debt, there is a huge unwinding of this trade, hundreds of billions of dollars flow out, and an emerging market crisis produces a world-wide market crash. That’s what happened in 1997 and 1998. The emerging markets carry trade is estimated to be at least $2 trillion in size. That’s huge.

The carry trade is great for the big trading outfits, but it doesn’t help the average person. And that is why there is such great income disparity. It’s just financial engineering.

However, there is possibly another, much more important element to these trends: Russia!

When Russia basically annexed the Crimea in March of this year, I proposed in our Wellington Letter that the U.S. could easily manipulate the oil price down to levels that would significantly damage Russia’s economy.

How do you get the international oil price down? Oil is denominated in dollars. If the central bank (the Fed), in collaboration with the large financial firms manipulate the U.S. dollar upward, it increases the cost of oil around the world. That reduces consumption, which reduces the oil price. Above I described how the carry trade increases the value of the dollar. Everything works together.

Oil revenues are the greatest source of foreign currency reserves for Russia. It needs these reserves to service its international debt. If these reserves dwindle, another Russian debt crisis and possible default similar to the late 1990’s could occur. The global markets would plunge, but Russia would be hurt the most. Perhaps that would cause Putin to retreat from his apparent plan to reassemble the old Soviet Union.

Conclusion: The carry trade causes a rising U.S. dollar, rising U.S. bond prices, rising U.S. stocks, and deflation in commodity prices. Of course, an unwinding of the carry trade will cause the opposite.

The soaring dollar and strong U.S. Treasury market confirm that the carry trade is alive and well. If and when the Bank of Japan hikes interest rates in order to combat rising inflation, the carry trade will unwind, perhaps ferociously. So, watch the BOJ.

The massive money creation of the major central banks and their “ZIRP” policy (zero interest rate policy) has created such huge financial speculation using other methods as well, making big speculators very rich. And that includes the large trading operations at the Wall Street firm, the biggest global banks, and hedge funds.
Keep the article above in mind in order to understand why the U.S. dollar and bond prices are surging, commodity prices plunging and emerging market debt and stocks are getting hammered. It's all part of a global, massive carry trade engineered by big banks and their big hedge fund clients which have leveraged this trade to the tilt.

And now that the euro is crashing and yields in the eurozone's core economies are at historic lows as the ECB moves ahead with its version of quantitative easing, investors are getting creative with the carry trade, selling euros to buy Indian and Indonesian debt:
Whipsawed by upheaval in the world’s foreign-exchange market, investors are ripping up the rule book on a popular trading strategy.

For years, traders big and small had used a tried, and usually true, way to make money: borrow cheaply in a country with low interest rates and a weak currency, typically Japan, and then invest in a country with higher rates such as Australia or South Africa.

But a wave of central-bank moves and shifts in regional economies in recent months have upended the strategy, known as the carry trade. The Australian dollar and South African rand are tumbling, while the Japanese yen is rising against the euro.

That is forcing money managers to go farther afield to find new ways to create the same trade. Today, many are borrowing in Europe, where the euro is at 12-year lows and interest rates are at rock-bottom levels.

Their money is finding its way to India and Indonesia and in some cases the Philippines and Sri Lanka. And, in a scenario few could have imagined a few years ago, some investors are putting their money in higher-yielding U.S. Treasurys, betting the dollar will continue to rise as the Federal Reserve raises rates.

Eric Stein, co-director of global income at Eaton Vance Management, with $295.6 billion under management, has been shorting, or selling, the euro and buying India’s rupee-denominated government bonds and Indonesian rupiah sovereign debt.

“Typically, you wouldn’t think of funding trades for rupees with euros,” Mr. Stein said. “You can think of it as an unconventional way to fund some of these Asian trades.”

A $10 million investment in the Indian rupee would generate $600,000 a year, Mr. Stein estimated, while negative interest rates in the eurozone would bring an additional $40,000 by betting against the euro. But movements in exchange rates of either currency could boost or pare gains on the trade, or even lead to losses.

Mr. Stein is among foreign institutional investors who have bought $5.89 billion of Indian debt so far in 2015, according to India’s National Securities Depository Ltd., more than the $5.8 billion in the same period last year. They have also bought $3 billion of Indonesian government bonds in the same period, helping stabilize benchmark 10-year yields since the beginning of the year.

India and Indonesia are especially popular because investors are more confident that new leaders in both countries will bring stability, growth and economic change, providing incentives for longer-term investment alongside higher interest rates.

The rupee is especially popular as it has fallen far less against the greenback over the past year than many other emerging-market currencies.

The surge of cash into these developing economies has already had effects on currencies and interest rates, helping to bolster growth. But it has also sparked concerns among investors and policy makers worried that, as quickly as the money has flooded in, it could also rapidly flow out, causing wild swings in financial markets.

Paul Lambert, head of currency at London-based Insight Investment Management (Global) Ltd., with £362.5 billion ($553.28 billion) of assets under management, said the recent bout of volatility in foreign-exchange markets has made employing the strategy difficult.

He has reduced his positions across the board, including the euro, in part because “we think we’re in a higher-volatility environment.”

Others, though, are sticking with it. Singapore-based Dymon Asia Capital Ltd., one of Asia’s largest homegrown hedge-fund firms, said it benefited from betting on the rupee against the euro in January, in an otherwise difficult month for the fund following volatility in other areas of the currency markets. A spokesman for the firm, with more than $4 billion in assets, didn’t respond to requests for comment.

The euro is popular because of the eurozone’s low interest rates and aggressive monetary easing that have sent the currency tumbling 23.1% against the dollar since 2013. Hedge funds and other speculators see more losses to come, holding the most bearish positions in nearly two years, according to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

“Monetary policy in the eurozone supporting the euro trend makes it a no-brainer for using the euro as a funding currency,” said Paresh Upadhyaya, director of currency strategy at Pioneer Investments.

The asset manager, which oversees $246.2 billion, also sells the common currency to buy rupees and Indian sovereign bonds, as well as rupiahs and Indonesian government debt.

Some investors who want to avoid the thrills of emerging markets are even heading back to the soaring greenback.

UBS AG said it has a small position borrowing and selling euro-denominated high-grade bonds, such as German bunds, and buying dollar-denominated high-grade bonds, such as U.S. Treasury notes. The firm also recommends the rupee and Indian equities to its clients.

“It’s hard to find any kind of growth in emerging markets,” said Kiran Ganesh, cross-asset strategist at UBS Wealth Management, with $1 trillion under management. “India is one of the few countries in the emerging markets that has good and even accelerating growth. That makes it a good candidate for carry strategies.”
Indeed, as I explained when I went over CPPIB's risky bet on Brazil, emerging markets are fraught with risks in this environment. Among the group, India is in the best relative shape, which is why it's the beneficiary of enormous liquidity flows but all that hot money can come out as fast as it came in.

And as I stated in my comment on the mighty greenback back in October 2014, " I wouldn't be surprised if it (EUR/USD) goes to parity or even below parity over the next 12 months." If this happens, expect to see more euro funded carry trades in India, Indonesia and elsewhere, placing even more pressure on the euro.

But for now, all eyes are on the Fed and the big question this week is will it stop being patient? I still maintain that if the Fed raises rates in June or August, it will be making a monumental mistake.

Importantly, the surging dollar has already tightened U.S. financial conditions and raising rates and risking a full-blown emerging markets crisis will only reinforce global deflation, an outcome that the Fed and other central banks desperately want to avoid.

But as Brian Romanchuk reminds us in his recent comment, Fed Rate Hike Cycles And Bond Yields, there are a lot of uncomfortable lessons for bond bulls from these past (rate hike) episodes:
Are they underestimating the acceleration of the labour market, as in 1994? Is too much emphasis being placed on the external sector, as in 1999? And finally, have bonds adequately priced the path of rate hikes? After years of Fed rate hikes continuously receding into the future, the next several months may finally be interesting for U.S. interest rate analysts. (Unless a downturn intervenes, in which case we will have to start listening to the hawks about how rate hikes starting in June 2016 are a certainty.)
I happen to think not enough emphasis is being placed on the weakening global economy, especially the ongoing slowdown in China's economy, which slowed at its sharpest rate in the first two months of the year since the global financial crisis, heightening fears that this deceleration will undermine global growth (Read the latest from Sober Look, Is China's growth slower than the 7% consensus?).

Stay tuned, it will be a very interesting summer and second half of the year. All these carry trades can be unwound at a moment's notice, wreaking havoc on global stock and bond markets. But as I explained in my Outlook 2015, even though it will be a rough and tumble year, there will be plenty of opportunities to make money in risk assets:
In this environment, investors should overweight small caps (IWM), technology (QQQ or XLK) and biotech shares (IBB or XBI) and keep steering clear of energy (XLE), materials (XLB) and commodities (GSG). And even though deflationary headwinds will pick up in 2015, I'm less bullish on utilities (XLU) and healthcare (XLV) because valuations are getting out of whack after a huge run-up last year.
I stick by all my stock, currency and bond calls. In fact, if global investors listened to me, they would have made a killing shorting the euro and going long U.S. bonds and stocks (especially the sectors I recommended when I told them to plunge into stocks) and shorting commodities and the commodity currencies like the CAD. I'm still short Canada and think the crisis is just beginning here (Read Brian's latest, Canada Reaching The Wiley E. Coyote Moment).

All this to say I don't get the respect I rightfully deserve. The world's largest pensions and sovereign wealth funds regularly read my comments as do top hedge funds and private equity funds, but very few actually support my efforts. Please take the time to always click on the ads on this blog and take the time to donate or subscribe via the PayPal buttons on the top right-hand side (don't be cheap, it's a disgusting trait!).

Below, Marin Katusa, chief energy investment strategist at Casey Research, discusses the oil price crash, the US Dollar, weakness in China, and the ongoing economic crisis with RT (March 9th, 2015). Listen to his comments, he raises several excellent points, explaining why the weakness in the commodity and energy sector will continue in 2015 and 2016.

And Morgan Stanley’s Hans Redeker appeared on Bloomberg recently, stating the U.S. dollar is only about halfway through what analysts at the bank are calling a super-cycle that compares with other large moves going back to the 1980s. Listen to his comments here as he's more favorable on the effects of the surging greenback. I'm not as convinced that the unwinding of the mother of carry trades will end nicely but enjoy the ride, for the time being.

How Scary Is the Bond Market?

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Nobel laureate Robert Shiller, Professor of Economics at Yale University and the co-creator of the Case-Shiller Index of US house prices, wrote a comment for Project Syndicate, How Scary Is the Bond Market?:
The prices of long-term government bonds have been running very high in recent years (that is, their yields have been very low). In the United States, the 30-year Treasury bond yield reached a record low (since the Federal Reserve series began in 1972) of 2.25% on January 30. The yield on the United Kingdom's 30-year government bond fell to 2.04% on the same day. The Japanese 20-year government bond yielded just 0.87% on January 20.

All of these yields have since moved slightly higher, but they remain exceptionally low. It seems puzzling – and unsustainable – that people would tie up their money for 20 or 30 years to earn little or nothing more than these central banks' 2% target rate for annual inflation. So, with the bond market appearing ripe for a dramatic correction, many are wondering whether a crash could drag down markets for other long-term assets, such as housing and equities.

It is a question that I am repeatedly asked at seminars and conferences. After all, participants in the housing and equity markets set prices with a view to prices in the bond market, so contagion from one long-term market to another seems like a real possibility.

I have been thinking about the bond market for a long time. In fact, the long-term bond market was the subject of my 1972 PhD dissertation and my first-ever academic publication the following year, co-authored with my academic adviser, Franco Modigliani. Our work with data for the years 1952-1971 showed that the long-term bond market back then was pretty easy to describe. Long-term interest rates on any given date could be explained quite well as a certain weighted average of the last 18 quarters of inflation and the last 18 quarters of short-term real interest rates. When either inflation or short-term real interest rates went up, long-term rates rose. When either fell, so did long-term rates.

We now have more than 40 years of additional data, so I took a look to see if our theory still predicts well. It turns out that our estimates then, if applied to subsequent data, predicted long-term rates extremely well for the 20 years after we published; but then, in the mid-1990s, our theory started to overpredict. According to our model, long-term rates in the US should be even lower than they are now, because both inflation and short-term real interest rates are practically zero or negative. Even taking into account the impact of quantitative easing since 2008, long-term rates are higher than expected.

But the explanation that we developed so long ago still fits well enough to encourage the belief that we will not see a crash in the bond market unless central banks tighten monetary policy very sharply (by hiking short-term interest rates) or there is a major spike in inflation.

Bond-market crashes have actually been relatively rare and mild. In the US, the biggest one-year drop in the Global Financial Data extension of Moody's monthly total return index for 30-year corporate bonds (going back to 1857) was 12.5% in the 12 months ending in February 1980. Compare that to the stock market: According to the GFD monthly S&P 500 total return index, an annual loss of 67.8% occurred in the year ending in May 1932, during the Great Depression, and one-year losses have exceeded 12.5% in 23 separate episodes since 1900.

It is also worth noting what kind of event is needed to produce a 12.5% crash in the long-term bond market. The one-year drop in February 1980 came immediately after Paul Volcker took the helm of the Federal Reserve in 1979. A 1979 Gallup Poll had shown that 62% of Americans regarded inflation as the “most important problem facing the nation." Volcker took radical steps to deal with it, hiking short-term interest rates so high that he created a major recession. He also created enemies (and even faced death threats). People wondered whether he would get away with it politically, or be impeached.

Regarding the stock market and the housing market, there may well be a major downward correction someday. But it probably will have little to do with a bond-market crash. That was the case with the biggest US stock-market corrections of the last century (after 1907, 1929, 1973, 2000, and 2007) and the biggest US housing-market corrections of all time (after 1979, 1989, and 2006).

It is true that extraordinarily low long-term bond yields put us outside the range of historical experience. But so would a scenario in which a sudden bond-market crash drags down prices of stocks and housing. When an event has never occurred, it cannot be predicted with any semblance of confidence.
I happen to agree with Shiller, there will be a major downward correction in the stock market and housing market but it will have little to do with a bond-market crash. To understand why this is the case, you have to understand the titanic battle over deflation which central banks are all fighting around the world. 

Importantly, deflation remains the biggest threat to the global economy. Aging demographics, a global jobs crisis, high public and private debt, a looming retirement crisis and rising inequality are all deflationary factors weighing on global consumption.

Nonetheless, the demand for long-term debt by global investors is cooling off. An astute hedge fund manager shared this with me on Monday:
We regularly track trends in asset allocation by the Norwegian Oil Fund as proxy for the behavior of sovereign wealth funds. The Norges Bank published its full report for 2014 this week. In a continuation of the trend we noted last December, the Norges Bank continued to buy equities in Q4 last year close to $50bn thebiggest quarterly buying ever. In addition, they bought around $25bn of bondsand $8bn in real estate, a historical high for real estate.

Overall the Norges Bank stepped up its buying of equities last year by buying $70bn of equities during 2014 (vs. $18bn in 2013, a 288% increase) and reduced its pace of buying bonds from $66bn in 2013 to $33bn in 2014.
But while Norway's mighty sovereign wealth fund is stepping up its purchases of stocks and real estate and cooling its purchases of bonds, as are most other global pensions and sovereign wealth funds, the truth is there is a thirst for long-term bonds by many large corporations looking to de-risk their pensions and shift out of defined-benefit plans.

Unlike public pensions and sovereign wealth funds, private corporations simply can't afford to take on longevity risk and risk being decimated by deflation. This is why I long argued that defined-benefit pensions should be treated as a public good, reformed to introduce world class governance and shared-risk, and backstopped by the full faith and credit of the federal government.

Anyways, getting back to the U.S. bond market. I've long argued against bond bears, including smart guys like Leo de Bever and Michael Sabia. They simply got their bond calls wrong because they underestimated the deflationary forces wreaking havoc on the global economy.

To be fair, they weren't alone. The only large pension that got its bond allocation right is HOOPP, which delivered outstanding results in 2014 investing in long dated U.S. bonds. And I got news for you, HOOPP will keep trouncing its larger peers in Canada and elsewhere as long as global deflation remains a lingering risk.

Another reason why I don't see a bond market crash is that the global carry trade is alive and well. To be sure, this poses serious risks to the bond market if it unwinds violently, but the reality is global investors are all clamoring to buy U.S. bonds for two reasons: yield/growth prospects and flight to quality.

If you look around the world, there isn't much growth going on outside the U.S. and even within the U.S., we can have a serious debate as to the quality of growth going on there. This is why I still maintain that if the Fed raises rates in June or August, it will be making a monumental mistake.

Having said this, the consensus believes the Fed is behind the curve and will raise rates this summer and global investors are slashing their exposure to U.S. stocks on rate hike fears. Even well-known bond bulls like my friend, Brian Romanchuk, have pointed out the risks of underestimating rate hikes in this environment.

Still, I agree with those that argue market expectations of a first Fed rate hike are unrealistic. The Fed and other central banks are worried about global deflation and that's why they're fighting tooth and nail to prevent it (it's a losing battle but enjoy the liquidity party while it lasts).

Below, CNBC's Steve Liesman reports more than half the respondents to CNBC's exclusive survey think the Fed is too accommodative. That just shows me most investors are on the wrong side of the trade and are severely underestimating the risks of global deflation.

When Doves Cry?

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Charlie Bilello is the Director of Research at Pension Partners, LLC, an investment adviser that manages mutual funds and separate accounts, wrote a comment, Dreaming of Doves: The Disconnect Between the Fed and Markets:
Will the Fed raise rates and if so, when will they start and how quickly will they hike?

In a world obsessed with easy money, these questions have become among the most important for global markets.

There is currently a wide disconnect on the answers, depending on whether we are looking at the Fed’s own projections or the projections implied by the market via the Fed Funds Futures.

The Fed last revealed its expectations (known as “dot plots”) in December, when they projected a year-end policy rate of 1.13% in 2015. This would imply between four and five rate hikes of 25 basis points in 2015 and the first hike to occur in June or July.

Fed Fund Futures today are far from these levels, with the market expecting a year-end policy rate of 0.56%. This implies only two to three hikes in 2015 with the first hike not occurring until September or October (click on image).


If we look out further, the expectations gap widens even more, with the market expecting only 1.96% at the end of 2017 versus the Fed’s projections of 3.63% (click on image).
Why the large disconnect and how will it be resolved?

Market participants are likely calling the Fed’s bluff here as betting on more dovishness has been the best bet every year since 2009. In 2010 and 2011 when the Fed was expected to hike rates within months, they reversed course after sharp stock market declines.

Most believe the same will happen in 2015 and with the additional pressure of global easing (over twenty central banks have eased policy in the last two months) and the rising dollar, few think the Fed will be the first to act.

Perhaps they will be correct, but I have a different view here. I believe Fed wants to start normalizing and will adjust market expectations as soon as the March 18th meeting. By removing the word “patient” and reaffirming their dot plots from December, they will send a strong message to the market that this time is indeed different and that a June/July hike is possible.

What could derail plans to raise rates in 2015? As I wrote a few months back, a large stock market correction if history is any guide. They cannot serve two masters and they have shown time and again that they will choose the short-term movement of the stock market over the real economy in making policy decisions (click on image).


But absent such a correction, the Fed is likely to move.

For as Stan Druckenmiller said on CNBC earlier this week: “If the Fed was ever going to raise rates and not have it dramatically impact financial conditions, this is a golden opportunity right here, right now. Because there’s so much foreign money that I think will be attracted to treasury rates that it will not affect the curve as it traditionally has if the Fed starts moving.”

Will Yellen take this “golden opportunity”? The market still doesn’t believe so, but then again, the market isn’t always right.
There are plenty of nervous Fed watchers out there worried that a significant tightening campaign is just getting underway. I'm glad Charles Bilello posted this comment but I thought the consensus view is the Fed will drop the word "patient" when it meets later today. At least that's what CNBC's exclusive poll is reporting.

Investors are worried about how the stock market and bond market will react if the Fed does indicate it's ready to raise rates. We'll find out soon enough but as I discussed in my last comments on unwinding the mother of all carry trades and why the bond market isn't as scary as it seems, I think many investors are getting ahead of themselves and don't realize why this time is different.

Importantly, too many investors continue to underestimate the very real possibility of global deflation, which is one reason why I actually agree with Marc Faber (rare instance that I agree with Dr. Doom!) and think the Fed won't raise rates this year because the mighty greenback keeps surging higher and the latest U.S. economic data has been lackluster at best.

Sure, the Fed will likely drop the word "patient" but until you actually see a rate increase, don't get all flustered about rate hikes. In my opinion, the Fed will be making a monumental mistake if it goes ahead and raises rates. The global economy is very weak and the euro deflation crisis is far from over.

Also, keep in mind the surging greenback has already done a lot of the tightening for the Fed and the risks are the U.S. will start importing disinflation and even deflation if this trend continues. I already discussed this in my comment on the mighty greenback back in October, 2014:
What does the strong USD mean for the U.S. economy? It means oil and import prices will drop and exports will get hurt. Ironically, lower oil and import prices will reinforce deflationary headwinds, which isn't exactly what the Fed wants. But the stronger USD might also give the Fed room to push back its anticipated rate hikes. Why? Because the rise in the USD tightens up financial conditions in the U.S. economy, acting as a rate increase.

In terms of stocks, the surging greenback may be a triple whammy for U.S. earnings. Multinationals which as a group derive almost half of their revenue from international markets, will see a hit on their earnings, especially if they didn't hedge accordingly. But you should see small caps (IWM), which have been beaten down hard in September and thus far in October, rally as they're more exposed to the domestic market.

Despite the October selloff, I'm not worried of another stock market crash. I maintain that the real risk in stocks remains a melt-up, not a meltdown, but you have to pick your spots carefully or risk getting slaughtered (look at coal, gold, commodity stocks that were obliterated in 2014). This is why a lot of active managers underperforming this market will continue to do so as we head into year-end. There are a lot of things that could derail this endless rally but there is still plenty of liquidity to drive all risk assets much, much higher.

Having said this, we are at an important crossroad here. The euro deflation crisis is threatening the global economy. If the ECB doesn't act fast, it will get worse, and likely spill over to the rest of the world. Then you will see more quantitative easing from all central banks as they try (in vain) to fight the coming deflation spiral.
I still think there is plenty of liquidity to drive U.S. stock much higher which is why in my Outlook 2015, I recommended investors to overweight small caps (IWM), technology (QQQ or XLK) and biotech shares (IBB or XBI) but keep steering clear of energy (XLE), materials (XLB) and commodities (GSG). 

Now, I realize there is an argument to be made the U.S. led the global economy down and it will lead the global economy out of this slump. While this has been the case in the past, I'm highly skeptical that this will be the case going forward.

Why? In my last comment on the scary bond market, I stated five structural factors exacerbating and bolstering global deflation:
  • Aging demographics
  • The global jobs crisis
  • High public and private debt in developed economies
  • Rising inequality throughout the world
  • The looming retirement crisis which will ensure more pension poverty down the road
You can add technological advances to this list but the point I'm trying to make is the Fed and other central banks can only buy time, they can't change the structure of our fragile economies. 

This is why I keep saying "enjoy the liquidity party while it lasts" -- and it will last a lot longer than Stanley Druckenmiller and other skeptics think -- but at one point, liquidity will not be enough to drive risk assets higher. That will be a very scary moment for financial markets but we're not there yet.

On that note, I leave you with an interview with Chris Watling, chief executive of Longview Economics, who tells CNBC why he is starting to "think like a bear" as the market environment starts to change. Watling thinks we're entering into the last 18 months of the global economic cycle, but warns of a challenging year ahead.

He may be right but all I can tell you is it isn't the time for doves to start crying. Listen to the classic song from Prince and the Revolution and keep on dancing to the music because this global liquidity party has a few more legs up before it all comes crashing down.


Will Japan's Pensions Save Abenomics?

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Eleanor Warnock of the Wall Street Journal reports,Japan Pension Funds Announce Portfolio Shift:
Three Japanese public pensions said Friday that they plan to shift more money into equities from domestic government bonds, following a similar move by the nation’s $1.1 trillion Government Pension Investment Fund.

The three funds control a combined ¥30 trillion yen ($249 billion), an amount roughly the size of Greece’s gross domestic product. They will adopt the same portfolio as the GPIF, according to a statement on the GPIF’s website.

The GPIF, the world’s largest pension fund, has been shifting assets to domestic and overseas equities since last year. Its reallocation—and expectations that other Japanese pension funds would follow suit—have helped push Tokyo’s Nikkei Stock Average to a 15-year high this week.

The moves into riskier assets come at the urging of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who hopes to secure higher returns for pension funds faced with a rapidly aging population while helping to reinvigorate financial markets.

The three smaller pensions’ decision to use the GPIF’s portfolio as a model reflects a 2012 law that mandates the consolidation of the nation’s employee pension system by October 2015. Though the funds will align their investment strategies, they will still be organizationally independent, welfare minister Yasuhisa Shiozaki said earlier this month.

The three smaller funds also hold assets that the GPIF doesn’t have, including real estate and educational and home loans to members. They will treat any such assets as either stocks or bonds, the statement said.

Data indicate the three smaller pensions have already started to shift their portfolios. Trust banks, which manage money for pensions, sold a net ¥389.1 billion of super-long Japanese government bonds in February, the sixth consecutive month of net selling, according to data released Friday by the Japan Securities Dealers Associations. Pensions are big investors in super-long JGBs as they invest over a long time horizon.

Strategists at JPMorgan Securities Japan Co. said in a note earlier this month that the three pension funds adjusting their portfolios in line with the GPIF’s would create ¥7.2 trillion in sales of domestic bonds, ¥2.5 trillion in purchases of domestic stocks, ¥1.6 trillion of foreign bond purchases and ¥3.1 trillion in foreign equities purchases.

The GPIF, which manages money for Japan’s national pension system and for private-sector employees, said in October that it would cut its allocation to domestic bonds by nearly half to 35%. The fund raised allocations to domestic and foreign stocks and foreign bonds to 25%, 25% and 15%, respectively.

The three smaller funds are the Promotion and Mutual Aid Corporation for Private Schools of Japan, which had ¥3.8 trillion in pension assets at the end of the fiscal year ended in March, 2014, the Pension Fund Association for Local Government Officials, with ¥18.9 trillion, and the Federation of National Public Service Personnel Mutual Aid Associations with ¥7.3 trillion.

The association for national public servants announced in February that it had decided upon target asset allocations that matched the GPIF’s.

Representatives for the other three funds declined to comment.
Takashi Umekawa of Reuters also reports, Japan public pensions to follow GPIF into stocks from JGBs:
Three Japanese public pension funds with a combined $250 billion in assets will follow the mammoth Government Pension Investment Fund and shift more of their investments out of government bonds and into stocks, two people involved in the decisions said.

The three funds and the trillion-dollar Government Pension Investment Fund, the world's biggest pension fund, will announce on Friday a common model portfolio in line with asset allocations recently decided by the GPIF, the people told Reuters.

Assuming, as expected, the three smaller mutual-aid pensions adopt the portfolio, that would mean shifting some 3.58 trillion yen ($30 billion) into Japanese stocks, a Reuters calculation shows.

The GPIF in October slashed its targeted holdings of low-yielding government bonds and doubled its target for stocks, as part of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's plan to boost the economy and promote risk-taking.

GPIF in October slashed its targeted holdings of low-yielding government bonds and doubled its target for stocks, as part of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's plan to jolt Japan out of two decades of deflation and fitful growth and promote risk-taking.

The shift to riskier investments by the 137 trillion yen ($1.1 trillion) GPIF has helped drive Tokyo Stocks to 15-year highs this week because of the fund's size and because it is seen as a bellwether for other big Japanese institutional investors.

The new model portfolio, part of a government plan to consolidate Japan's pension system in October, will match the new GPIF allocations of 35 percent in Japanese government bonds, 25 percent in domestic stocks, 15 percent in foreign bonds and 25 percent in foreign stocks, the sources said.

Final investment amounts may vary, as the three funds are not required to follow the model and they, like GPIF, will have some leeway above and below their targeted levels to manage their portfolios in practice, the sources said.

The smaller funds will also have latitude to keep some of their assets in cash, which GPIF no longer does, the sources said.

Shinichiro Mori, head of GPIF's Planning Division, said nothing has been decided about the model portfolio.

Spokesmen for the other funds - the 18.9-trillion-yen Pension Fund Association for Local Government Officials, the 7.6-trillion-yen Federation of National Public Service Personnel Mutual Aid Association and the 3.8-trillion-yen The Promotion and Mutual Aid Corporation for Private Schools of Japan - declined to comment on their asset-allocation plans.
I've been covering the 'seismic shift' in Japan since November 2012. Interestingly, Japan is pulling its own version of Operation AIG, throwing everything it's got to tackle its deflation dragon. More QE, more government spending and more risk taking by GPIF and other public and private pensions.

Will it work? I strongly doubt it. Japanese authorities are trying to change perceptions by using pension savings to promote risk-taking behavior, but all they're doing is throwing money at a deep structural problem that won't magically disappear.

Earlier this week, Mehreen Khan of the Telegraph reported, Japan will struggle to slay deflation warns Bank governor:
The Japanese economy is in danger of slipping back into deflation despite two years of intensive monetary action, the country's central bank governor has warned.

Haruhiko Kuroda, head of the Bank of Japan, said the falling price of oil would push consumer prices back into negative territory later this year.

"Depending on oil price moves, we can't rule out the possibility that core consumer prices will fall slightly year-on-year," said Mr Kuroda.

Core consumer inflation, which is the central bank's preferred measure, currently stands at 0.2pc, well below the mandated 2pc target. Prices are now "moving to around zero percent for the time being on declines in energy prices" cautioned the Bank of Japan.

Despite the downgrade to inflation expectations, the central bank decided to hold interest rates butcontinue with its aggressive quantitative easing programme.


"There's absolutely no change to our stance of aiming to achieve our 2pc inflation target at the earliest date possible with a timeframe of roughly two years," said Mr Kuroda, who will mark two years in office this week.

The country launched one of the most radical experiments in monetary policy last year, carrying out asset purchases worth 80 trillion yen (£444bn) a year in a bid to revive growth and flagging prices.

But there are doubts that the central bank will be able to stoke inflation amid weak global demand and collapsing energy prices.

April's headline inflation numbers are likely to take a further plunge as they will include the effects of a higher sales tax, warn Capital Economics.

"Risks will be mounting that the Bank’s success in lifting expectations of future price rises gets undermined," said Marcel Thieliant, economist at Capital Economics.

Economists think the weak inflationary outlook could force the BoJ into intensifying Japan's QE programme, to 90 trillion yen-a-year. But any decision to ramp up the stimulus could face opposition within the bank.

Three of the BoJ's monetary policy members voted against the decision to increase asset purchases last autumn. Mr Kuroda would need to convince a majority of his Board that more easing is necessary to approve the measure.

"Given that Japanese stocks are doing well, there's no need to ease policy now," said Hiroaki Muto, senior economist at Sumitomo Mitsui Asset Management.

"However, the BoJ will probably have to push back its two-year timeframe when it updates its forecasts in October, which will raise questions about monetary easing," said Mr Mitsui.

The Yen has weakened by 22pc since the government of Shinzo Abe began a policy of fiscal stimulus accompanied by radical monetary easing. Japan's QE blitz has led to fears of a "currency war" in Asia.
There are other reasons why I'm concerned about using Japan's large pensions as an extension of monetary and fiscal policy. First, it's terrible governance. In late February, Reuters reported that GPIF's governance overhaul bogs down amid resistance:
Japan's prime minister's office has baulked at a proposal to create a large board to oversee the country's $1.1 trillion pension which could delay attempts to improve its governance as it increasingly moves into riskier assets, according to sources and draft legislation seen by Reuters.

The Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) last year cut its allocations for low-yielding government bonds and doubled its target for stocks, a key element of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's agenda to jump-start the long-sluggish economy, boost returns for millions of pensioners and spur risk-taking.

But five months after those changes helped boost Tokyo stocks, the dispute over the fund's governance is endangering the prospects for a governance bill, being prepared by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, to bolster oversight of the world's largest pension fund.

The bill, championed by Welfare Minister Yasuhisa Shiozaki, would put the fund under the management of a committee of up to 10 members, modelled on the board of directors of the Bank of Japan.

They would get broad powers as final judges on how the fund invests its 130 trillion yen in assets, the previously undisclosed draft shows.

The massive fund manages reserves of national and employee pension plans covering 67 million people, but hired its first chief investment officer only last July and has roughly 80 employees. Most of its investments are managed by outside fund managers.

Shiozaki and other reformers "believe that a more professional GPIF could not only deliver better returns for pensioners, but could also serve as a powerful activist investor, pressuring Japanese companies to improve their return on equity," said analyst Tobias Harris at Teneo Intelligence.

But the Prime Minister's Office has pushed back, essentially stalling Shiozaki's bill, on the grounds that GPIF needs a nimbler structure with more streamlined decision-making, said two people briefed on the matter.

"People in the ministry are still working on the draft, but the sense is that they are unlikely to get the green light to submit it to this session of parliament," said a person briefed on the process. That would mean the reform would be delayed until at least the autumn.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, asked about potential delays to the bill, said this week the government should move ahead with what steps it can as they are ready "and move ahead with a sense of speed."

Abe's cabinet on Tuesday approved a separate, smaller measure that would add a senior GPIF executive and rescind a previous plan to move the fund's headquarters to Yokohama from Tokyo.

"The reform plan is still being debated at the relevant ministerial committee," said Hiyoshi Kai, an official at the ministry's pension department. "It's hard to say if it's going to be submitted in this session of parliament."
I guess all that talk about focusing on governance first was thrown right out the window. It's too bad because GPIF is the biggest pension fund in the world and without proper governance, modeled after the CPPIB, you leave it vulnerable to mediocre performance, not to mention corruption and unwise government interference (which is what's going on right now).

I have other concerns with Abenomics and using pensions to inflate risk assets. Yuriko Koike, Japan's former defense minister and national security adviser and former Chairwoman of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party's General Council, wrote an excellent comment for Project Syndicate, Thomas Piketty’s Japanese Tour:
Six months after Thomas Piketty's book Capital in the Twenty-First Century generated so much buzz in the United States and Europe, it has become a bestseller in Japan. But vast differences between Japan and its developed counterparts in the West, mean that, like so many other Western exports, Piketty's argument has taken on unique characteristics.

Piketty's main assertion is that the leading driver of increased inequality in the developed world is the accumulation of wealth by those who are already wealthy, driven by a rate of return on capital that consistently exceeds the rate of GDP growth. Japan, however, has lower levels of inequality than almost every other developed country. Indeed, though it has long been an industrial powerhouse, Japan is frequently called the world's most successful communist country.

Japan has a high income-tax rate for the rich (45%), and the inheritance tax rate recently was raised to 55%. This makes it difficult to accumulate capital over generations – a trend that Piketty cites as a significant driver of inequality.

As a result, Japan's richest families typically lose their wealth within three generations. This is driving a growing number of wealthy Japanese to move to Singapore or Australia, where inheritance taxes are lower. The familiarity of Japan, it seems, is no longer sufficient to compel the wealthy to endure the high taxes imposed upon them.

In this context, it is not surprising that Japan's “super-rich" remain a lot less wealthy than their counterparts in other countries. In the US, for example, the average income of the top one percent of households was $1,264,065 in 2012, according to the investment firm Sadoff Investment Research. In Japan, the top 1% of households earned about $240,000, on average (at 2012 exchange rates).

Yet Japanese remain sensitive to inequality, driving even the richest to avoid ostentatious displays of wealth. One simply does not see the profusion of mansions, yachts, and private jets typical of, say, Beverly Hills and Palm Beach.

For example, Haruka Nishimatsu, former President and CEO of Japan Airlines, attracted international attention a few years ago for his modest lifestyle. He relied on public transportation and ate lunch with employees in the company's cafeteria. By contrast, in China, the heads of national companies are well known for maintaining grandiose lifestyles.

We Japanese have a deeply ingrained stoicism, reflecting the Confucian notion that people do not lament poverty when others lament it equally. This willingness to accept a situation, however bad, as long as it affects everyone equally is what enabled Japan to endure two decades of deflation, without a public outcry over the authorities' repeated failure to redress it.

This national characteristic is not limited to individuals. The government, the central bank, the media, and companies wasted far too much time simply enduring deflation – time that they should have spent working actively to address it.

Japan finally has a government, led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, that is committed to ending deflation and reinvigorating economic growth, using a combination of expansionary monetary policy, active fiscal policy, and deregulation. Now in its third year, so-called “Abenomics" is showing some positive results. Share prices have risen by 220% since Abe came to power in December 2012. And corporate performance has improved – primarily in the export industries, which have benefited from a depreciated yen – with many companies posting their highest profits on record.

But Abenomics has yet to benefit everyone. In fact, there is a sense that Abe's policies are contributing to rising inequality. That is why Piketty's book appeals to so many Japanese.

For example, though the recent reduction in the corporate-tax rate was necessary to encourage economic growth and attract investment, it seems to many Japanese to be a questionable move at a time when the consumption-tax rate has been increased and measures to address deflation are pushing up prices. To address this problem, the companies that enjoy tax cuts should increase their employees' wages to keep pace with rising prices, instead of waiting for market forces to drive them up.

Herein lies the unique twist that Piketty's theory takes on in Japan: the disparity is not so much between the super-rich and everyone else, but between large corporations, which can retain earnings and accumulate capital, and the individuals who are being squeezed in the process.
She hits the nail on its head but there is another twist she neglects to mention. Japan's mammoth pensions are being used to buy domestic shares of companies which will undoubtedly make corporations and those that run them even richer, further fueling inequality. To be sure, it's nothing compared to the gross excesses of corporate America where CEO pay is spinning out of control but it's a form of wealth redistribution that needs to be openly discussed.

Anyways, I remain highly skeptical on using Japan's large public and private pensions to slay the deflation dragon. Pensions should not be used as an extension of monetary and fiscal policy. They are pooled savings of people who contribute expecting to retire in dignity and security. So on this front, I'd give Abenomics a categorical failing grade.

However, I agree with Thomas Piketty, Europe should learn from Japan that monetary policy alone can’t prevent the economy entering deflation and that other measures are needed. One of those measures is to raise wages for workers so they have more disposable income to spend on goods and services (see the clip below).

In theory, this will help as long as rising inequality and high inflation doesn't hit them. For now, this doesn't seem to be the problem as the country is still struggling to get out of a long deflationary cycle. But as Japan's giant pensions start taking on more risk, it could come back to haunt the country in ways nobody thought possible. This is why I urge Japanese policymakers to get the governance on GPIF and other large public pensions right and let them operate at arm's length from the government.

The Big Fat Greek Squeeze?

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Marcus Bensasson and Nikos Chrysoloras of Bloomberg report, Empty Greek Coffers Bring ‘Accident’ Threat Closer:
With Greece’s coffers emptying and payments looming, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s government is in a tight race to avoid a financial day of reckoning after receiving a “final political push” from his EU partners.

While Tsipras may have bought some time after yesterday’s European Union summit in Brussels, he acknowledges Greece is facing “liquidity pressure”, without revealing how much money is left in the bank. The country’s cash shortfall is projected to hit 3.5 billion euros ($3.7 billion) in March, according to Bloomberg calculations based on 2015 budget figures.

After nearly four hours of talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other European leaders yesterday, Tsipras received no guarantees that creditors would unlock cash from a 240 billion-euro bailout package unless concrete steps are taken to implement agreed reforms. The EU chiefs warned him time is running out to overcome a standoff over the aid and that the Greek government needed to submit a new list of reform measures rapidly.

“To be quite honest, the ball is in the court and in the hands of the Greek government,” Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb told reporters in Brussels today on the second day of the EU summit. “The institutional decisions were taken on Feb. 20 after long and difficult negotiations and now a final political push has been given.”

As Tsipras prepares for another meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on Monday, concerns grow as to whether he’ll be able to pay salaries and pensions next week. Just how long Greece can survive on reserves isn’t known, with estimates ranging from a matter of days to a few months. An EU official yesterday said the understanding among euro-zone leaders is that Greece has enough cash until April.
Accident Prone

“A government should not be in this position because it’s a difficult situation prone to accidents,” said Athanasios Vamvakidis, head of G-10 foreign exchange strategy at Bank of America Merrill Lynch. “We are assuming that in April and May the government will be paying mostly wages and pensions. For everything else, things will be delayed, so the government will be running arrears.”

Greece has signed off on a repayment of about 350 million euros of loans to the International Monetary Fund on Friday, two Greek government officials said.

Investors were relieved on Friday that at least an accident has been averted for now. Greek bonds recovered from multi-month lows, while the Athens Stock Exchange index was trading 2.7% higher. The yield on three-year bonds was 55 basis points lower at 23.2 percent at 13:19 p.m. in Athens, after reaching yesterday the highest level since July, when the notes were first issued. The Athens Stock Exchange index has fallen 15.7 percent so far this month, while the yield on three-year bonds has risen almost 9 percentage points as a rift between Greece and its creditors widened. 
Rupture Avoided

“We avoided a rupture which could lead to a depositors panic next week,” George Pagoulatos, a professor of European politics and economy at the Athens University said. “On a more substantial level, we saw that neither side wants to push things to the edge. The fact remains though, that Greece needs to deliver on concrete reform commitments, and it couldn’t have been otherwise.”

Even if Tsipras meets March obligations, things could only get tighter in coming months. The second-quarter shortfall, including debt payments, is an estimated at 5.7 billion euros, based on Bloomberg calculations using monthly figures from the 2015 budget passed by the previous government and finance ministry information on the debt servicing costs.

The second-quarter projection assumes Greece is able to roll over short-term debt as it comes due, most of which is held by the country’s banks. The lenders thus far have participated in liquidity-draining auctions rather than let the country default. That could change if things deteriorate. 
Deposit Outflows

Greek daily deposit outflows accelerated to a one-month high Thursday, two people familiar with the matter said. At this pace available liquidity could be exhausted in a matter of days, one of the people said.

The Bank of Greece has plugged cash shortfalls by tapping the reserves of other public sector entities, including pension funds, hospitals, and universities. How much money these entities have and how easily the government can directly access these funds is critical to knowing how long Greece can keep paying its bills. Officials directly involved in the bailout talks have said they don’t have a clear picture.

“Although visibility on the exact liquidity position is low, reports continue to suggest that the Greek authorities’ ability to continue to meet their liabilities is measured in weeks,” Malcolm Barr, a JPMorgan economist based in London, wrote in note to clients Wednesday.

The public sector held 12.3 billion euros of deposits in the Greek banking system at the end of January, including 3.4 billion euros from the social security fund and 2.2 billion euros from local governments, according to the most recent data available from the central bank. 
Plugging Gaps

If the government taps public sector deposits held at commercial banks, this could add to funding pressure on Greek lenders, which have lost more than 20 billion euros in deposits since November and are reliant on an emergency funding through the European Central Bank to prop them up.

Tsipras is plugging the budget gaps as best he can. Spending in February was 800 million euros less than originally planned and this week the government moved forward with measures designed to bring in more revenue, including a plan to allow repayment of tax arrears in 100 installments.

The government potentially bought itself some time thanks to the ECB. The bank’s governing council on Wednesday raised the amount available to Greek banks by 400 million euros to about 70 billion euros, people familiar with the matter said. Still, that leaves the financial system with a cushion of just 3 billion euros and was less than half of what Greece requested, the people said.

“If we start seeing progress in the negotiations and it becomes clear that we are going to have a deal and Greece will receive official funding in June, there is absolutely no way that the Europeans will allow an accident in Greece,” Vamvakidis said. “However, if the brinkmanship continues and by the end of March we don’t have some concrete progress in the negotiations and we are exactly where we are today, then these funding pressures will become more severe.”
Things are not good in Greece. In order to avoid going bankrupt and a full-blown banking crisis, the cash-strapped leftist government is scrambling to find money and it's resorting to raiding pensions, which were already at a breaking point, to make its basic payments. 

And Kathimerini reports the Greek government has also called on major public corporations, including utilities, to invest their cash reserves in state debt, along the lines of the proposal made to social security funds and other state entities.

As the FT reported last week, the Syriza government is pressing the country’s social security funds to hand over hundreds of millions of euros immediately to ensure that pensions and civil servants’ salaries are paid this month (of course, we wouldn't want to piss off civil servants in Greece outrageously bloated public sector!). 

How long can this charade go on? I don't know but it's clear Greece's creditors have had enough of the clowns running the country. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has set strict terms for Greek aid, stating on Friday Greece would only receive fresh funds to ease a cash crunch once its creditors approve a comprehensive list of reforms it has promised to present soon.

Basically, Merkel and Schauble are telling Tsipras and his cronies that there is no more time to waste. Either reform the Greek economy or you risk going back to the drachma and being the Argentina of Europe (if they're so lucky).

I call it the big fat Greek squeeze. The creditor nations are using every tool available to weaken the leftist Syriza government in an attempt to persuade Greeks in Greece to start realizing that they won't be blackmailed into submission and that this government is a total farce.

To be sure, the Germans are playing a very dangerous game, one that could easily backfire spectacularly on them, but I'm tired of professor Varoufakis lecturing his counterparts and want to see more concrete actions focusing on what Greece needs now. And what Greece needs are major structural reforms in its antiquated, over-bureaucratized and corrupt economy which benefits a handful of ultra rich families and a few special interest groups.

In a sad state of affairs which proves austerity isn't working, Kathimerini now reports the European Union will commit 2 billion euros ($2.15 billion) to help Athens deal with what even EU leaders now call the "humanitarian crisis" hitting Greeks in the wake of the financial crisis that left the nation on the brink of bankruptcy:
EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said the funds will not be linked to international loans keeping Greece afloat but will instead be used as aid for people and companies hit hardest by the crisis.

Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras praised the decision.

"It is a good sign," he said. "It was recognized that there is a humanitarian crisis in our country and that there must be a common effort against it — because it was the not the result of some natural catastrophe."

The pledge came hours after the EU leaders told Tsipras to come up "in the next days" with a raft of budget cuts and tax increases to improve his balance sheet before he gets more bailout money from Europe.

Tsipras, however, refused to commit to a date of delivery, saying "deadlines only create more pressure."

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said Tsipras can decide what mix of budget cuts and tax increases to impose: "What’s important is that in the end the sums add up."

Fears remain that the hard line of the Greek government formed in January could cause the country to drop out of the euro, something that would trigger a crisis for the currency shared by 19 nations.

"A disorderly Greek exit from the euro remains a major threat to Europes economic stability," British Prime Minister David Cameron said.

European leaders have become increasingly exasperated by what many see as foot-dragging on the part of Tsipras’ government. Greece agreed a month ago to push through reforms in exchange for EU help in keeping it solvent, but has delayed submitting the measures.

French President Francois Hollande said Tsipras had recommitted to moving fast.

"The Greek prime minister promised me that he would move as quickly as he can to present his reforms," he said.
Get to it Mr. Tsipras, time is running out and your obsession of holding on to power at all cost is quickly making you and the Syriza government the laughingstock of the entire world.

Of course, if you ask me, Tsipras, Merkel, Schauble, Varoufakis, Juncker and many others should all get an Oscar for their performance. I've never seen so much hopeless political dithering in my life. How the eurozone can survive with such incompetent leaders incapable of making critical decisions is beyond me. Then again, I remain short euros and will gladly short their incompetence!

On that cynical note, I leave you with the now infamous discussion which took place two years ago in Zagreb, Croatia where then professor Varoufakis discussed his book, The Global Minotaur.

Take the time to listen carefully to Varoufakis, there is no denying he's brilliant -- and hopelessly full of himself! He explains in great detail why the United States is able to maintain its global hegemony in spite of taking on increasing debt to maintain its control. You will learn why Paul Volckner is the most important central banker in history and why President Reagan was wrongly glorified by Americans and should be a mere "footnote in history."

I'm actually reading The Global Minotaur along with many other books including Michael Hudson's The Bubble and Beyond, Steve Keen's Debunking Economics, Warren Mosler's The 7 Deadly Innocent Frauds of Economic Policy and Soft Currency Economics II, and Randall Wray's Modern Money Theory. I recommend them all, especially to economics and finance students being taught mainstream garbage at universities.

As you will see in the discussion below, Varoufakis at one point sticks the finger to Germany. This was a complete hoax. A German TV presenter has admitted to faking a video showing Varoufakis giving the middle-finger gesture to Germany, after the politician vehemently contested its authenticity.

Mr. Varoufakis obviously doesn't understand satire. He should stop going around the world lecturing people, doing photo spreads for Paris Match, and writing blog comments on Greek-German relations, and start implementing much needed reforms in the Greek economy.

It's high time Greeks take responsibility for their country's economic failure and realize that there are no magical solutions to this ongoing Greek tragedy. The Global Minotaur will continue to reign supreme but the Greek Minotaur is facing an ugly and painful death if it continues to avoid much needed reforms.

 

The UK Pension Raid?

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Katie Morley of the Telegraph reports, Another pension raid: the scenarios of who will have to pay:
In the three years since 2012 the Government has virtually halved the sum people can save into pensions during the course of a working life, slashing it back from £1.8m to £1m.

The numbers may sound big: but the retirement incomes such sums can buy is disappointing.

The latest cut – announced on Wednesday in the Budget – takes the lifetime limit down from £1.25m to £1m.

If your pension grows above that, the tax payable when money is subsequently withdrawn is 55pc.

The Government has decided the limit will remain at £1m until 2018, before increasing in line with inflation every year thereafter. This is not much of a sweetener. The new limit will place a restrictive ceiling on the retirement incomes of middle-class workers such as doctors, middle-managers, teachers and policemen.

Many will now need to change their financial plans. And even though the Budget ink is barely dry, financial advisers have already posted thousands of letters to clients aged 50 and over, warning them at what date they are expected to break through the new lifetime allowance.

One such letter is likely to be opened by John, a 50-year old company director with a £500,000 pension fund. John has £1,000 going into his pension each month and is aiming to retire on his 65th birthday. When he opens the letter from his adviser, Tilney Bestinvest, he will learn that if his pension fund continues to grow at 7pc a year, he will reach the new £1m allowance when he is 58.

Another saver about to receive a shock in the post is Alison, a 55-year-old solicitor with an £800,000 pension pot. She no longer contributes to her pension – because she is already aware of the danger of exceeding the limit – yet she too wants to work until her 65th birthday. Alison will soon find out that if her cautiously invested portfolio continues to grow at 4pc, she will exceed £1m before her 60th birthday, leaving her potentially liable to a huge tax bill.

The lower ceiling is also a blow for younger savers. As things now stand those in their 40s and 30s will not be able to amass retirement funds as generous as their parents’.

The Pensions Minister, Steve Webb MP, has recently warned that people in their twenties and thirties need to be contributing 15pc of their salary into a pension to have a “comfortable” retirement - around seven times more than most currently save. But following the Budget announcement his advice is now questionable.

If a 25-year-old saver earning an average graduate salary of £30,000 put 15pc of their salary into a pension, they would exceed the £1m threshold before they retire, according to projections from Mercer, a pension consultant.

Final salary? You'll get off more lightly
The cut will hit savers with defined contribution pensions twice as hard as those with final salary arrangements in place. This is because they are calculated in very different ways.

For someone using a defined contribution pension pot to buy an index-linked annuity with a spouse’s pension, the allowance cut takes the maximum annual income you can buy down from around £33,500 (bought with a £1.25m fund) to just under £27,000 (bought with a £1m fund). That assumes you take no tax-free cash and spend every penny on an annuity.

For people with final salary pensions, the maximum annual pension they can receive if their pension is worth under £1m in total is reduced to £50,000, down from £62,500 for a fund worth £1.25m.

This higher benefit arises because the value of a final salary scheme – for the purposes of working out the lifetime allowance – is found by multiplying the annual benefit by 20.

Brian Henderson, a partner at consultants Mercer, said: “On the face of it, £1 million is a huge amount of money and beyond the reach of many. However, the impact of this reduction on defined contribution savers reminds us that they continue to be the poorer relation when it comes to pension provision.”

He predicts that some savers will have to abandon the idea of further pension savings and turn instead to “making use of the increased Isa allowances, which they may sensibly choose to use as an alternative to pension savings.”

What should I do if my pension is nearly worth £1m now?

That depends on your age, on how long you have until you want to draw benefits, and whether you want to keep investing.

The new limit doesn’t apply until April 2016 so you have some time to prepare. But if you are near the limit, you do need to keep a close eye on your fund value.

You have the option to “protect” the higher limit of £1.25m if you apply to do so before April 2016 (read on for more details).

So some investors will have to weigh up the advantages of further tax relief if they continue to contribute, against the risk of becoming liable to the penal tax. You will want to get as close as possible to the cap – without ever exceeding it.

This is why your age matters very much. By taking money out of your pension you can manage the risk, but you can only make withdrawals if you are over 55.

Once the money is outside of the pension, if it grows, this growth won’t count toward your allowance. But your withdrawals won’t give you new “headroom”. That’s because the limit is calculated at the point of any withdrawal. So drawing £200,000 from a £900,000 pension will still leave you a lifetime balance of £900,000.

Every time you take benefits, including your tax free cash, your pension firm will test your fund against the lifetime allowance and report this information back to HMRC. If you don’t make withdrawals, your pension firm will only test your pension against the limit at age 75, and/or when you die.

Jackie Holmes, a senior consultant at Towers Watson, said that although the 55pc tax which applies where the limit is exceeded is punitive, sometimes it is better just to pay the tax than to give up valuable benefits.

Some employers offer cash alternatives to pensions for people who have already reached the lifetime allowance, but for people in final schemes these rarely get close to the value of the pension that must be given up.

She said: “ If your employer isn’t offering a cash alternative at all, it’s better to pay 55pc tax on something than 0pc tax on nothing – though the decision is less straightforward if the employee must contribute to benefit.”

What should I do if my pension is worth between £1m and £1.25m now?

If you’ve already built up a pension worth more than £1m but less than the old limit of £1.25m, you’ll be able to “protect” your pension at its current value under various arrangements. Using “protection” means no more money can be put into your pension, or the protection is lost. One danger is where employers mistakenly pay into a pension where protection has been set up, potentially leaving savers vulnerable to the 55pc. The Government knows this is a problem for high earners and has introduced a new rule to allow you to ask your employer to permanently exclude you from “auto-enrolment” into a scheme.
As a Canadian reading all these pension articles from the UK makes me glad I don't live there. What a needlessly complicated pension system.

The other thing I don't really buy with this article is that people in Britain are actually able to save £1m or more by the time they hit 55 years of age. People in the UK are being squeezed by higher cost of living and high taxes. I have serious doubts that they're tucking away 15% of their income for their retirement.

Sure, the Chancellor, George Osborne, just announced plans for a "savings revolution" as the centerpiece for his final budget, just 50 days before the election, but this won't help the working poor as much as the Conservatives claim:
“This Budget helps hard-working people keep more of the money they have earned,” Mr Osborne said.

“This is a Budget that takes Britain one more big step on the road from austerity to prosperity. We have a plan that is working – and this is a Budget that works for you.”

In a surprise announcement, Mr Osborne was also able to proclaim that government debts - as a proportion of the total size of the economy - are forecast to begin falling this year.

The austerity programme will also end a year earlier than expected in 2018 - paving the way for the Conservatives to offer sweeping tax cuts if they are re-elected in the forthcoming general election. New tax pledges are expected to be included in the party's election manifesto next month.
A lot of things can happen between now and 2018, derailing those "sweeping tax cuts" the Conservatives are promising. All it takes is another global financial crisis or a major euro crisis and you can throw those government projections right out the window.

And by the way, those in a defined-contribution plan are much more vulnerable to the vagaries of markets than those in defined-benefit plans. That's just part of the brutal truth on DC plans.  This is why I'm totally against taking money out of pension plans unless you face serious financial constraints due to health or other unfortunate events.

What else? As Katie Morley reports in an other Telegraph article, hundreds of thousands of UK pensioners living overseas are discovering that their state pension is at risk of being cut off if they “fail to prove they are alive”:
Since 2013 the Department for Work & Pensions (DWP) has been making expat pensioners fill in official forms to stop their friends and relatives fraudulently claiming their state pensions after they have died.

If forms are not correctly filled out and returned within nine months, the DWP will assume pensioners are dead – and will stop their pension payments.
Well, I'm all for anti-fraud measures when it comes to pensions and social programs but they better make sure these people are really dead or they risk making some serious mistakes like they did in the United States.

Below, CBS 60 Minutes reports on how thousands of errors to the Social Security Administration's Death Master File can result in fraudulent payments -- costing taxpayers billions -- and identity headaches. Watch this report, it's another eye-opener.

Unfortunately, 60 Minutes doesn't always get it right, like Sunday night's report on rare earths and China. Be very careful deducing any investment advice from 60 Minutes and other news outlets.

The Great 401(k) Experiment Has Failed?

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Kelley Holland of NBC News reports, Retirement Crisis: The Great 401(k) Experiment Has Failed for Many Americans:
You need to know this number: $18,433. That's the median amount in a 401(k) savings account, according to a recent report by the Employee Benefit Research Institute. Almost 40 percent of employees have less than $10,000, even as the proportion of companies offering alternatives like defined benefit pensions continues to drop.

Older workers do tend to have more savings. At Vanguard, for example, the median for savers aged 55 to 64 in 2013 was $76,381. But even at that level, millions of workers nearing retirement are on track to leave the workforce with savings that do not even approach what they will need for health care, let alone daily living. Not surprisingly, retirement is now Americans' top financial worry, according to a recent Gallup poll.

To be sure, tax-advantaged 401(k) plans have provided a means for millions of retirement savers to build a nest egg. More than three-quarters of employers use such defined contribution plans as the main retirement income plan option for employees, and the vast majority of them offer matching contribution programs, which further enhance employees' ability to accumulate wealth.

But shifting the responsibility for growing retirement income from employers to individuals has proved problematic for many American workers, particularly in the face of wage stagnation and a lack of investment expertise. For them, the grand 401(k) experiment has been a failure.

"In America, when we had disability and defined benefit plans, you actually had an equality of retirement period. Now the rich can retire and workers have to work until they die," said Teresa Ghilarducci, a labor economist at the New School for Social Research who has proposed eliminating the tax breaks for 401(k)s and using the money saved to create government-run retirement plans.

A historical accident?

It wasn't supposed to work out this way.

The 401(k) account came into being quietly, as a clause in the Revenue Act of 1978. The clause said employees could choose to defer some compensation until retirement, and they would not be taxed until that time. (Companies had long offered deferred compensation arrangements, but employers and the IRS had been going back and forth about their tax treatment.)

"401(k)s were never designed as the nation's primary retirement system," said Anthony Webb, a research economist at the Center for Retirement Research. "They came to be that as a historical accident."

History has it that a benefits consultant named Ted Benna realized the provision could be used as a retirement savings vehicle for all employees. In 1981, the IRS clarified that 401(k) plan participants could defer regular wages, not just bonuses, and the plans began to proliferate.

By 1985, there were 30,000 401(k) plans in existence, and 10 years later that figure topped 200,000. As of 2013, there were 638,000 plans in place with 89 million participants, according to the Investment Company Institute. And assets in defined contribution plans totaled $6.6 trillion as of the third quarter of 2014, $4.5 trillion of which was held in 401(k) plans.

"Nobody thought they were going to take over the world," said Daniel Halperin, a professor at Harvard Law School, who was a senior official at the Treasury Department when 401(k) accounts came into being.

Rise of defined contributions

But a funny thing happened as 401(k) plans began to multiply: defined benefit plans started disappearing. In 1985, the year there were 30,000 401(k) plans, defined benefit plans numbered 170,000, according to the Investment Company Institute. By 2005, there were just 41,000 defined benefit plans-and 417,000 401(k) plans.

The reasons for the shift are complex, but Ghilarducci argued that in the early years, "workers overvalued the promise of a 401(k)" and the prospect of amassing investment wealth, so they accepted the change. Meanwhile, companies found that providing a defined contribution, or DC, plan cost them less. (Ghilarducci studied 700 companies' plans over 17 years and found that when employers allocated a larger share of their pension expenditures to defined contribution plans, their overall spending on pension plans went down.)

But the new plans had two key differences. Participation in 401(k) plans is optional and, while pensions provided lifetime income, 401(k) plans offer no such certainty.

"I'm not saying defined benefit plans are flawless, but they certainly didn't put as much of the risk and responsibility on the individual," said Terrance Odean, a professor of finance at the University of California, Berkeley's Haas School of Business.

Early signs of trouble

That concept may not have been in the forefront of employees' minds at the start, but problems with 401(k)s surfaced early.

For one thing, employee participation in 401(k) plans never became anywhere near universal, despite aggressive marketing by investment firms and exhortations by employers and consumer associations to save more. A 2011 report by the Government Accountability Office found that "the percentage of workers participating in employer-sponsored plans has peaked at about 50 percent of the private sector workforce for most of the past two decades."

The employees who did participate tended to be better paid, since those people could defer income more easily. The GAO report found that most of the people contributing as much as they were allowed tended to have incomes of $126,000 or more.

In part, that is because the ascent of 401(k) plans came as college costs started their steep rise, hitting many employees in their prime earning years. Stagnating middle-class wages also made it hard for people to save.

Fees have been another problem. Webb has studied 401(k) fees, and he concluded that "as a result of high fees, fund balances in defined contribution plans are about 20 percent less than they need otherwise be."

The Department of Labor in 2012 established new rules requiring more disclosure of fees, but it faced strong industry opposition, including a 17-page comment from the Investment Company Institute.

Failure of choice

Most employees also turned out to be less than terrific investors, making mistakes like selling low and buying high or shying away from optimal asset classes at the wrong time.

Berkeley's Odean and others have studied the effect of investment choice on 401(k) savers, and found that when investors choose their asset class allocation, a retirement income shortfall is more likely. If they can also choose their stock investments, the odds of a shortfall rise further.

"401(k)'s changed two things: you could choose not to participate, and you chose your own investments, which a lot of people, I think, screw up," Halperin said.

Benna, who is often called the father of the 401(k), has argued that many plans offer far too many choices. " If I were starting over from scratch today with what we know, I'd blow up the existing structure and start over," he said in a 2013 interview.

Another problem is that when 401(k) savers retire, they often opt to take their savings in a lump sum and roll the money into IRAs, which may entail higher fees and expose them to conflicted investment advice. A recent report by the Council of Economic Advisors found that savers receiving such advice, which may be suitable for them but not optimal, see investment returns reduced by a full percentage point, on average. Overall, the report found that conflicted investment advice costs savers $17 billion every year.
The result of all these shortcomings? Some 52 percent of American households were at risk of being unable to maintain their standard of living as of 2013, a figure barely changed from a year earlier—even though a strong bull market should have pushed savings higher and the government gives up billions in tax revenue to subsidize the plans.

In a hearing last September on retirement security, Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., declared that "something is out of whack. The American taxpayer delivers $140 billion each year to subsidize retirement accounts, but still millions of Americans nearing retirement have little or nothing saved."

Retirement worries rise


As problems mount with 401(k)s, Americans' worries about retirement security are intensifying.

A 2014 Harris poll found that 74 percent of Americans were worried about having enough income in retirement, and in a survey published recently by the National Institute on Retirement Security, 86 percent of respondents agree that the country is facing a retirement crisis, with that opinion strongest among high earners.

Changes may come, but for now, 401(k) plans and their ilk remain Americans' predominant workplace retirement savings vehicle. They may be a historical accident, but for the millions of people now facing a potentially impoverished retirement, the fallout is grave indeed.

As a former Treasury official, Halperin witnessed the creation of 401(k) accounts, But, "on balance, I don't think it was a big plus" that the accounts were created, he said. "I don't take credit for it. I try to avoid the blame."
Welcome to the United States of Pension Poverty where rich and powerful private equity and hedge fund titans make off like bandits charging public pension funds excessive fees while the restless masses work till they die, or more likely, retire in poverty because they simply can't save enough money to retire in dignity.

I commend Kelly Holland for writing this article. Of course, it's didn't surprise me one bit. In July 2012, I discussed America's 401 (k) nightmare and explained why it was going to lead to more pension poverty down the road.

And now that America's private and public sector is following the rest of the world, shifting out of DB into DC plans, you can bet there will be more pension poverty down the road, pretty much ensuring global deflation. That's why I laugh at all the bond bears claiming we're in for a major bond market bruising, they simply don't get it, rising inequality, including the growing retirement divide, is bad for the overall economy and will dampen growth prospects for decades to come.

What else? America's ongoing retirement crisis (and ongoing quality jobs crisis) will place considerable constraints on public finances, exacerbating total debt due to higher health and social welfare costs. This is why I'm a stickler for enhancing the Canada Pension Plan for all Canadians and doing the same thing via enhanced Social Security for all Americans.

Sure, America's rich and powerful will shout "we can't afford it" and I will counter their warped ideological arguments with a good dose of basic economic theory and tell them we can't simply afford the status quo. It's the real road to serfdom (Hayek got it wrong).

Importantly, policymakers around the world and their rich and powerful backers need to open their eyes and understand the benefits of defined-benefit plans to the overall economy (and overall debt profile of a country) and also recognize the brutal truth on defined-contribution plans.

One thing I can guarantee you, the growing angst of Americans unable to retire will be an issue in the 2016 elections. Senators Warren and Sanders will make it a point to remind Americans that they bailed out Wall Street's elite following the 2008 financial crisis but nobody is going to help them retire in dignity and security.

Below, CNBC's Kelley Holland discusses how $18,433 is the median amount in a 401(k) savings account, according to a recent report by the Employee Benefit Research Institute, highlighting the failure of 401 (k)s.

And Emily Wittmann paid for years into a 401(k), but dipped into those retirement savings during the economic downturn. She's not alone. the scars of the 2008 crisis remain fresh to many Americans petrified to "invest" in these increasingly volatile markets dominated by computer algorithms.

Lastly,  a 2009 report which explains the 401(k) nightmare. As the default retirement plan of the United States, the 401(k) falls short, argues CBS MoneyWatch.com editor-in-chief Eric Schurenberg. He tells Jill Schlesinger why the plans don't work.



Greece's Lose-Lose Game?

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Tom Beardsworth and Francine Lacqua of Bloomberg report, Soros Says Greece Now Lose-Lose Game After Being Mishandled:
The chances of Greece leaving the euro area are now 50-50 and the country could go “down the drain,” billionaire investor George Soros said.

“It’s now a lose-lose game and the best that can happen is actually muddling through,” Soros, 84, said in a Bloomberg Television interview due to air Tuesday. “Greece is a long-festering problem that was mishandled from the beginning by all parties.”

Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s government needs to persuade its creditors to sign off on a package of economic measures to free up long-withheld aid payments that will keep the country afloat. Since his January election victory, he has tried to shape an alternative to the austerity program set out in the nation’s bailout agreement, spurring concern that Greece may be forced out of the euro.

The negotiations between Tsipras’s Syriza government and the institutions helping finance the Greek economy -- the European Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund -- could result in a “breakdown,” leading to the country leaving the common currency area, Soros said in the interview at his London home.

“You can keep on pushing it back indefinitely,” making interest payments without writing down debt, Soros said. “But in the meantime there will be no primary surplus because Greece is going down the drain.”

Soros said in January 2012 that the odds are in the direction of Greece leaving the euro region.

“Right now we are at the cusp and I can see both possibilities,” he said in Tuesday’s interview.
Aid Payment

Tsipras is meeting with German lawmakers in Berlin on Tuesday after Chancellor Angela Merkel encouraged him to follow the path set out by Greece’s creditors. European Parliament President Martin Schulz said in an interview with Italian newspaper Repubblica that he expects a deal by the end of this week that will allow the release of at least some money.

The start of quantitative easing by the ECB at a time when the U.S. Federal Reserve is considering raising interest rates “creates currency fluctuations,” said Soros, one of the world’s wealthiest men with a $28.7 billion fortune built partly through multi-billion dollar trades in currency markets, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.

“That probably creates some great opportunities for hedge funds but I’m no longer in that business,” he said. Soros, who was born in Hungary, said the war in eastern Ukraine between government forces and rebel militia supported by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin concerns him the most.

Without more external financial assistance the “new Ukraine” probably will gradually deteriorate and “become like the old Ukraine so that the oligarchs come back and assert their power,” he said. “That fight has actually started in the last week or so.”
Soros is no longer managing money himself but his family office, Soros Fund Management, is alive and well and I can guarantee you it's been shorting the euro aggressively. You can listen to his exclusive Bloomberg interview here (his thoughts on Ukraine and Russia scare me because he and U.S. politicians are playing a dangerous game).

Is Soros right? Could Greece go "down the drain"? It sure looks hopeless but let me take a step back here and offer some additional thoughts, ones that his hedge fund eminence, Soros, chooses to ignore (as he does with his myopic and antiquated views on Russia and the Ukraine).

Kimon Valaskakis, former ambassador of Canada to the OECD and now president of the New School of Athens Global Governance Group, published a comment on LinkedIn, Greece and Europe: The Real Choice Is Win-Win or Lose-Lose:
Greece and Europe are contemplating divorce. In the first of a two part series which I published on March 17 2015 in the World Post, the global division of the Huffington Post. I have argued that this would be a masochistic lose-lose outcome when alternative win-win solutions exist.

The present essay is an expanded version of the World Post article which can be found here. It's also permanently listed in my author archive: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kimon-valaskakis/

Following the recent Greek election where a new government was elected on an anti-austerity platform, an attempt to renegotiate the Greek Debt under the supervision of the so-called Troika (EU, Euro Zone and IMF) has, so far, been inconclusive. The final agreement (or non-agreement) will be decided upon in the next few months, although past experience has shown that most so-called ‘agreements’ tend to be quite temporary.

Behind this ambivalence and the protracted negotiations, what are the real choices ? How can we fly above the accountants quarrels to higher ground and see the whole forest ?

Many observers have presented the negotiations as a standard win-lose game. Either Europe ‘wins’ and Greece ‘loses’ or vice versa. In this post and its sequel I argue that the real choice is between ‘win-win’ for both or ‘lose-lose’. In developing my arguments I must acknowledge my intellectual debt to a colleague and friend John Evdokias, portfolio manager for his perceptive insights.
Argument 1 : The Debt Issue is Surprisingly Insignificant

The debt issue, blown out of proportion by professional alarmists, is actually relatively trivial for many reasons.

First the debt itself is small by global standards. 315 billion euros is high for you and me but small in the European and world economy. It can be managed.

What is much more problematic is Greece’s capacity to repay it quickly, given current conditions. The debt is 175% of GDP because the Greek Economy has contracted for the last 6 years due to imposed austerity. To ask for quick repayment is like asking an unemployed worker to immediately reimburse his mortgage. Not possible.

Second, since the debt is held not, thankfully, by the Mafia but by supposedly ‘friendly’ institutions including the European Central Bank and the IMF, what should be at issue are convivial repayment modalities, not the principle of repayment which has been accepted by both parties, These modalities involve (a) the date of maturity and (b) the rate of interest.

Concerning the date of maturity, it may surprise the reader to discover that long term loans (going to one hundred years) are increasing in popularity. At one point Disney Corporation obtained such a loan and as Evdokias pointed out “if a Mickey Mouse company can get such a loan, why not Greece”. Some countries allow 100 year mortgages and some companies issue 100 year bonds. What would have been unthinkable many years ago may become commonplace.

So, an extension of repayment of the Greek Debt would not be absurd perhaps to a hundred years but to a long enough time horizon.

As far as the rate of interest is concerned, as we all know, we live in a period of very low rates which are, in some cases, actually negative. What that means is that lenders are now paying to lend, an aberration a few years ago but now more and more frequent.

The reason behind both trends, longer repayment periods and lower interest rates is simple. Contrary to popular belief, the world is awash with capital both private and public (via money creation and quantitative easing). The challenge for investors is, now, not where to get the highest returns but where to park their money, especially when the capital they themselves invest is usually obtained at extremely low rates. When you lend other people’s money, as banks do, you expect less than when you invest your own.

Given the above, a Greece-Europe divorce based on disagreement on debt repayment would be ridiculous. That’s not how things should be settled between members of the same family.

As to future debt, the question of structural reform, (preventing further imprudent borrowing etc.) is valid and will be addressed in my second post. For now, the argument I am advancing is that past debt issues should not be the casus belli or the cause of the divorce.
Argument 2 : Greece’s Exit From The Eurozone Would Be Very Dangerous For Both Parties

The 19 country Eurozone with a common currency, the euro, is a work in progress. It was designed as a one way street leading towards more and better European integration.

In fact there is no clear mechanism to expel a delinquent member. In addition, consider that new members, joining the European Union, are now obligated to eventually join the Eurozone, although this does not apply to the original members.

If Greece leaves the Eurozone, it may have to leave the European Union itself.

The Eurozone was meant to be followed by some sort of fiscal union and ultimately a political union : the United States of Europe. This has not happened yet, because the economic problems of Europe, at large, since the Great Recession of 2008 have created many Euro skeptics.

A withdrawal from the Euro Zone and the adoption of a new national currency by Greece, may well offer short term benefits for that country since the new drachma will, most likely, be devalued vis-a-vis the euro thus making exports more competitive (and imports more expensive).

But how long will that benefit last ? The strategy of devaluation works if one country devalues and not others. In the 1930s Western countries, faced with depression and mass unemployment, resorted to competitive devaluations, which cancelled each other out. As a result everyone lost.

Furthermore, Grexit, as it is called, may not be an isolated phenomenon. If successful, other countries may be tempted to follow suit, including Spain, Italy and even France, if Marine Le Pen were to become the next French President .

Grexit could then be the first step to a break-up of the entire euro zone. It is very easy to destroy something and much more difficult to build it up. The negative momentum which this would entail, not immediately but over time, would be disastrous for the Old Continent and put the entire European Project in grave jeopardy.
Argument 3 : Beyond economics, serious geopolitical dangers lurk for both parties unless the issues are resolved.

If Greece is forced to stay in the Euro Zone under humiliating conditions this may not be the end of the matter. Right now the Syriza Government is the last bastion for left of center ‘respectable’ parties. If Syriza fails, then much more extreme and less ‘respectable’ parties from the far left and the far right, may be elected with ominous consequences.

Greece will then be vulnerable to serious social upheaval. Putin’s Russia may well seek an interesting new pied a terre in Greece, invoking the common link of orthodoxy. This will not please Western oriented Greeks. The upheaval, may, God forbid, lead to armed violence, including a potential civil war. It must not be forgotten that Greece went through a particularly bloody civil war, on class lines, after the end of World War II, where the extreme left opposed the extreme right. The scars are still there.

Not only would an unstable and weakened Greece be bad news for itself, it would also be very bad news for the entire European Union.

Beyond economics, Europe faces three additional threats. One comes from a newly aggressive Russia, as discussed above seeking to reverse the demise of the Soviet Union. A second one comes for the expansionist and disruptive ambitions of ISIS and radical jihadi terrorism. A third comes from the disaffected euro-skeptics, all over the Continent, some advocating a departure from the euro zone, others against the European Union itself and still others, promoting separatist movements designed to break up existing countries.

The balkanization of Europe would be bad, not only for this continent but for the world, because the European integration experiment which was started after the Second World War was initially seen as a model for better global integration. It could still serve as such a model, once it is restructured, perhaps even reinvented.

To give all this up for a mere question of debt, in a world drowning in unused capital would be to show unbelievable myopia and even masochism.

The Greece-Europe marriage can and must be saved. A reasonable accommodation is quite possible because of the win-win vs. lose-lose potential.

As self appointed ‘marriage counselor’ my recommendations for this accommodation will be found in a subsequent post.
I respect Kimon Valaskakis and John Evdokias and think they're absolutely right, in a world awash in debt and capital, there is no reason to kick Greece out of the eurozone based solely on its debt.

But as I've stated many times in my blog comments, Greece desperately needs major structural reforms. Amazingly, even during Greece's do-or-die moment, there has been no serious austerity whatsoever in the bloated Greek public sector. And by serious austerity, let me be crystal clear, they cut pensions and wages but they didn't cut any public sector jobs.

Importantly, this huge imbalance between the Greek public sector and private sector is the root of all evil in Greece and all political parties have maintained this farce because Greek politicians never dared to cut the hand that feeds them. Powerful public sector unions keep threatening to crush them if they ever dared cutting the Greek public sector beast down to size (keep in mind over 60% of the few jobs remaining in Greece are directly or indirectly related to the public sector, a staggering figure for a country of just 11 million population).

What Greece needs now is a Maggie Thatcher,someone with the courage to stand up to self-entitled Greek oligarchs, special interest groups and ever powerful public sector unions and crush them. This may sound like sheer right-wing lunacy but the reality is that unless Greece implements serious reforms to its grossly antiquated economy, the country will never grow properly and will always remain one step away from bankruptcy.

Of course, as my friend's father reminds me, in the history of Greece, Greeks haven't been kind to heroes like Eleftherios Venizelos, Ioannis Kapodistrias and many others who have tried to change the country for the better. "Greeks have a long, sordid history and the country won't change until they change their collective mentality and stop blaming others for their mistakes," he keeps telling me.

I'm afraid he's right which is why while it pains me to see the big fat Greek squeeze -- knowing full well that more austerity without proper growth initiatives will only exacerbate the euro deflation crisis -- but something has to be done to finally break the Greek public sector shackles and introduce proper reforms in an economy that desperately needs them.

But I warn Germany and other creditors, ramming more austerity onto Greece and other periphery economies without infrastructure growth projects will be a lose-lose proposition for the eurozone.

And it's not just the periphery economies that worry me. Marine Le Pen may not achieve her 'Frexit' referendum promise but she's absolutely right when she recently stated on Greek television that "as long as the government tells the Greek people they can remain in the eurozone while fighting against austerity, it will at worst be lying and at best wrong." 

In a weird twist of irony, the "economic and financial disaster" of Greece's ruling Syriza party has hit the chances of other populist parties gaining power in Europe, analysts told CNBC, after surprising shifts in voting in local elections in France and Spain this weekend. Perhaps this is why Le Pen wants Greece to exit the euro.

As far as Yanis Varoufakis, Greece's "rock star" finance minister, he wrote antoher comment on Project Syndicate, Deescalating Europe’s Politics of Resentment, where he states:
The fact is that Greece had no right to borrow from German – or any other European – taxpayers at a time when its public debt was unsustainable. Before Greece took any loans, it should have initiated debt restructuring and undergone a partial default on debt owed to its private-sector creditors. But this “radical” argument was largely ignored at the time.

Similarly, European citizens should have demanded that their governments refuse even to consider transferring private losses to them. But they failed to do so, and the transfer was effected soon after.

The result was the largest taxpayer-backed loan in history, provided on the condition that Greece pursue such strict austerity that its citizens have lost one-quarter of their incomes, making it impossible to repay private or public debts. The ensuing – and ongoing – humanitarian crisis has been tragic.

Five years after the first bailout was issued, Greece remains in crisis. Animosity among Europeans is at an all-time high, with Greeks and Germans, in particular, having descended to the point of moral grandstanding, mutual finger-pointing, and open antagonism.

This toxic blame game benefits only Europe’s enemies. It has to stop. Only then can Greece – with the support of its European partners, who share an interest in its economic recovery – focus on implementing effective reforms and growth-enhancing policies. This is essential to placing Greece, finally, in a position to repay its debts and fulfill its obligations to its citizens.

In practical terms, the February 20 Eurogroup agreement, which provided a four-month extension for loan repayments, offers an important opportunity for progress. As Greece’s leaders urged at an informal meeting in Brussels last week, it should be implemented immediately.

In the longer term, European leaders must work together to redesign the monetary union so that it supports shared prosperity, rather than fueling mutual resentment. This is a daunting task. But, with a strong sense of purpose, a united approach, and perhaps a positive gesture or two, it can be accomplished.
There is a lot of truth in what Varoufakis writes but as someone who has visited the epicenter of the euro crisis many times throughout my life, let me tell you, Greeks are perennial whiners and they never take responsibility for their economic failures.

But it's also high time that Germany and other creditors take responsibility for the euro deflation crisis which threatens to spread throughout the world. Something is fundamentally broken in the eurozone and all this endless political dithering is hardly inspiring confidence among nervous global investors and worse still, it's betraying an entire generation of young Europeans looking to work and start a family.

Also, I think my readers should read another comment on Project Syndicate by Yannos Papantoniou, Greece’s former Economy and Finance Minister, where he discusses Sustaining the Unsustainable, as well as a superb comment by Robert Skidelsky, Messed-Up Macro.

On this Greek Independence Day, let us all hope that Greece and the eurozone aren't embroiled in a lose-lose game. The Marine Le Pens and Nigel Farages of this world may want the dissolution of the eurozone but this is not in the best interest of Europeans or the global economy, which looks increasingly more fragile.

Below, Greece risks running out of cash by April 20 unless it secures fresh aid, a source familiar with the matter told Reuters on Tuesday, leaving it little time to convince skeptical creditors it is committed to economic reform.

Greece said it will present a package of reforms to its euro zone partners by next Monday in hope of unlocking aid to help it deal with a cash crunch and avoid default. See the Reuters clip below.

And professor Stephen Cohen, America's top Russian expert, says that he and other authorities have no input into US policy toward Russia. He says that there is no discourse, no debate, and that this is unprecedented in American foreign policy.

Cohen says that the "ongoing extraordinary irrational and nonfactual demonization of Putin" is an indication of "the possibility of premeditated war with Russia." Key points from Cohen's speech can be found here, and you can watch it below.

Keep his comments in mind as U.S. politicians voted on Monday to send lethal arms to Ukraine, dangerously escalating an already tense situation. That, Mr. Soros, is the real lose-lose game you're funding.


America's Pensions in Peril?

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John W. Schoen of CNBC reports, Funding shortfalls put pensions in peril:
These days, a pension just isn't what it used to be.

For generations, a defined benefit pension—a fixed monthly check for life—provided an ironclad promise of a secure income for millions of retired American workers. But today, that promise has been badly corroded by decades of underfunding that have undermined what was one of the cornerstones of the American dream.

The safety net that millions of retirees spent decades working toward has been fraying for some time. The Great Recession, and the market collapse that wiped out trillions of dollars of investment wealth, weakened the pension system further, though some of the damage has been repaired since the stock market rebounded and the economic recovery took hold.

Hundreds of billions of dollars in defined benefits are still paid out every year to retirees. State and local public pension benefit payments reached $242.9 billion in 2013, according to the most recent Annual Survey of Public Pensions. And a Towers Watson study of more than 400 major companies that sponsor U.S. defined benefit plans estimated they paid out nearly $97 billion in benefit payments last year, and another $8.6 billion went toward lump sum payments and annuities.

But that's nothing compared to the private employers' projected benefit obligations last year, which climbed 15 percent from the previous year to a whopping $1.75 trillion, while plan assets grew by only 3 percent.

Disparities like that help explain why so many pensions are in peril. Simply put: Obligations have outpaced fund contributions and growth for private and public plans. That means that even workers who have paid into pensions for several years may not get the level of benefits they expect. And many younger employees may never have an opportunity to participate in a pension at all.

The result is that, unlike past generations of Americans, many workers today bear the brunt of the investment risk that underpins their hopes of income security once they are no longer able to work.

In 1975, some 88 percent of private sector workers and 98 percent of state and local sector workers were covered by defined benefit plans, according to a 2007 report by the researchers at the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. By 2011, fewer than 1 in 5 private industry employees was covered by a pension that paid a guaranteed monthly check, according to the Labor Department.

That historic shift has been blamed by critics for an estimated deficit in retirement savings of more than $4 trillion for U.S. households where the breadwinner is between ages 25 and 64, according to Employee Benefits Research Institute.

"You have this hole in what private sector workers have for retirement. We're coming up on this place where all these people are not going to be able to retire," said Monique Morrissey, a researcher at the liberal Economic Policy Institute.

That shift away from a guaranteed pension check has been slower to take hold among public sector workers, where some 83 percent still have access to a pension that promises to pay monthly retirement income for life after a career of service. But that's changing.

Faced with rising health costs and retirees living longer than expected, many state and local governments are failing to keep up with the annual payments. A CNBC analysis of financial data for 150 state and local pension plans collected by Boston College's research center found that 91 had set aside less than 80 percent of the money needed to meet current and future obligations to retirees. Only six were fully funded.

One big reason: State and local governments aren't making the annual contributions required to fund those liabilities. Of the 150 plans tracked by the center, 47 paid less than 90 percent of what's needed to keep pension benefits funded and 79 paid more. (There was no data available for 24 of the 150 plans.)

"People appreciate services: They want cops and firefighters, they want teachers and all that stuff," said Morrissey. "But if you're a politician in a budget crunch, the one way to not raise taxes is to just not pay your pension bill. In the states and cities where there's a big problem, it's not because they underestimated cost. They simply didn't pay the bill."

In New Jersey, which has averaged less than half its required annual contributions for over a decade, a state judge last month ordered Gov. Chris Christie to make a court-ordered $1.6 billion payment into the state's public pension system after it was withheld from his proposed $34 billion state budget. Christie is appealing the ruling.

In New York, state lawmakers plan to defer more than $1 billion in required pension contributions over the next five years. In Illinois, the state's new Republican governor, Bruce Rauner, last month proposed more than $6 billion in spending cuts—more than a third of which would come from shifting government workers into pension plans with reduced benefits.

In Rhode Island, retirees are suing the state over a 2011 pension overhaul led by newly elected Democratic Gov. Gina Raimondo during her tenure as state treasurer. The reforms, which raised retirement ages and cut cost-of-living increases, were projected to save $4 billion over 20 years. (On Monday, the retirees accepted a proposed settlement that would reduce retirement benefits.)

With state and local politicians loathe to propose the tax increases needed to fund the shortfalls, many have overhauled their pensions systems instead by increasing the burden on public workers and retirees and cutting benefits.

"Nearly every state since 2009 enacted substantive reform to their retirement programs, including increased eligibility requirement, increased employee contributions or reduced benefits, including suspending or limiting (cost of living increases)," said Alex Brown, research manager at the National Association of State Retirement Administrators, a nonprofit association whose members are the directors of the nation's state, territorial, and largest statewide public retirement systems.

Those cuts range from about 1 percent for retirees in Massachusetts and Texas to as much as 20 percent in Pennsylvania and Alabama, according to a survey of state pension reforms last year by the association and the Center for State and Local Government Excellence.

For retirees like David Jolly, 90, that's mean getting by with a little less every year.

Jolly, who retired in 1986 as public works director for Island County, Wash., now lives with his wife on a combined monthly income of $1,888 from his state pension and Social Security. "Every time they try nibbling at it, it just makes it that much harder," he said. "They don't realize what the cost of living of older people is. ... It just keeps going up and the retirement pay just doesn't."

To close the pension funding gap, many state and local governments have also cut access to defined benefit pensions for new hires or increased contributions and minimum retirement age for active workers. "New employees can expect to work longer and save more to reach the benefit level of previously hired employees," according to a survey by the retirement administrators association.

While closing plans to new members may reduce benefit liabilities decades from now, it also cuts into the contributions from active workers to support retirees. For over a decade, the ratio of active workers to retirees has been falling, placing an added strain on the public pension system.

For workers and retirees in the private sector, where defined benefit plans are much less common, funding levels are generally in better shape.

Rising investment returns since the financial collapse of 2008 helped boost funding levels for private industry plans in 2013 to 88 percent of their liabilities, according to a survey of the latest available data by pension fund consultant Milliman. But that still left the 100 largest companies surveyed with a combined pension plan funding deficit of $193 billion.

The pension funding shortfall is even worse for a handful of so-called multi-employer pension plans, which typically cover smaller companies and unions and face a different set of financial challenges. Declining union enrollments, for example, mean there are fewer active workers to cover the cost benefits for retirees, many of whom are living longer than expected than when these plans were established.

Multi-employer plans also face the added burden of their pooled pension liabilities. When one member of the plan fails to keep up with contributions, for example, the burden on the other members increases.

About a quarter of the roughly 40 million workers who participate in a traditional "defined benefit" plan—those that pay retirees a guaranteed check every month—are covered by these multi-employer plans, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In the last four years, the Labor Department has notified workers in more than 600 of these plans that their plans are in "critical or endangered status."

Last year, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the government insurance fund for pension plans that go bust, reported that its program backing multi-employer plans was $5 billion in the red. It projected that unless Congress acted, there was about a 35 percent probability its assets would be exhausted by 2022 and about a 90 percent probability by 2032. (Single-employer pension plans are covered by a separate program that is on a much more solid financial footing.)

After funding shortfalls threatened the solvency of the governments' insurance backstop for multi-employer pension plans, Congress eased the rules allowing plan administrators to cut benefits last year. Proponents of the proposed pension guaranty corporation reforms argue that they will help prevent more multi-employer plans from going under and that retirees are better off with smaller monthly payments than none at all.

That's something beneficiaries of private and public pensions are hearing a lot these days.
As you can read above, America's private and public pensions aren't in good shape. There are a lot of reasons why this is the case and my fear is the worst is yet to come.

One thing I can tell you, the attack on U.S. public pensions continues unabated. Andrew Biggs, a resident scholar for the conservative American Enterprise Institute wrote a comment for the Wall Street Journal, Pension Reform Doesn’t Mean Higher Taxes:
The Pennsylvania State House held a hearing on Tuesday about reforms that would shore up the state’s public-employee pension program. The hearing was overdue. Annual required contributions to the state’s defined-benefit plan have soared to more than 20% of employee payroll from only 4% in 2008. Legislators in the state, like many elected officials nationwide, are looking for a way out.

State Rep. Warren Kampf has introduced a bill to shift newly hired government employees to defined-contribution pensions similar to a 401(k) plan. Defined-contribution pensions offer cost stability for employers, transparency for taxpayers and portability for public employees.

But the public-pension industry—government unions and the various financial and actuarial consultants employed by pension-plan managers—claims that “transition costs” make switching employees to defined-contribution pensions prohibitively expensive. Fear of “transition costs” has helped scuttle past reforms in Pennsylvania, as in other states. But the worry is unfounded.

The argument goes as follows: The Governmental Accounting Standards Board’s rules require that a pension plan closed to new hires pay off its unfunded liabilities more aggressively, causing a short-term increase in costs. Thus the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, known as Calpers, claimed in a 2011 report that closing the state’s defined-benefit plans would increase repayment costs by more than $500 million. Similar claims have been made by government analysts in Minnesota, Michigan and Nevada. The National Institute for Retirement Security, the self-styled research and education arm of the pension industry, claims that “accounting rules can require pension costs to accelerate in the wake of a freeze.”

But GASB standards don’t have the force of law; nearly 60% of plan sponsors failed to pay GASB’s supposedly required pension contributions last year. That includes Pennsylvania, where the public-school-employees plan last year received only 42% of its actuarially required contribution. GASB standards are for disclosure purposes and not intended to guide funding. New standards issued in 2014, GASB says, “mark a definitive separation of accounting and financial reporting from funding.”

In fact, nothing requires a closed pension plan to pay off its unfunded liabilities rapidly, and there’s no reason it should. Unfunded pension liabilities are debts of the government; employee contributions are not used to pay off these debts. Whether new hires are in a defined-contribution pension or the old defined-benefit plan, the size of the unfunded liability and the payer of that liability are the same.

More recently, pension-reform opponents have shifted to a different argument: Once a pension plan is closed to new hires, it must shift its investments toward much safer, more-liquid assets that carry lower returns. Actuarial consultants in Pennsylvania have claimed that such investment changes could add billions to the costs of pension reforms.

This argument doesn’t hold. It is standard practice for a pension to fund near-term liabilities with bonds and to pay for long-term liabilities mostly with stocks. A plan that is closed to new entrants stops accumulating long-term liabilities. As a result, the stock share of the plan’s portfolio will gradually decline. But that’s because the plan’s liabilities have been reduced. Plans would not be applying a lower investment return to the same liabilities. They would apply a lower investment return to smaller liabilities.

Many public pension plans apparently believe that a continuing, government-run pension can ignore market risk, while a plan that is closed to new entrants must be purer than Caesar’s wife. The reality is that all public plans, open and closed, should think more carefully about the risks they are taking. But the difference in investment returns between an open plan and a closed one should be a minor consideration for policy makers considering major pension reforms.

Shifting public employees to defined-contribution retirement plans won’t magically make unfunded liabilities go away. Pension liabilities must be paid, regardless of what plan new employees participate in. But defined-contribution plans, which cannot generate unfunded liabilities for the taxpayer, at least put public pensions on a more sustainable track.
The problem with this Wall Street Journal article is it's factually wrong. Jim Keohane, CEO of the Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP), sent me these comments:
I read the clip from the WSJ you included on your blog, and I thought you would be interested in a piece of research on the subject which was completed by Dr. Robert Brown (click here to view the paper). This is a fact based piece of research which looked at the cost of shifting from DB to DC. Proponents of a shift from DB to DC, such as this article, portray this as a win-win situation, but when Dr. Brown looked into the facts, what he found was that this is in fact a lose-lose situation. The liabilities in the existing plans are very long tailed and putting these plans into windup mode causes the costs and risks to go up, so there are no savings to taxpayers – in fact the costs go up, and the individuals are much worse off having been shifted to DC plans because they end up with much lower pensions.
When I read these articles in the Wall Street Journal, it makes my blood boil. Why? Am I a hopeless liberal who believes in big government? Actually, not at all, I'm probably more conservative than the resident "scholars" at the American Enterprise Institute (read my last comment on Greece's lose-lose game to understand the effects of a bloated public sector and how it destroys an economy).

But the problem with this article is that it spreads well-known myths on public pensions, and more importantly, it completely ignores the benefits of defined-benefit plans to the overall economy and long-term debt profile of the country. Worse still, Biggs chooses to ignore the brutal truth on defined-contribution plans as well as the 401(k) disaster plaguing the United States of Pension Poverty.

Importantly, pension policy in the United States has failed millions of Americans struggling to save enough money to retire in dignity and all these conservative think tanks are spreading dangerous myths telling us that DC plans "offer cost stability for employers, transparency for taxpayers and portability for public employees."

The only transparency DC plans offer is that they will ensure more pension poverty down the road,  less government revenue (because people with no retirement savings won't be buying as many goods and services), and higher social welfare costs to society due to higher health and mental illness costs.

And again, I want make something clear here, I'm not arguing for bolstering defined-benefit plans for all Americans from a conservative or liberal standpoint. Good pension policy is good economic policy. Period.

This is why I wrote a comment for the New York Times stating that U.S. public pensions need to adopt a Canadian governance model (less the outlandish pay we pay some of our senior public pension fund managers) in order to make sure they operate at arms-length from the government and have the best interests of all stakeholders in mind.

But the problem in the United States is that politicians keep kicking the can down the road, just like they did in Greece, and when a crisis hits, they all scramble to implement quick nonsensical policies, like shifting public and private employees into defined-contribution plans, which ensures more pension poverty and higher debt down the road.

Finally, while most Americans are struggling to retire in dignity, the top brass at America's largest corporations are quietly taking care of themselves with lavish pensions. Theo Francis and Andrew Ackerman of the Wall Street Journal report, Executive Pensions Are Swelling at Top Companies:
Top U.S. executives get paid a lot to do their jobs. Now many are also getting a big boost in what they will be paid after they stop working.

Executive pensions are swelling at such companies as General Electric Co., United Technologies Corp. and Coca-Cola Co. While a significant chunk of the increase is the result of arcane pension accounting around issues like low interest rates and longer lifespans, the rest reflects very real improvements in the executives’ retirement prospects.

Pension gains averaged 8% of total compensation for top executives at S&P 500 companies last year, up sharply from 3% the year before, according to data from LogixData, which analyzes SEC filings. But the gains are much larger for some executives, totaling more than $1 million each for 176 executives at 89 large companies that filed proxy statements through mid-March. For those executives, pension gains averaged 30% of total pay.

The gains often don’t represent new pay decisions by corporate boards. Instead, they reflect the sometimes dramatic growth in value of retirement promises made in the past. Nonetheless, they are creating an optics problem for companies at a time when executive-pay levels are under greater scrutiny from investors and the public. Companies now face regular shareholder votes on their pay practices that can be flash points for broader concerns, leaving them sensitive about appearing too generous.

New mortality tables released last fall by the American Society of Actuaries extended life expectancies by about two years. That, as well as low year-end interest rates, helped push pension gains higher than many companies had expected. The result is much higher current values for plans with terms like guaranteed annual payouts, which are no longer offered to most rank-and-file workers.

GE Chief Executive Jeff Immelt’s compensation rose 88% last year to $37.3 million. Meanwhile, excluding $18.4 million in pension gains, his pay actually fell slightly to $18.9 million.

The company says about half of the pension increase came from changes in its assumptions about interest rates and life span. About $8.8 million, however, comes from an increase of nearly $490,000 a year in the pension checks he stands to take home as his pay has risen and he approaches 60 years old, the age at which top GE executives can collect full pension benefits.

In all, Mr. Immelt’s pension is valued at about $4.8 million a year for life. The company puts its current value at about $70 million, up from around $52 million a year ago.

A GE spokesman said that much of the gain reflects accounting considerations and that Mr. Immelt’s recent salary increases reflect balanced-pay practices and board approval of his performance.

The SEC is particular about how companies report pay in their proxy statements. There is a standard table that breaks out salary, bonuses and pension gains, along with totals for the past three years, and other details. GE, encouraging investors to overlook the pension gains, added a final column to the table to show what top executives’ total pay would look like without them. The company says investors find the presentation useful in making proxy voting decisions.

Lockheed Martin is also asking investors to look past pension gains when considering its executives’ total pay.

At Lockheed Martin Corp., CEO Marillyn Hewson’s total pay rose 34% to $33.7 million last year, with $15.8 million of that stemming from pension gains. An extra column in the proxy statement’s compensation table strips out those gains, showing her pay up about 13% to $17.9 million.

Lockheed says that $5 million of the pension gains can be traced to changes in interest rates and mortality assumptions. Most or all of the remaining $10.8 million probably stems from increases in the payments she would receive in retirement: about $2.3 million a year now, up from about $1.6 million a year under last year’s proxy disclosure. Ms. Hewson’s pay rose sharply with her ascent to CEO in 2013 and chairman last year, increasing her pension benefit significantly.

Overall, the company’s obligation for future pension benefits for executives and other highly paid employees totaled $1.1 billion last year, up from $1 billion at the end of 2013.

A Lockheed Martin spokesman said the company broke out a nonpension compensation total in the proxy statement to provide more context for pay.

Executive pensions generally don’t consume the attention that pensions for the rank and file do. For years, as costs of traditional pension plans have risen amid low interest rates and longer lifespans, big companies have been closing them to new employees or even freezing benefits in place, often continuing with only a 401(k) plan for all but the oldest workers.

Last June, Lockheed Martin told its nonunion employees that it would stop reflecting salary increases in their pension benefits starting next year, and that the benefits would stop growing with additional years of work starting in 2020.

“It eliminates a lot of the variability that defined-benefit pension plans can create in our cost structure,” Chief Financial Officer Bruce Tanner told investors during a Dec. 3 conference presentation.

In 2011, GE stopped offering new employees traditional defined-benefit pensions and replaced them with 401(k) plans. At the time, Mr. Immelt cited recent market downturns and lower interest rates as being among the reasons for the shift.
In a cruel twist of irony, America's top CEOs are now enjoying much higher pension payouts while they cut defined-benefit plans to new employees and increase share buybacks to pad their insanely high compensation. I guess longer life spans are fine when it comes to CEOs' pensions but not when it comes to their employees' pensions.

Lastly, my comment on the 401(k) experiment generated a lot of comments on Seeking Alpha. Some people rightly noted that looking at 401(k) balances distorts the true savings because it doesn't take into account roll overs into Roth IRAs. When you factor in IRAs, savings are much higher.

While this is true, there is still no denying that Americans aren't saving enough for retirement and that 401(k)s are an abject failure as the de facto pension policy of America. It's high time Congress stops nuking pensions and starts thinking of bolstering and enhancing Social Security for all Americans, as well as implementing shared risk and serious governance reforms at public pensions.

Below, the pension terminator, Arnold Schwarzenegger, asks Warren Buffett his advice on how to handle unfunded liabilities of public pensions. Listen carefully to the Oracle of Omaha's reply, he understands the dire situation better than most people.

A Buyback or Biotech Bubble?

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Steven Davidoff Solomon, professor of law at the University of California, Berkeley, wrote a comment for the New York Times, General Motors’ Stock Buyback Follows a Worrying Trend:
General Motors' announcement that it will buy back $5 billion worth of stock raises the question of whether the stock buyback has turned into a shareholder activist shakedown.

G.M. did not open its coffers willingly. Harry J. Wilson, a former member of the auto industry crisis task force led by Steven Rattner, gave it a helping hand. A few weeks ago, Mr. Wilson announced a campaign to press G.M. to buy back $8 billion worth of stock, leading four hedge funds with a total stake of about 2 percent in the automaker. As part of this, Mr. Wilson was nominated to run for a board seat.

Because G.M. was bankrupt only a few years ago, it seems a bit foolhardy for the company to willingly part with billions of dollars of hard-earned cash. But in a world where stock buybacks and shareholder activism are all the rage, it makes perfect sense on paper, if not in reality.

As activist hedge funds take aim at companies left and right from their spreadsheet-laden war rooms in Manhattan’s glass towers, their expertise is financial engineering, not running companies. And so the activists love to argue for sales, split-ups, stock buybacks and other financial machinations. The idea is that a quick financial event is more likely to generate immediate returns than the harder and longer-term work of building value.

According to a report by the law firm Schulte Roth & Zabel, as recently as 2013, 13 percent of activist campaigns sought a cash return. The call to return cash is based on the fact that United States companies are extraordinarily profitable and are building cash mountains when interest rates are at record lows. With limited ability to earn decent returns, activists have pushed hard for companies to return the cash to shareholders.

Companies that want to return money to shareholders have a choice: They can pay a dividend or buy back shares. In the former case, the calculus is easy. Assuming that there are no big tax issues, a dividend is just a return of cash to shareholders. But buybacks do more by taking shares out of the market. A buyback does not create wealth; theoretically, the cash disappears with the shares. But it does increase earnings per share and usually lifts the stock price, giving the remaining shareholders a bigger piece of the upside.

Buybacks make sense if a company’s management thinks its shares are underpriced and thus thinks it is getting a bargain. The peril in any stock repurchase, of course, is that the company pays too much.

But when have executives ever thought their company’s stock was overpriced? So companies choose the buyback. According to a highly influential article criticizing buybacks in The Harvard Business Review by William Lazonick, 54 percent of earnings — $2.4 trillion — went to stock buybacks and 37 percent went to dividends for the 449 companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index that were publicly listed from 2003 to 2012. According to a Barclays report, stock buybacks totaled $535 billion for the year that ended September 2014.

But returning cash isn’t all that a buyback or even a dividend does. The core idea behind a share repurchase is that it will make the company more disciplined.

Think about a world where you can have all the doughnuts you want. You just might eat a few too many. If a company like G.M. has an extra $5 billion sitting around, the thinking goes, it might decide not to invest wisely in the business or make smart acquisitions but instead simply use the cash less efficiently, like paying higher executive salaries.

Mr. Wilson’s argument for a large stock buyback was based on this conceit. In an interview with CNBC, he said that in the auto industry, when “times are good, they overinvest and make bad acquisitions, they overspend.”

But buybacks can leave a company without needed cash. G.M. had many buybacks before the financial crisis, totaling $20.4 billion from 1986 to 2002. It certainly could have used the cash then. Mr. Wilson is aware of this issue and stated in the CNBC interview, “We have always agreed that the company should have enough cushion” but that it was “enormous.”

And there is always the risk of overpaying for shares, especially now. With zero-interest rates, the stock market is bound to be high, and buying now may not make sense. In fact, most buybacks these days tend to destroy value because of their inflated prices.

Other problems can arise with buybacks. Mr. Lazonick has argued that repurchases leave little for “productive investment” and should be banned. The Economist called them “corporate cocaine” and cautioned that some companies may be borrowing too much to pay for them. Companies may also end up using buybacks to manage expectations for earnings per share, especially when large numbers of stock options are outstanding.

Still, the noted valuation expert Aswath Damodaran asserts that much good could come from share buybacks and that banning or regulating buybacks falls “squarely in the feel-good but do-bad economic policy realm.”

The vibrant debate shows the pros and cons of share repurchases, but G.M. was apparently unswayed by the cons.

The automaker quickly capitulated to the $5 billion buyback, with Mr. Wilson agreeing to withdraw his candidacy for the board, despite disagreement from another large shareholder, Warren E. Buffett. In an interview with CNBC, he said, “I think the idea of trying to do something now that gets a little pop in the stock should not be on” G.M.’s agenda.

At the end of the day, G.M. decided it was better to retreat than to fight. The activists know that the companies are feeling defensive. Even though Mr. Wilson’s group owned just 2 percent of the company, a contest would have been difficult and expensive. The $5 billion turned out to be the cost of doing business. As Marketplace put it, “Please shut up and here’s some money.”

Going forward, G.M. will aim to keep $20 billion in cash on its balance sheet and return free cash flow beyond that to shareholders. It had built up about $25 billion in cash as its sales and profits rebounded after its 2009 government-led bankruptcy.

The G.M. episode may signal a turning point. In good times, it is easy to get too comfortable. Technology companies like Google and Microsoft are stockpiling foreign cash. Others are racing to buy back shares at high valuations. But the good times inevitably end, this time most likely led by the activist stampede.

The haste in which G.M. rushed to comply to Mr. Wilson’s demands, and they and other companies shed cash rather than fight, shows that the activist tide pushing the stock buyback may have gone too far. Let’s hope that it doesn’t wash out companies and shareholders.
The stock buyback bubble is something that receives little attention from the media but buybacks have soared to record levels, and by the way, it has little to do with the "activist tide" and everything to do with a compensation system run amok.

Yes folks, we can blame "evil" activist hedge fund managers but America's CEOs have never had it this good. Ultra low rates, cheap debt, record cash levels are allowing them to buy back shares at a record pace, artificially boosting their earnings-per-share and padding their disgustingly bloated compensation which also includes lavish pensions as they shed defined-benefit plans and jobs to cut costs and increase profits.

Forgive my sarcasm, but if this is the "golden era of capitalism," god help us all. And make no mistake, everyone is in on this buyback binge. I check out news articles on buybacks every day, and it shocks me to see how many big companies are buying back their shares. Yahoo(YHOO) justgotapprovalfromitsboardtobuybackanadditional$2 billion in company shares, andMerck's(MRK) boardjustapprovedawhopping$10 billion repurchase program.

And Apple's buyback activity may not be enough forCarl Icahn, but during the fourth quarter of 2014, it was good enough to top the S&P 500. According to a new analysis from financial research firm FactSet, Apple spent more in buybacks than any other S&P company— even as year-over-year buyback spending for the overall index declined:
FactSet reported that during the fourth quarter, aggregate share buybacks by S&P companies totaled $125.8 billion, down 4.4% compared to the same time in 2013 and down 13.5% over buybacks in the third quarter of 2014. Overall, 362 companies — 72% of the index — participated in buybacks during the final quarter of the year, a figure that is consistent with the average participation rate over the past five years.

On a company-by-company basis, Apple’s $6.1 billion in share repurchases during the quarter was the most of any company on the S&P. This figure marks a 20% increase year-over-year but a 64% drop quarter-over-quarter.

“In the previous quarter, Apple spent the second-largest dollar amount on share repurchases by an individual company in the S&P 500 since 2005 at $17 billion,” FactSet analyst John Butters wrote in the report Tuesday. “Over the past three quarters, Apple has spent $16.9 billion on share repurchases on average. As a result, on a trailing 12-month basis, Apple has now spent the highest amount on buybacks, $57 billion, of all the companies in the index.”

For perspective, that $57 billion spending total is four times higher than the next-highest total: the $13.4 billion IBM spent in buybacks over the same period. Behind Apple and IBM is Exxon, with its $13.2 billion in buybacks over the trailing twelve months, Intel, which spent $11 billion over the same period, and Wells Fargo with $9.1 billion.

While Apple did lead the index in overall spending during the fourth quarter, its $1 billion year-over-year increase in spending was not the largest in the index. Intel — whose $4 billion in buyback activity during the quarter was second only to Apple — increased its spending by $3.5 billion. Johnson & Johnson increased its buyback by $2.3 billion, while Wells Fargo and Yahoo both increased theirs by $1.9 billion.

But of course, since overall buyback activity did dip 4.4% year-over-year, more sectors decreased their buyback than increased it. Seven of the S&P’s 10 sectors recorded a decrease in share repurchases, with the 95.8% drop in telecomm buybacks the largest plunge of the pack.
To be sure, buybacks are no panacea and they have backfired on a few companies. Moreover, there is an increasing unease on how much of the extraordinary stock market gains since 2009 have been fueled by share buybacks. Institutional Investor just published a great article, Stock Buybacks Wrestle With an Aging Bull, which discusses the concerns companies should ponder before approving share repurchase programs.

But as Bloomberg notes, American companies are in love with themselves, and they're not afraid to show it by buying back their shares at a record pace:
Corporate America’s love affair with itself grows more passionate by the month.

Stock buybacks, which along with dividends eat up sums of money equal to almost all the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index’s earnings, vaulted to a record in February, with chief executive officers announcing $104.3 billion in planned repurchases. That’s the most since TrimTabs Investment Research began tracking the data in 1995 and almost twice the $55 billion bought a year earlier.

Even with 10-year Treasury yields holding below 2.1 percent, economic growth trailing forecasts and earnings estimates deteriorating, the stock market snapped back last month as companies announced an average of more than $5 billion in buybacks each day. That’s enough to cover about 2 percent of the value of shares traded on U.S. exchanges, data compiled by Bloomberg show.
No wonder big investors are openly worried and urging corporate titans to focus capital on the long term. Unfortunately, their warnings are falling on deaf ears and truth be told, many pensions are guilty of the same short-term behavior they're openly criticizing.

And while some claim that larger stock buybacks are a sign of increasing stock market efficiency, I agree with those who claim that buybacks are nothing more than a glorified accounting scheme to help boost corporate compensation spinning out of control.

The problem, of course, is that the share buyback bubble is an integral part of the rising stock market, dwarfing everything in the U.S. market. Just how important is buyback activity?  As Oliver Renick of Bloomberg reports, Buyback Blackout Leaves U.S. Stocks on Own Prior to Earnings:
U.S. stocks are entering part of the year when one of their biggest support systems is turned off.

Buybacks, which reached a monthly record in February and have surged so much they make up about 2 percent of daily volume, are customarily suspended during the five weeks before companies report quarterly results, according to Goldman Sachs Group Inc. With the busiest part of first-quarter earnings seasons beginning in April, the blackout is getting started now.

While the data isn’t conclusive, owning stocks during the five-week stretch when repurchases were curbed has generated a return that trails the market average over the past two years, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. That’s not surprising to Eric Schlanger of Barclays Plc, who says companies buying back shares have helped keep equities aloft.

“Blackout periods are on radar screens now because of valuations, the length of the bull market, and the consensus that buybacks have been a major part of the bull market,” Schlanger, head of equities for the Americas at Barclays, said by phone. “With the S&P up around 2,100, people are going to be more attuned to possible fractures or previous areas of support changing than they were at 1,400.”

Companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 have spent more than $2 trillion on their own stock since 2009, underpinning an equity rally in which the index has more than tripled. They spent a sum equal to 95 percent of their earnings on repurchases and dividends in 2014, data compiled by S&P and Bloomberg show.
How can individual investors play this buyback bubble? It turns out there is an ETF, PowerShares Buyback Achievers ETF (PKW), which assembles companies buying back their shares. You can view the top ten holdings and chart of this ETF below:

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But if you ask me, you are better off investing in biotech ETFs (IBB and XBI) and stocks I recommended in my Outlook 2015 at the beginning of the year (read a comment in Seeking Alpha, A Bold Call For Biotech ETFs).

Importantly, I want you all to ignore the talking heads on CNBC and elsewhere warning you of a biotech bubble, and keep using any selloff in this sector to add to your positions just like I did last year during the big unwind and just as I did this week. Keep buying the major dips on biotech.

Here is just a small sample of over 200 biotech stocks I'm tracking (click on image):


Some of the smaller biotechs got whacked hard this past week. As I've repeatedly warned you, if you can't stomach huge swings of 20%, 30% or more either way, it's best to avoid the smaller biotech companies and just focus on the ETFs (IBB and XBI) or just buy shares of the big biotech giants like Biogen (BIIB), Celgene (CELG), Gilead (GILD) and others which make up the top ten holdings of the iShares Nasdaq Biotechnology (IBB).

As someone who suffers from Multiple Sclerosis, Biogen remains one of my favorite biotech companies.  It's an incredible company discovering amazing drugs for patients suffering from neurological diseases, including Alzheimer's disease, where there's nothing really good available.

One thing is for sure, all this talk of a biotech bubble about to burst is absolute rubbish spread by ignorant fools or big hedge funds and mutual funds that are looking to get in on the action. As far as I'm concerned, there is no biotech bubble and investors ignoring this sector will severely underperform their peers in the next few years (you read that right, never mind what Zero Edge claims).

But the buyback bubble does concern me in a market where Nobel laureate Michael Spence rightly notes, equities are overvalued. Of course, as Keynes reminded us a long time ago, "markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent," so I'm comfortable playing this buyback bubble and especially comfortable playing the secular bull market in biotech shares which I foresaw back in 2008 in my comment, The Age of Biotech.

Once more, I remind my readers to support my blog by clicking on the ads and more importantly, by donating any amount via PayPal on the top right-hand side. Institutional investors can donate or subscribe via PayPal using one of the three options provided to them. Please take the time to support this blog, I work extremely hard to provide you with the very best insights on pensions and investments and appreciate your financial support.

Below, an older clip from the Harvard Business Review discussing profits without prosperity. Take the time to watch this clip and you'll understand why American companies are in love with themselves.

And one of my favorite portfolio managers, LMM Chairman and CIO Bill Miller, shares his market forecast, and view of the biotech and homebuilder sectors. Miller says we're in a long lasting bull market, and he really likes Pandora's (P) stock as well as Intrexon (XON), which remains one his largest biotech holdings.

Listen carefully to Bill Miller, he knows what he's talking about, which is more than I can say for most skeptics who are going to get crushed avoiding stocks and the red hot biotech sector.
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